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Abstract
The importance of history to Victorian culture, and to nineteenth-century Europe more generally, is readily
apprehended not only from its historiography, but also from its philosophy, art, literature, science, politics,
and public institutions. This dissertation argues that the discourse of aesthetics in Victorian Britain
constitutes a major area of historical thinking that, in contrast to the scientific and philosophical
historicisms that dominated nineteenth-century European intellectual culture, focuses on individual
experience. Its starting point is Walter Pater’s claim that we are born “clothed in a vesture of the
past”—that is, that our relation to ourselves is historical and that our relation to history is aesthetic.
Through readings of aesthetic theory and art criticism, along with works of historiography, fiction, poetry,
and visual art, this dissertation explores some of the ways in which Victorian aesthetics addresses the
problem of the relationship between the sensuous representation and experience of the historical, on the
one hand, and the subjects of such representation and experience, on the other. Through these readings,
aesthetic modes of historical relation such as memory, revival, contrast, haunting, collection, and
displacement are addressed as modes of subjectivation. The dissertation considers a wide range of more
and less canonical texts by John Ruskin, George Eliot, Walter Pater, John Addington Symonds, William
Morris, Oscar Wilde, Aubrey Beardsley, and Marcus Clarke. While the dissertation focuses on texts written
in England, it takes a transnational approach, situating these texts in the broader contexts of the European
intellectual discourses with which they engage and of British imperialism, which is addressed in the
dissertation’s coda through texts created in colonial Australia. By highlighting the role of the aesthetic in
the formation of subjectivity as historical, this dissertation revises the image of nineteenth-century
aesthetics as either ahistorical, formulating the pleasures of a timeless subject, or, conversely,
deterministic, finding in art merely a reflection of larger historical processes. Instead, aesthetics emerges
here as a discourse for the problematization of the historicity of subjectivity.
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ABSTRACT

VESTURES OF THE PAST:
THE OTHER HISTORICISMS OF VICTORIAN AESTHETICS
Timothy Chandler
Emily Steinlight

The importance of history to Victorian culture, and to nineteenth-century Europe more
generally, is readily apprehended not only from its historiography, but also from its
philosophy, art, literature, science, politics, and public institutions. This dissertation
argues that the discourse of aesthetics in Victorian Britain constitutes a major area of
historical thinking that, in contrast to the scientific and philosophical historicisms that
dominated nineteenth-century European intellectual culture, focuses on individual
experience. Its starting point is Walter Pater’s claim that we are born “clothed in a vesture
of the past”—that is, that our relation to ourselves is historical and that our relation to
history is aesthetic. Through readings of aesthetic theory and art criticism, along with
works of historiography, fiction, poetry, and visual art, this dissertation explores some of
the ways in which Victorian aesthetics addresses the problem of the relationship between
the sensuous representation and experience of the historical, on the one hand, and the
subjects of such representation and experience, on the other. Through these readings,
aesthetic modes of historical relation such as memory, revival, contrast, haunting,
collection, and displacement are addressed as modes of subjectivation. The dissertation
iv

considers a wide range of more and less canonical texts by John Ruskin, George Eliot,
Walter Pater, John Addington Symonds, William Morris, Oscar Wilde, Aubrey
Beardsley, and Marcus Clarke. While the dissertation focuses on texts written in England,
it takes a transnational approach, situating these texts in the broader contexts of the
European intellectual discourses with which they engage and of British imperialism,
which is addressed in the dissertation’s coda through texts created in colonial Australia.
By highlighting the role of the aesthetic in the formation of subjectivity as historical, this
dissertation revises the image of nineteenth-century aesthetics as either ahistorical,
formulating the pleasures of a timeless subject, or, conversely, deterministic, finding in
art merely a reflection of larger historical processes. Instead, aesthetics emerges here as a
discourse for the problematization of the historicity of subjectivity.
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Preface
For in truth we come into the world, each one of us, not in nakedness, but
by the natural course of organic development clothed far more completely
than even Pythagoras supposed in a vesture of the past, nay, fatally
shrouded, it might seem, in those laws or tricks of heredity which we
mistake for our volitions; in the language which is more than one half of
our thoughts; in the moral and mental habits, the customs, the literature,
the very houses, which we did not make for ourselves.
— Walter Pater1
A talent for History may be said to be born with us, as our chief
inheritance. In a certain sense all men are historians.
— Thomas Carlyle2
The one duty we owe to history is to rewrite it.
— Oscar Wilde3

Do we make history, or does it make us? There is, of course, no easy answer to this
question. Asking it, however, gets us thinking about a problem at the heart of the historical consciousness by which we define our modernity: the relationship between history as
the meaningful representation of temporality and the individuals who are its subjects. The
present dissertation treats explorations of this problem in Victorian aesthetic discourse,
1

Pater, Plato and Platonism, 72.
Carlyle, “On History,” in Historical Essays, 3.
3
Wilde, “The Critic as Artist,” W4:147.
x
2

including literature and art as well as criticism and theory. In contrast to the philosophical
and scientific historicisms that dominated nineteenth-century European intellectual
culture, aesthetics centers the individual subject of historical consciousness, allowing it to
articulate the nature of its historicity in its own terms. Hence “other historicisms.”
Alluding to the “other Victorians” of Steven Marcus’s classic study of Victorian pornography, as well as to Michel Foucault’s ironic citation of Marcus in The Will to
Knowledge, the “other historicisms” in this dissertation’s subtitle points to a diversity of
positions regarding historical consciousness within the context of a larger cultural discourse whose main tenets they problematize.
The three epigraphs that open this Preface illustrate some of the ways in which
history was thought by Victorian writers through the aesthetic. Despite the different
positions taken, they all mark the historicity of subjectivity and establish the domain of
history in favor of a subjective rather than objective perspective. Their juxtaposition thus
tells a story about the relationship between aesthetics, historiography, and self-formation
that is central to this dissertation: that we are born already historical also means that we
are born historians, with the power to give form to our lives, however “fatally” determined by the past. While Pater appears the most deterministic in this set, the metaphor of
vesture in the quotation from his Plato and Platonism—the metaphor that I have chosen
as the title of this dissertation—formulates historicity in aesthetic terms. For Pater,
clothing figures the already aesthetic relationship to history into which we are born. A
history that is both natural and social, material and ideal, it is that which gives shape to
individuality. The metaphor of clothing reminds us that the aesthetic not only marks
xi

social determinations such as gender and class, but that it is also a mode of self-formation
and expression. In the nineteenth century, fashion became newly conscious of its historicity, a fact that finds one of its most remarkable articulations in Carlyle’s novel Sartor
Resartus (1836), in which sensible phenomena are figured as the clothing of the ideal: “It
is written the Heavens and the Earth shall fade away like a Vesture; which indeed they
are: the Time-vesture of the Eternal. Whatsoever sensibly exists, whatsoever represents
Spirit to Spirit, is properly a Clothing.”4 Later in the century, in Wilde’s The Picture of
Dorian Gray (1891), clothing and textiles are among the historical curios that Dorian
collects, not only because they are exquisite artistic objects, but also because their
materiality, unlike Dorian’s ageless visage, marks and is marked by time (W3:283–86).
That we are “clothed […] in a vesture of the past” accordingly means that the historical is
aesthetically mediated and that identity—in both its determinate and volitional nature—is
aesthetic: sensuous, formative, relational, and critical.
In the Introduction that follows, I situate my readings of Victorian texts in the
context of nineteenth-century historiography and philosophy of history; I also spell out
there the currents in contemporary scholarship with which this dissertation is in conversation and the critics and theorists who have influenced my thinking. My purpose in this
Preface is to introduce the topic along with the shape and stakes of the argument, as it
were, from a high altitude. My central claim does not pertain to a historical development
within aesthetic discourse over the six decades of the Victorian period but rather to the
capacity of aesthetics to think historical processes and relations in non-linear, nondevelopmental ways. This seems important to me for what it reveals about the character4

Carlyle, Sartor Resartus, 56.
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istics and contradictions of the Victorian episteme as we come to know it through our
studies of the period. It is now a familiar argument that scientific forms of knowledge
(including scientific history), with their aim of a view from nowhere, and the philosophy
of history, with its sublimation of violence into narratives of progress, have often been
complicit in the history of imperialism, and that this complicity is conditioned by the
universalization of a particular subject position. The impulse of aesthetics to detail the
mechanics of subjective experience challenges this dispensation by restoring history to
the individual and by problematizing the relationship between the individual and the
collective. The succeeding chapters will demonstrate some of the ways in which Victorian writers and artists achieved this. Although I think this work is important—precisely
because it problematizes an intellectual position that over the course of the century
became increasingly naturalized—I do not mean to argue that the regulative ideal of
objectivity is always oppressive and moreover wants only a transfer of power to the
individual subject in order for the complex political problems of historical consciousness
in its European tradition to be resolved. On the contrary, at several points in this dissertation, it will become apparent that the aesthetic subjectivization of the historical reinscribes many of the same political problems associated with the dominant forms of
historicism, and, furthermore, often fails to escape those historically associated with the
discourse of aesthetics. We will see this most clearly in the Coda, which looks at how
Victorian aesthetics addresses the problem of history in the context of settler colonialism.
Is this work, then, of merely “historical” interest? I hope not. Foucault’s citation
of Steven Marcus in the first chapter of The Will to Knowledge invites his readers to
xiii

consider their own relationships to the Victorian period: “We ‘Other Victorians.’” For
The History of Sexuality, this means asking why we project the sexual repression that we
proclaim so loudly back onto the nineteenth century (if, that is, we still do so, forty-three
years after Foucault first claimed as much). In the spirit of the genealogical method, one
of my hopes in presenting this dissertation is to bring attention to the power historicism
continues to have over our thinking by examining some of its moments of crisis in the
nineteenth century, some of which might feel familiar, others of which imagine a time
radically different from the one in which we find ourselves. For many of the writers
discussed here, the engagement with history is deeply personal. So, the French historian
Jules Michelet, whom we will encounter in Chapter Two, repeatedly identifies himself
with his text: “Ce livre est plus qu’un livre; c’est moi-même.”5 Indeed, writing this
dissertation has at times felt like a strange form of autobiography: it might be coincidental that it begins with a text published in the year of my birth (Foucault’s L’Usage des
plaisirs) and ends with one written over a century earlier in the country of my birth
(Marcus Clarke’s preface to Adam Lindsay Gordon’s Sea Spray and Smoke Drift)—but
coincidences are not insignificant. It is strange narratives like this, narratives in which
connections across time and space become the materials of an overdetermined yet selfconsciously articulated identity, that the authors treated in the present work give so much
effort to thinking through, and whose emergence the study of the past makes possible.

5

Michelet, Le Peuple, 3.
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Introduction
“We Are All Historicists Today”1

1.
In the introduction to the second volume of The History of Sexuality, The Use of Pleasure, Michel Foucault includes the following footnote:
I am neither a Hellenist nor a Latinist. But it seemed to me that if I gave
enough care, patience, modesty, and attention to the task, it would be
possible to gain sufficient familiarity with the ancient Greek and Roman
texts; that is, a familiarity that would allow me—in keeping with a
practice that is doubtless fundamental to Western philosophy—to examine
both the difference that keeps us at a remove from a way of thinking in
which we recognize the origin of our own, and the proximity that remains
in spite of that distance which we never cease to explore.2
Here Foucault puts two historical moments—Greco-Roman antiquity and European
modernity—into a relationship of close distance. For all that they share, they remain alien
to one another; yet, these two moments separated in time establish each other’s historicity. They are, respectively, each other’s antiquity and modernity, and, as such, will
always, so long as each depends upon the other for its concept, recognize themselves in
each other, in spite of their otherness. The personification here is not merely rhetorical:
Foucault first indicates the close distance through his own desires with respect to the
1
2

Beiser, German Historicist Tradition, 26.
Foucault, Use of Pleasure, 7.
1

historical materials; he will add later that he was motivated by curiosity. He seeks a
“familiarity” in spite of his belatedness, and it is this relation—in both its proximity and
its distance—that he undertakes to explore. Foucault’s surprising claim for Western
philosophy’s fundamental concern—measuring this close distance—emphasizes the
correlation between the personal and the historiographical. This correlation becomes
especially evident when we discover, firstly, that philosophy is here conceived as “ascesis,” glossed as “an exercise of oneself in the activity of thought”; and, secondly, when
Foucault presents the aim of The History of Sexuality as a work of philosophy so understood: “to learn to what extent the effort to think one’s own history can free thought from
what it silently thinks, and so enable it to think differently.”3 “Philosophy” is constituted
as work carried out, in a relation of close distance, on two objects simultaneously: the
past and the self. The introduction to The Use of Pleasure thus presents genealogical
historiography as what Foucault would call a “mode of subjectivation”: a practice of selfformation.
As striking as Foucault’s genealogical definition of philosophy may seem, it
addresses a problem at the heart of modern epistemology: What is the relationship
between history and subjectivity? This problem is one of the most important and enduring for Foucault as both a philosopher and a historian. In an oft-cited passage from The
Archaeology of Knowledge (1969), Foucault makes explicit what is at stake in the writing
of history:
3

Ibid., 9. In ancient Greek, ἄσκησις signifies an “exercise” or “practice,” and was used
especially in relation to athletes; however, in a broader sense, it can also mean a “mode of
life.” Its Latinization as ascesis has a long history of use in Christian theology, where it
denotes practices of self-discipline with the goal of moral perfection. On Foucault’s use
of the term, see McGushin, Foucault’s Askēsis.
2

Continuous history is the indispensable correlative of the founding
function of the subject: the guarantee that everything that has eluded him
may be restored to him; the certainty that time will disperse nothing
without restoring it in a reconstituted unity; the promise that one day the
subject—in the form of historical consciousness—will once again be able
to appropriate, to bring back under his sway, all those things that are kept
at a distance by difference, and find in them what might be called his
abode. Making historical analysis the discourse of the continuous and
making human consciousness the original subject of all historical
development and all action are the two sides of the same system of
thought.4
In this earlier moment in his career, as a historian of epistemic transformation, Foucault is
engaged in a critique of progressive historiographies and philosophies of history. His
problem is not that they misrepresent the past but rather that they posit a subject identified with history. Teleology, the search for origins, historical constants, and metahistorical narrative—all are rejected as the correlatives of a unified historical subject. That the
problem is not subjectivity as such but rather a subjectivity predicated on totality and
identity becomes especially clear in the programmatic essay “Nietzsche, Genealogy,
History” (1971), with its well-known remarks in favor of “effective” history: “History
becomes ‘effective’ to the degree that it introduces discontinuity into our very being […]
‘Effective’ history deprives the self of the reassuring stability of life and nature.”5 In The
History of Sexuality, then, the turn to modes of subjectivation represents an attempt to
transvalue modern Western subjectivity by inviting comparison with its premodern forms
and thereby disrupting identification, while, at the same time, acknowledging the ineluctability of a tradition that prompts “curiosity,” the desire for “familiarity,” and an ethic of
4

Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge, 12.
Foucault, The Foucault Reader, 88. See also the interview “An Aesthetics of Existence”
in Foucault Live, 450–54.
3
5

“care, patience, modesty, and attention.”6 Close distance. So it is that the introduction to
The Use of Pleasure imagines philosophy—“the effort to think one’s own history”7—as
the formation of the self as historical, but in opposition to the dominant forms of historical thinking of the past two and a half centuries of European philosophy and science.
This dissertation is also concerned with the relationship between historical
knowledge and subjectivity, and, in particular, with modes of establishing this relation
other than those afforded by the dominant historiographical and philosophical discourses
of the nineteenth century. While most of the texts discussed in the following chapters
were composed in Victorian Britain, their authors are responding to a broader shift in
European intellectual culture towards more historical ways of thinking about humanity
and the world, a shift that had its beginnings in the eighteenth century but which became
so foundational in the nineteenth, even as it diversified, that the latter has often been
called the age of history.8 The primary outcomes of this shift are often summed up under
the name historicism, which has been used to denote a range of intellectual and aesthetic
positions.9 At its broadest, historicism can describe almost any historically conscious
discourse or sustained orientation towards the past. Its dominant epistemological forms,
both in the nineteenth century and today, are generally characterized by their progressive,
or, at least, supersessory, models of time, and by the centrality they give to historicity as a
6

On Foucault’s archival ethics, see Huffer, Mad for Foucault.
Foucault, Use of Pleasure, 9.
8
Influential accounts of this shift can be found in Collingwood, The Idea of History;
Foucault, The Order of Things; Meinecke, Die Entstehung des Historismus; and
Koselleck, Futures Past.
9
This deceptive polysemy is regularly attested in definitions of the term (e.g., Lozek,
“Historismus”; Raulet, “Historisme”; Scholtz, “Historismus, Historizismus”; Thornhill,
“Historicism”).
4
7

measure of truth, that is, to historical accuracy in representation and to historical context
in interpretation and explanation. As Frederick Beiser points out, intellectual history has
had to grapple with two main currents of historicism that are historically contemporaneous but conceptually incompatible: a philosophical discourse that aims “to determine the
general laws of history” and a scientific-historiographical one that attempts “to know the
unique and singular events and personalities of history.”10 Despite this conceptual tension, however, in the nineteenth century, these two historicisms—philosophical historicism and scientific historicism—regularly occur together.11 Indeed, both tendencies may
be seen in the work of J. G. Herder,12 who is regularly cited as one of the key early
theorists of historicity, and who influenced both philosophers of history such as G. W. F.
Hegel and scientific historians such as Leopold von Ranke. The complicity of these two
forms of historicism is such that, rather than separate them out prescriptively, as Beiser
does, Hans-Georg Gadamer presents the contradiction of empiricism and idealism
internal to historicism as one of its key aporias.13 One reason for the happy coexistence of
these two forms of historicism in many nineteenth-century writers is, I suggest, epistemological: both of them situate historical truth outside the individual subject, that is, as the
determination of social or environmental conditions.14

10

Beiser, German Historicist Tradition, 1–2. In intellectual history, Beiser associates the
first sense with Karl Popper’s The Poverty of Historicism and the second with Friedrich
Meinecke’s Die Entstehung des Historismus.
11
In Chapter Two, we will witness their proximity in the work of John Addington
Symonds.
12
For example, in Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit (1784–1791).
13
Gadamer, Truth and Method, 222.
14
That this is a ruse that ends up consolidating the position of the subject of historical
knowledge Foucault makes all too clear.
5

The “other historicisms” of this dissertation, by contrast, grapple with the problems resulting from scientific historicism’s objectifying mission and philosophical
historicism’s models of progressive time—some of them, in explicit opposition to these
dominant discourses. They are not embarrassed by the subjective nature of historical truth
but rather explore ways in which knowledge of the past, in a variety of forms, conditions
modern subjectivity and techniques of self-formation, and they do so, in most cases,
without falling back on what Foucault calls “continuous history.” One of the reasons they
can do this, I contend, is because the authors treated here are mostly not historians or
philosophers in the usual sense. Instead, their concerns are self-consciously and primarily
aesthetic. The genres they employ—including art criticism and aesthetic theory, the
realist novel, speculative fiction, dramatic monologue—afford representations that
generate meaning in excess of that over which scientific and philosophical historicism
claim jurisdiction. While the enormous influence on Victorian intellectual culture of the
two major forms of nineteenth-century historicism—what I call here philosophical and
scientific historicism—cannot be denied, this dissertation shows that the effects of these
discourses included forms of historical consciousness that were in many ways incompatible with those demanded by a strict adherence to dogmatic interpretations of the likes of
Hegel or Ranke. Accordingly, this dissertation makes the case for aesthetic discourse as
an alternative form of historiography in Victorian Britain that explores the fraught
relationship between history and subjectivity, consciously centering and problematizing
the subject of historical knowledge, at the same time as conventional historiography is
increasingly concerned with effecting its disappearance. This turn to aesthetics leads to
6

the recognition that art is not merely interested in the past as potential subject matter but
can also be read as generating forms of historical consciousness—that is, of relating self
and society to past, present, and future—and that it does so on its own terms. More than
this, however, my argument for Victorian aesthetics as a way of problematizing the
historicity of subjectivity challenges two more general, but by no means unwarranted,
understandings of aesthetics as, at least until recent decades, either an ahistorical discourse concerned with the formulation of universal laws regarding such dubious categories as taste, genius, beauty, and harmony, or a deterministic one, finding in art merely a
reflection of a larger historical narrative. Rather than a historicization of Victorian
aesthetics, then, what I provide here is an analysis of it as meta-historiographical theory,
a discourse of “other historicisms” concerned (in the fullest affective sense of the word)
with the nature of modern subjectivity as simultaneously historical and aesthetic.
This dissertation is in dialogue with recent discussions in Victorian studies about
the methodological status of historicism. Just as Victorian authors were consciously
engaged in working out the nature of historical epistemology, so literary scholars in
recent years have given attention to the legacies of nineteenth-century historicism in their
discipline. The appearance in 2015 of the Manifesto of the V21 Collective revived a
debate about the use of historicism in literary studies, and in Victorian studies, specifically, that has ebbed and flowed in the humanities since the rise of theory in the 1970s.15
According to the authors of the Manifesto, the discipline is dominated by a methodology
they call “positivist historicism”: “a mode of inquiry that aims to do little more than
15

In addition to the Manifesto, see the V21 Forum on Strategic Presentism, edited by
Coombs and Coriale.
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exhaustively describe, preserve, and display the past,” and characterized by “a fetishization of the archival; an aspiration to definitively map the DNA of the period; an attempt
to reconstruct the past wie es eigentlich gewesen; an endless accumulation of mere
information.”16 Despite its polemical language, the Manifesto does not, as far as I understand it, reject historicism tout court, but rather an approach to literary studies that merely
presents material instead of interpreting it, a position with which I am firmly in agreement. In this regard, the V21 Collective shares common ground with slightly earlier
defenses of historicism that responded to developments in literary studies in the early
twenty-first century, such as surface and distant reading, which many deemed problematically depoliticizing.17 For these critics, historicism is a form of political critique rather
than an apolitical antiquarianism, a fact that attests to the slipperiness of the term in
current academic discourse. In calling for a “strategic presentism,” however, the V21
Collective goes beyond both historicism (whether political or antiquarian) and the new
methods critiqued in its name. As the Manifesto points out, our world is still, in many
respects, that of the Victorians, and so our engagement with the period will be motivated
by our concern for the present: “A survey of the Victorian period is a survey of empire,
war, and ecological destruction. Insofar as the world we inhabit bears the traces of the
nineteenth century, these traces are to be found not only in serial multiplot narrative, but

16
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in income inequality, global warming, and neoliberalism.”18 The V21 Collective’s
Manifesto thus brings attention to the complex ways in which past and present are
mutually determined in our attempts to know them, an epistemological claim that this
dissertation explores through examples from Victorian aesthetics.
My own interest in the nineteenth century was initially motivated by a longstanding sense, first articulated for me by Walter Benjamin’s Arcades Project, that we live
today amidst that century’s rubble. While this decidedly modernist image says much
more about twentieth-century relations to the past than nineteenth-century ones, it remains valuable to me for its suggestion that every historical moment has its own historicisms and, moreover, for its insight into the aesthetic dimension to all historical
experience.19 While Benjamin and Foucault remain key influences, my thinking about the
relationship between past and present, as both a general theoretical concern and in the
specific context of Victorian aesthetics, has also been informed by recent work on queer
temporality, such as that of Carolyn Dinshaw, Carla Freccero, Elizabeth Freeman, and
Heather Love.20 These scholars have argued for non-linear models of time in queer
cultural studies and historiography, whose archives are especially submerged and fragmentary, and provided theorizations of the affective relations with the past characteristic
of queer subjectivity as a form of historical subjectivity. Moreover, and unlike Benjamin
or Foucault, they are concerned with the possibility of transtemporal community, an
18
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aspect of historical relation that was of great importance to many of the Victorian writers
treated here, in particular George Eliot and William Morris. Freeman’s work, for example, “track[s] the ways that nonsequential forms of time […] can also fold subjects into
structures of belonging and duration that may be invisible to the historicist eye.”21 In
Getting Medieval, Dinshaw examines the creation of transtemporal communities through
partial connections across time: “using ideas of the past, creating relations with the past,
touching in this way the past in our efforts to build selves and communities now and into
the future.”22 Bringing psychoanalysis and deconstruction to bear on these discussions,
Freccero describes the affective legacy of trauma that characterizes queer relationships to
the past as haunting, but an affirmative haunting that is open to the future. Love, finally,
examines cases where the past appears to refuse attempts, such as Dinshaw’s, to make
connections with it. The present study shares with such work an interest in models of
temporality that are neither linear nor progressive and an understanding of modern
subjectivity as an affectively ambivalent condition determined by its attempts to create
collective and individual relationships with the past. Accordingly, my question here is not
so much the classic epistemological one—Can we know the past?—as an aesthetic one:
What are the imaginative modes of historicization by which we understand ourselves in
relation to the past?
As one of the major genres of scientific historicism, the dissertation invites, if not
requires, the historical contextualization of its materials; in this case, the historical
context includes historicism itself. Accordingly, in the next section, I present a basic
21
22
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outline of the main currents in nineteenth-century historicism, philosophical and scientific, in Europe generally and Britain specifically, as the background against which its
more ambivalent or subversive forms can take shape in the succeeding chapters. This will
be a necessarily partial sketch of a vast and complex field, but I will endeavor to keep in
sight the primary problem of the relationship between historical knowledge and subjectivity, and to anchor these in the Victorian context. If the result is a picture in broad
strokes that focuses on a small set of hypercanonical authors, then this is because my aim
is not to present an exhaustive overview and original reading of the major figures of
historicism, who are in every case the subjects of massive bibliographies and ongoing
debate, but rather to provide by way of specific examples a general sense of the historicist
episteme that has dominated European intellectual culture over the last two centuries, and
to do so, moreover, without falling back on clichés about Victorian scientism.23 The third
section of the Introduction will turn to the discourse of aesthetics, which gathers together
the generically diverse texts considered in the dissertation and which, I argue, affords
forms of historical knowledge and self-formation different from those associated with
conventional philosophy and historiography. The fourth section provides an overview of
the chapters—which treat the work of John Ruskin, George Eliot, William Morris, Walter
Pater, John Addington Symonds, Oscar Wilde, and Aubrey Beardsley—and the Coda,
which, in turning to a text written by Marcus Clarke in colonial Australia, places the
arguments of this dissertation in the larger context of British imperialism and discusses
some of the problems thereby raised for Victorian aesthetics.
23
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2.
In the infamous conclusion to his collection of essays on the Renaissance, the Victorian
art critic, classicist, and novelist Walter Pater provides a philosophically eclectic meditation on the nature and meaning of historical knowledge in which he warns his readers
against “acquiescing in a facile orthodoxy, of Comte, or of Hegel.”24 At the time of
writing (the text was first published in 1868), Pater’s warning was by no means unwarranted: Auguste Comte and G. W. F. Hegel were then arguably the most influential
modern philosophers in Europe and their systematic thought seemed, as many of their
Victorian readers perceived, particularly susceptible to dogmatic adherence. While the
positivism of the one, with its natural laws, and the idealism of the other, with its metaphysical principles, are usually taken to be opposed, as philosophical historicism, their
work shares a common aim, in the words of F. A. Hayek: “to construct a universal history
of all mankind, understood as a scheme of the necessary development of humanity
according to recognisable laws.”25 Not everyone would agree with Hayek, who, like Karl
Popper, identified the results of such systems in the totalitarianisms of the twentieth
century.26 Even so, while both Comte and Hegel found their warmest reception in Victorian Britain among political liberals, it was no doubt the search for historical laws that
attracted many Victorian readers, including Pater, to these philosophers. While their
British reception begins in the 1820s, it was the 1840s that saw the first serious engagements in print, including two popular surveys of modern philosophy published in 1846, J.
D. Morell’s An Historical and Critical Review of the Speculative Philosophy of Europe in
24
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the Nineteenth Century and the final volume of George Henry Lewes’s A Biographical
History of Philosophy, both of which include summaries of Comte and Hegel that make
clear the historical quality of their philosophies. Later, more systematic presentations,
such as Lewes’s Comte’s Philosophy of the Sciences (1853) and James Hutchison Stirling’s The Secret of Hegel (1865), accordingly gave substance to a more or less direct
engagement already well underway.
To take an interest in Comte and Hegel in the nineteenth century often meant
picking sides (Morell chooses Hegel; Lewes, Comte), and the trajectories of their Victorian reception result in two very different stories. Comtean positivism made its greatest
impact on mid-Victorian liberal circles that included writers such as Lewes, John Stuart
Mill, George Eliot, Harriet Martineau, Herbert Spencer, and Henry Thomas Buckle.27 Yet
growing, widespread skepticism towards Comte’s Religion of Humanity, shared eventually by even once-enthusiastic advocates such as Lewes, meant that his ideas never
achieved the success in Britain that they did, for example, in France or Brazil. However,
with influential figures as unalike as Mill and John Ruskin rejecting both philosophers,
the reception of Hegel was no less controversial than that of Comte. Arguably, the
greatest effects of Hegel’s work in Victorian Britain are indirect, occurring in the contentious reception of German biblical criticism in the century’s middle decades, whose
signal event was the publication in 1846 of George Eliot’s translation of David Strauss’s
Das Leben Jesu, and, later in the century, in the development of British Marxism, espe27

Wright’s excellent The Religion of Humanity remains the only general survey of
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cially in the writing and activism of William Morris and E. Belfort Bax. Yet the direct
influence is also clear, not only in the widely read work of writers such as Lewes and
Pater, but also, in the final quarter of the century, in the Hegelianism that dominated the
philosophical scene in Britain, especially at Oxford, and at a time when British Comteans
were mostly relegated to the fringes of intellectual culture.28 While the new analytic
philosophy displaced Hegelianism in Anglophone universities early in the next century,
at around the same time, Comtean positivism experienced a worldwide collapse from
which it never recovered. Since then, there has been no reappraisal of Comte’s philosophy comparable to that which Hegel’s has enjoyed in the decades since the Second World
War. Comte has yet to find an Alexandre Kojève or Charles Taylor, nor has his work had
anything like the broad reengagement in the humanities that in Hegel’s case includes
Hayden White’s Metahistory (1973), Jürgen Habermas’s The Philosophical Discourse of
Modernity (1985), Judith Butler’s Subjects of Desire (1987), Francis Fukuyama’s The
End of History (1992), Susan Buck-Morss’s Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History (2009),
Rebecca Comay’s Mourning Sickness (2011), and Slavoj Žižek’s Less than Nothing
(2013).29 While this means that scholarship has probably overstated the importance of
28
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Hegel relative to Comte for late-Victorian writers such as Pater, John Addington Symonds, and Oscar Wilde,30 it also means that, of the two philosophers, it is Hegel, I
suggest, whose thought can better frame for us a general picture of Victorian thinking
about the nature of historical knowledge.
To many Victorians, post-Kantian German Idealism—that is, the philosophy of J.
G. Fichte, F. W. J. Schelling, and Hegel—appeared in the first instance an abstruse
metaphysics ponderously turning about abstract notions of subjectivity and objectivity.
Wilkie Collins’s sensation novel The Moonstone (1868) is surely one of the most unlikely
places to register the influence of such philosophy in Victorian England, but there we
have it:
“This question has two sides,” he said. “An Objective side, and a
Subjective side. Which are we to take?”
He had had a German education as well as a French. One of the
two had been in undisturbed possession of him (as I supposed) up to this
time. And now (as well as I could make out) the other was taking its place.
It is one of my rules in life, never to notice what I don’t understand. I
steered a middle course between the Objective side and the Subjective
side. In plain English I stared hard, and said nothing.31
The cosmopolitan Franklin Blake’s subsequent determination of “Subjective-Objective”
and “Objective-Subjective” views leaves the commonsensical Gabriel Betteredge flummoxed (and, more importantly, sheds no light on the case of the missing diamond). While
by both philosophers and intellectual historians. Scharff’s Comte after Positivism
attempts to rescue Comte’s philosophy of science from Mill’s critique of it.
30
For example, while Wilde’s familiarity with Hegel is obvious in his criticism (see
Smith and Helfand, Oscar Wilde’s Oxford Notebooks), Haley’s compelling case in
“Wilde’s ‘Decadence’ and the Positivist Tradition” for the influence of Comte on Wilde
is not registered in Guy’s edition of the criticism for the Complete Works.
31
Collins, The Moonstone, 46.
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such terminology was inherited by modern philosophy from medieval scholasticism,
Collins’s association of it with contemporary German philosophy was neither unusual nor
unwarranted.32 It was in no small part thanks to Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s presentation
of Schelling in his Biographia Literaria (1817) that the terminology gained wider currency in Britain; Coleridge even takes credit for the modern reintroduction of the words.33
Moreover, it was precisely the problem of Kantian subject–object dualism that, the
history of philosophy tells us, the German Idealists set out to solve. Hegel himself
distinguishes the philosophies of Fichte and Schelling from each other and from his own
through the question of the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity.34 Hegel’s
self-serving narrative, though no longer accepted by scholars, has exercised a powerful
hold on the history of philosophy.35 It structures Morell’s impressive account of “The
German School” in An Historical and Critical Review, as well as Lewes’s much less
32
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sympathetic one in A Biographical History of Philosophy.36 In reproducing this narrative,
however, the British writers recognize the great importance given to the problem in
German Idealism, especially as it came to be canonized after Hegel’s death in 1831.
Morell’s account, however, also makes clear that Hegel’s theory of knowledge as the
internal development of the subject–object relation describes, like Comte’s classification
of the sciences, a progressive development in the history of human societies. For Hegel,
the question of the nature of the relation between the subject and object of knowledge is
not a question apart from that about the nature of history.
Despite Collins’s clichés about German philosophy, then, there was a sense
among Victorian intellectuals that the import of such philosophy was to be found in its
historical character. In Hegel’s case, this meant a theory of history as the development of
spirit (Geist)—self-conscious (i.e., human) life—towards the full realization of its
freedom. Hegel first presented this philosophy in The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807)
and it guides all his subsequent work. However, it is perhaps encountered most often by
non-philosophers, today as in the Victorian era, in two posthumously published sets of
lectures, the Lectures on the Philosophy of Art, on which both Lewes and Pater wrote,
and the Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, which in 1857 became one of the
first of Hegel’s texts to be translated into English.37 The lectures, which were collated by
36
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Hegel’s students after his death, have a complicated textual history, but they nevertheless
remain useful entry-points to the system.38 The Lectures on the Philosophy of World
History are remembered for their three-part, geographical division of history understood
as the rational progress of spirit towards self-conscious freedom within the ethical totality
of the state.39 This may be quickly outlined. To begin with, in the Oriental world, only
one person, the despot, is free because humanity has not yet attained consciousness of its
intrinsic freedom. Such consciousness arises among the Greeks and Romans but is only
partially realized, such that only some in these societies are free, and their freedom
depends upon slavery. In Christian Europe, finally, humanity attains consciousness of its
intrinsic freedom, which is realized as a universal principle in the modern (Protestant)
nation-state, such that all are free. Only in this last stage are subjectivity (the individual)
and universality (the state) united. In Hegel’s geographical distribution of the historical,
Africa, notoriously, lies entirely outside history. The Lectures on the Philosophy of Art
provide a similar three-part division of history into epochs corresponding to the Orient,
the Mediterranean, and Germanic Europe.40 In symbolic art, which is represented by
architecture, spirit strives for but is unable to attain ideal meaning beyond sensuous form.
With classical art, represented by Greek sculpture, the ideal, understood here as the ideal
38
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beauty of the human figure, is attained because spirit is now capable of adequating the
material of art to the ideal; form and content are thus in harmony. Finally, with romantic
art, represented by modern lyric poetry, spirit transcends the sensuous and the ideal by
turning inward and representing itself to itself. The history of art, like world history more
generally, thus narrates the progress of spirit or humanity towards realization of its
intrinsic freedom, represented as a process of individual subjectification.41 A parallel to
this narrative occurs, moreover, in the final moment of the master–slave dialectic in the
Phenomenology, famously read by Jean Hyppolite as a Bildungsroman.42 Here, the unity
of subject and object is demonstrated by the slave’s attainment of self-consciousness of
his freedom through his labor, by which he comes to realize that he has created the world
around him, in which he sees himself reflected.43 This is not the place to go further into
the theory of subjectivity outlined in the early sections of the Phenomenology; nevertheless, these few moments suffice to show, I hope, that Hegel’s philosophy of history—
whether considered, as here, from the perspective of world history or aesthetics—tells the
same story as his more strictly metaphysical and epistemological philosophy that aims to
show the unity of subject and object, namely, the progressive development of selfconsciousness and freedom. Because of Hegel’s holism, this path is just as much that of
the individual as the collective, even if the former always depends absolutely on the
latter. This correlation between individual and universal history is exactly that which
Foucault writes against.
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However, Foucault is just as critical of those forms of historicism that accumulate
empirical data with the aim of objective reconstruction. If the name of Hegel can serve as
shorthand for philosophical historicism, then that of Leopold von Ranke, Hegel’s younger colleague at the University of Berlin, just as often stands for scientific historicism.44
This representative usage may be found as early as the two authors’ invectives against
each other: for example, in Hegel’s dismissal of “reflective” history as the mere accumulation of facts without any attempt to grasp the whole, which he associates with Ranke,
and in Ranke’s objection to the Hegelian a priori deduction of a historical law of progress
that cares nothing for individual lives.45 Even if, as Beiser demonstrates, Hegel and
Ranke misread each other to the extent that they only engage with strawmen and, in the
process, fail to see some key similarities between their ideas about history, the terms of
the debate—universality and particularity—are illustrative of the tensions animating
nineteenth-century historicism.46 While the image of Ranke as a naive realist has been the
subject of revision, his practice and advocacy of a scientific method of historiography
remains central to appraisals of his work and its influence.47 This method, founded on
archival research and the critical examination of sources, rejects the moral lessons of
pragmatic history and the speculative metanarratives of the philosophy of history, proposing instead the careful reconstruction of the past. Yet even a cursory reading of Ranke’s
44
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work reveals that his valorization of objectivity and particularity has more than the
accumulation of facts for their own sake as its end. Ranke’s understanding of the historian’s task is most explicit in the prefaces to his major works.48 On the one hand, these
invariably emphasize the importance of archival work and, moreover, give us the famous
quotes about Ranke’s desire to “extinguish” himself and to represent the past “as it
actually happened,” all of which, to be sure, endorse the objectifying aims of a scientific
historiography.49 On the other hand, the prefaces also consistently locate the importance
of particular histories—whether it be France during the Reformation, the English Civil
War, or the early-modern Papal States—in their relation to “universal” (i.e., European)
history and so, by implication, in their contribution to modern Europe’s selfunderstanding. “The history of humanity,” he writes, “becomes manifest in the nations
themselves.”50
While Ranke’s work did not encounter the extremes of repulsion and enthusiasm
that generally characterized Hegel’s British reception, his histories were widely read,
with all of them being translated into English during his lifetime. Moreover, the methods
of scientific historicism that he promulgated (even if he did not invent them) were given
careful consideration, ultimately shaping the direction of historiography in Britain,
though not without resistance.51 As many have noted, the nineteenth century saw the
48
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gradual transformation of historiography from a belletristic practice largely independent
of the universities into a professionalized academic science.52 Mike Goode, for example,
situates Ranke’s British reception in the context of a shift from Romantic historiography,
in which emotion was considered an appropriate element of historical narrative, to
scientific historiography, whose proponents made a doctrine of Ranke’s desire for
impartiality.53 In the 1840s and 1850s, when this shift was still in its early stages, the two
most prominent historians in Britain were Thomas Carlyle, who began his career as a
translator, novelist, and social critic, and Thomas Babington Macaulay, who became a
household name after the publication of poems he wrote while serving in the colonial
government of India. Despite occupying opposed political positions, Macaulay and
Carlyle both understand historiography as a literary and moral discourse. For Carlyle,
reactionary and pessimistic, the past satisfies a need for heroic figures that the present
cannot provide. For Macaulay, the archetypal Whig historian, the history of England is a
drama proving the inevitability and goodness of constitutional monarchy and liberal
democracy.54 Both were highly rhetorical writers who relied on published documents,
histories, and memoirs rather than archival material and who took the meaning of the past
than four times between 1840 and 1846, and reviewed by Thackeray and Macaulay), see
Bahners, “A Place among the English Classics.”
52
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for the present to be its most important meaning. While Carlyle was an influential figure
among Victorian intellectuals, his work never achieved the enormous popularity of
Macaulay’s History of England (1848–1861), whose five volumes sold 267,000 copies by
1863.55 Nevertheless, beginning in the 1860s, a new generation of historians—most
notably, William Stubbs, J. R. Seeley, Edward A. Freeman, and John Dalberg-Acton
(Lord Acton)—began to take Ranke’s methods seriously, even as they continued to write
histories invested in the ideology of national progress. By the end of the century, scientific historicism dominated academic history just as philosophical historicism dominated
academic philosophy, not only in Britain but across Europe. In 1903, in his inaugural
lecture as Regius Professor of History at Cambridge (a position that in the 1860s had
been held by the novelist Charles Kingsley), the Rankean J. B. Bury tersely concludes
that history is “simply a science, no more and no less.”56
In his presentation of scientific historiography, Bury also notes the “strange and
fortunate coincidence” that the rise of historicism in nineteenth-century Germany occurred at the same time as the development of German national consciousness.57 This is a
connection that has been made many times since.58 While Ranke is notable for his
eclectic and cosmopolitan interests, it is also the case that, as a historian of early modernity, he understood Europe as a collection of nations with their own specificity. Notwithstanding such cosmopolitanism, national histories written by members of the nation in
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question became the dominant form of historiography in nineteenth-century Europe.59
This is certainly the case in England.60 After Macaulay’s successful history, the landmarks of Victorian historiography include the Comtean H. T. Buckle’s History of Civilization in England (1857–1861), the Carlylean J. A. Froude’s History of England (1856–
1870), the Whig histories of Stubbs (Constitutional History of England, 1874–1878),
Freeman (The History of the Norman Conquest of England, 1867–1879), and Seeley (The
Expansion of England, 1883), and the radical J. R. Green’s Short History of England
(1874). Reviewing the first volume of Ranke’s History of England (1859), the utilitarian
philosopher Henry Sidgwick suggests that the very nature of English history as it is
conceived—namely, as political continuity—makes its impartial representation by an
English historian unlikely and, accordingly, the contribution of a suitably qualified
“cosmopolitan” German such as Ranke welcome.61 Yet the British Rankeans whose
English histories would be published in the 1870s took impartiality as an iron law, and so
saw themselves as distinct from the histories that they wrote. A quick look at the opera
magna of Macaulay and Stubbs (perhaps the most preeminent of Ranke’s British advocates) will demonstrate the enormity of the change effected by scientific historicism, even
as the parameters of progressive, continuous history remain firm.
Here is the opening paragraph of Macaulay’s History of England:

59

Berger, “The Invention of European National Traditions.” See also the individual
essays in Part II: Historical Scholarship and National Traditions of The Oxford History of
Historical Writing, vol. 4, edited by Macintyre et al.
60
Bentley, “Shape and Pattern in British Historical Writing”; however, for a longer view
of British historians’ engagements with Continental Europe, see Evans, Cosmopolitan
Islanders.
61
Sidgwick, “Ranke’s History of England,” 85–86.
24

I purpose to write the history of England from the accession of King
James the Second down to a time which is within the memory of men still
living. I shall recount the errors which, in a few months, alienated a loyal
gentry and priesthood from the House of Stuart. I shall trace the course of
that revolution which terminated the long struggle between our sovereigns
and their parliaments, and bound up together the rights of the people and
the title of the reigning dynasty. I shall relate how the new settlement was,
during many troubled years, successfully defended against foreign and
domestic enemies; how, under that settlement, the authority of law and the
security of property were found to be compatible with a liberty of
discussion and of individual action never before known; how, from the
auspicious union of order and freedom, sprang a prosperity of which the
annals of human affairs had furnished no example; how our country, from
a state of ignominious vassalage, rapidly rose to the place of umpire
among European powers; how her opulence and her martial glory grew
together; how, by wise and resolute good faith, was gradually established
a public credit fruitful of marvels which to the statesmen of any former
age would have seemed incredible; how a gigantic commerce gave birth to
a maritime power, compared with which every other maritime power,
ancient or modern, sinks into insignificance; how Scotland, after ages of
enmity, was at length united to England, not merely by legal bonds, but by
indissoluble ties of interest and affection; how, in America, the British
colonies rapidly became far mightier and wealthier than the realms which
Cortes and Pizarro had added to the dominions of Charles the Fifth; how
in Asia, British adventurers founded an empire not less splendid and more
durable than that of Alexander.62
The breathless superlatives and escalating anaphoras of Macaulay’s purple chauvinism
may read as bathos today, but for the author and his many contemporary readers such
rhetoric provided a fitting vehicle for communicating a vision of historical grandeur in
which all are invited to participate.63 The immediately established strong authorial voice
not only makes a promise to its readership (I shall, I shall, I shall) but quickly makes
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itself identical with that readership through the first-person plural: “our sovereigns,” “our
country.” By invoking “the memory of men still living,” Macaulay moreover establishes
history as an aspect of lived experience rather than scholarly research.64 Compare the
preface to Stubbs’s Constitutional History:
The History of Institutions cannot be mastered,—can scarcely by
approached,—without an effort. It affords little of the romantic incident or
of the picturesque grouping which constituted the charm of History in
general, and holds out small temptation to the mind that requires to be
tempted to study of the Truth. But is has a deep value and an abiding
interest to those who have courage to work upon it. It presents, in every
branch, a regularly developed series of causes and consequences, and
abounds in examples of that continuity of life, the realization of which is
necessary to give the reader a personal hold on the past and a right
judgment of the present. For the roots of the present lie deep in the past,
and nothing in the past is dead to the man who would learn how the
present comes to be what it is. It is true Constitutional History has a point
of view, an insight, and a language of its own; it reads the exploits and
characters of men by a different light from that shed by the false glare of
arms, and interprets positions and facts in words that are voiceless to those
who have only listened to the trumpet of fame. The world’s heroes are no
heroes to it, and it has an equitable consideration to give to many whom
the verdict of ignorant posterity and the condemning sentence of events
have consigned to the obscurity of reproach.65
If it is excitement and romance that are sought, the reader is advised to look elsewhere.
The hard work of Truth makes no accommodations for those accustomed to the sweeteners of the old school. In distancing his text from “the charm of History in general,”
Stubbs’s defensive opening also refuses the collective identification of Macaulay’s firstperson plural. Yes, Stubbs asserts continuity; however, this appears no longer in the
collective experience of a living history, but rather through the patient work of “the man
64
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who would learn.” Strangest of all, Stubbs alienates even himself from the text, ascribing
authorial perspective to the academic discipline of Constitutional History. This disciplinary personification continues throughout the three volumes. While Macaulay’s swashbuckling entry makes clear that his is a boys-own history of England, Stubbs’s dry
statements on the acquisition of historical knowledge go even further in restricting
historiography’s franchise. One consequence of the simultaneous professionalization and
nationalization of English history was the exclusion not only of non-scientific methods
and modes of presentation, such as we find in Macaulay and Carlyle, but also of perspectives and topics other than those which told the story of a great nation: “When history
took root in nineteenth-century universities, it was built on a dismissal of so-called
amateur history associated particularly with women writers, and it celebrated both
masculine conquest in the archives and manly dispassion in historical writing.”66 This
brings us, finally, to the central problem of scientific historicism for this dissertation: its
goal of extinguishing the subject.
“Do not imagine you are listening to me; it is history itself that speaks.”67 Acton
quotes this memorable sentence from the nineteenth-century French historian Fustel de
Coulanges. It captures, for him, one of the most important tenets of scientific historiography, which he attributes to his “own master” Ranke—the regulative ideal of objectivity.68 Despite the epistemic centrality of objectivity in the late-nineteenth century,
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however, it did not go without challenge.69 While it went largely unnoticed when first
published in 1874, Friedrich Nietzsche’s essay On the Use and Disadvantages of History
for Life is now recognized as an important critique of nineteenth-century historicism,
both scientific and philosophical. For Nietzsche, the problem with such approaches to
history is that they subordinate life to knowledge. We moderns are “walking encyclopaedias” alienated from the past as a result of knowing too much about it.70 Rather than
taking the objectivity esteemed by contemporary historians as a scientific view from
nowhere, Nietzsche identifies it with its opposite: “These naive historians call the assessment of the opinions and deeds of the past according to the everyday standards of the
present moment ‘objectivity’: it is here they discover the canon of all truth; their task is to
adapt the past to contemporary triviality.”71 Seeing themselves as coming at the end of
history, these historians imagine that they have transcended it, when, in fact, they simply
cannot see beyond their present moment. So-called objectivity turns out to be a subjectivity blind to itself. When Acton writes that “a historian is seen at his best when he does not
appear,”72 he exemplifies Nietzsche’s problem with scientific history precisely. Rather
than simply know facts about the past, Nietzsche’s history “for life,” by contrast, inspires
action, fosters care and contentment, and allows for judgment and transformation.73 It is a
way of relating to the past that, rather than aim for the extinguishing or disappearance of
the subject, actively engages in the formation of that subject. Foucault, for whom Nie69
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tzsche’s essay was a major influence, imagines a similarly anti-scientific historiography
in the introduction to The Use of Pleasure with which we began: “to learn to what extent
the effort to think one’s own history can free thought from what it silently thinks, and so
enable it to think differently.”74 In a similar spirit, this dissertation brings attention to a
particular area of Victorian cultural discourse—aesthetics—and argues that it provided
Victorian writers and artists with a context in which to explore historical meaning, not for
history itself, as scientific historicism proposes, but rather as providing the materials from
which the self, as the situated subject of historical knowledge, is produced.

3.
In the nineteenth century, the professionalization of history and its discourse of objectivity did not entail a reduction in the modes of historical relation or the forms of historical
representation. Notwithstanding Nietzsche’s critique, this should not be a controversial
statement. In addition to historiography (whether popular or academic) and the philosophy of history, the century was also one in which artistic forms such as the historical
novel, historical opera, and historical painting gained in popularity, and, moreover, one in
which national museums and monuments proliferated, and collective acts of commemoration were established.75 Scholars of European Romanticism have demonstrated that the
historicism long acknowledged as characteristic of the period found expression across a
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range of cultural forms.76 Two of these forms lay claim to particularly strong associations
with Romanticism: the public museum and the historical novel. While both have their
roots in earlier periods and, moreover, were prominent components of the cultural sphere
throughout the nineteenth century (and, indeed, remain so today), the association stands
to reason. In the case of the former, the few decades following the French Revolution
witnessed the creation of the modern museum as we know it, with the opening of the
Louvre in 1793, the precursor to the Rijksmuseum in 1800, the Prado in 1819, the National Gallery in 1824, the Prussian Königliches Museum in 1830, and, most importantly
in our context, the transformation of the British Museum (opened 1759) from a library
and cabinet of curiosities into a museum of antiquities, a process that culminated in the
acquisition of the Elgin Marbles in 1816.77 The transition from private (noble or royal)
collection to public (national) museum that occurred during the period came with a major
aesthetic shift, from the admiration of complete works of classical statuary, in many cases
creatively restored and arranged for aesthetic effect, to the appreciation of isolated and
increasingly historicized fragments.78 That the establishment of these new museums
76
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required wrenching works of art out of their historical life-worlds—as Byron wrote of the
Elgin Marbles, “And snatch’d thy shrinking Gods to northern climes abhorr’d”—was an
irony lamented from the start, preempting Nietzsche’s more general critique of historicism later in the century.79 As “a place of all times that is itself outside of time,”80 the
museum provides the archetypal aesthetic form of historicism as described in the previous section: torn between the scientific presentation of particular contexts and the grand
narrative of civilizational progression, apprehended from a position of timelessness.81
Much like the public museum, the historical novel became a prominent part of the
cultural sphere during the Romantic period and remained a major literary form for the
remainder of the nineteenth century. In the well-known Marxist-Hegelian account of
Georg Lukács, the properly historical novel arises in the early nineteenth century as a
result of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, when world-historical events
appear to be happening in quick succession, such that history becomes a mass experience
for all of Europe; it is only at this moment, according to Lukács, that a novel such as
Walter Scott’s Waverley (1814), in which the individuality of characters is historically
derived, becomes possible.82 While few would now accept Lukács’s argument in its
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entirety,83 the historical novel, understood as a hybrid genre of history and romance, and
the work of Scott in particular, has become an important field for the exploration of the
relationship between fiction and non-fiction, and between aesthetics and historical
consciousness.84 Like the museum, it is one of historicism’s most important aesthetic
forms, presenting in imaginative literature the experience of historicity.
Despite this importance, my aim in this dissertation is to look beyond these more
obvious examples. Their absence from this dissertation—if not entirely, then at least as
theoretical objects—is justified by the fact that, in comparison to the cultural forms
considered here, the public museum and the historical novel are understood to have a
closer and more veridical relationship to the experience of historicity, even if they fall
short of the standards of scientific and philosophical historicism (for Lukács, the historical novel is the example par excellence of historical consciousness in literary form).85
The authors whose texts are considered in the following chapters explore alternative
forms of historical consciousness, relation, and representation to those usually associated
with these two canonical forms and the philosophical and scientific historicisms described above. Even authors like Ruskin and Eliot, whose investments in the dominant
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modes of historicism seem obvious, theorize historicity and representation in terms that
are incompatible, at least in the texts treated here, with those same dominant modes. A
further point that unites the generically diverse texts gathered in this dissertation is the
fact that all of the authors treated, with the exception of Beardsley, published texts that
explicitly theorize artistic representation and aesthetic experience. Aesthetics is, accordingly, the super-generic concept organizing the texts of this dissertation.
The attempt of scientific historicism to dispossess the subject—both individually
and collectively—of historiography is at the same time an attempt to remove historiography from the domain of aesthetics.86 Aesthetics, however, cannot do without a subject.
Whether in its historical meanings as the critique of taste or the philosophy of fine art, or
according to one recent, broad definition of it, as “critical reflection on art, culture, and
nature,”87 the modern European tradition of aesthetics has always been concerned with
explaining the experience of an individual embodied subject in relation to a community.
In this regard, aesthetics retains an important element from its origins in Enlightenment
philosophy—the Earl of Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson, Alexander Baumgarten, David
Hume, Edmund Burke, Immanuel Kant—that finds its canonical articulation in Kant’s
definition of a judgment of taste as a subjective judgment with universal validity, and as a
bridge connecting reason and morality.88 Aesthetics remains, moreover, not merely
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theoretical but a practice by which individuals are formed, either autonomously or under
the guidance or compulsion of others. This thread in the history of aesthetics, historically
associated with Friedrich Schiller, received renewed attention in the late work of Foucault, who once asked in an interview, “But couldn’t everyone’s life become a work of
art? Why should the lamp or the house be an art object, but not our life?”89 Though
articulated in the terms of a Wildean aestheticism, Foucault understands the problematic
addressed by his question as a much older one, arising, for example, in classical Athens
and Renaissance Italy, and implicit even in Kant.90 Ian Hunter provides a usefully succinct definition of such an aesthetics: “an autonomous set of techniques and practices by
which individuals continuously problematize their experience and conduct themselves as
the subjects of an aesthetic existence.”91 He notes, moreover, that this mode of aesthetics,
theorized by Schiller, Coleridge, and Matthew Arnold, was incorporated into the governmental sphere through the new mass education systems developed in Europe over the
course of the nineteenth century, thereby integrating the aesthetic techniques of selfdiscipline into the lives of the many.92
In light of such formulations of the function of aesthetics, it should not be surprising if, in the Victorian period, the ethical-political dimension of aesthetic experience
Baumgarten in 1735 (from αἴσθησις, “perception”), shifted over the course of the
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became its most important dimension, finding expression across a range of positions: the
reactionary conservatism of Ruskin, the liberal organicism of Eliot, the socialism of
Morris, the intellectual hedonism of Pater, and the antinomianism of Wilde. Scholars of
Victorian aesthetics have consequently tended to emphasize the social concerns of these
authors and aligned changes in aesthetic discourse with developments in other fields of
knowledge, in particular, natural science, philology, and anthropology, or broader social
and economic changes, such as democratization. This is the approach taken, for example,
by important studies of Victorian aesthetics such as Linda Dowling’s The Vulgarization
of Art, Regenia Gagnier’s The Insatiability of Human Wants, and Rachel Teukolsky’s The
Literate Eye. By contrast, I approach aesthetics as itself a form of historical theory. Even
though aesthetics is, in the Victorian period, a discourse that attempts, first and foremost,
to describe the ways in which art mediates between individual and collective subjectivities, this mediation often intersects with another transtemporal one that appropriates
history for aesthetics. For the Victorian writers considered here, the questions of representation and aesthetic experience are questions of historical epistemology. We will see
this, for example, in Ruskin’s analysis of the aesthetic experience of nature as determined
by personal memory, in Morris’s vision of the Gothic as a way in which the future haunts
the present, and in the inverted historicism of Wilde’s appropriation of antiquity for the
articulation of lyric desire. My contention, accordingly, is that, if aesthetics provides the
concepts for thinking about the relationship between individual and collective and the
techniques for forming the self and problematizing subjectivity, then, for these Victorian
authors, it does so most conspicuously and most effectively at those moments in which
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the subject feels its own historicity and relation to the past. Far from being an ahistorical
discourse about universal judgment, Victorian aesthetics explores the complex historical
determinations of subjectivity.
While I believe that modern aesthetics generally affords a theorization of historicity and of the modes of mediation between history and subjectivity, Victorian aesthetics
is an especially rich field in which to explore this question. The importance of history to
Victorian aesthetic discourse has long been recognized. Classic studies by Peter Allan
Dale, A. Dwight Culler, Richard Jenkyns, Linda Dowling, and Carolyn Williams have
shown the variety of ways in which Victorian writers—in particular, Carlyle, Ruskin,
Arnold, and Pater—turned to the past in order to better understand the present, and
through aesthetic experience rather than historical knowledge.93 The present study goes
beyond such work in two regards. Firstly, while it is true that my focus gathers many of
the same sages and aesthetes that typically constitute the canon of Victorian aesthetics—
Ruskin, Eliot, Pater, Morris, Wilde—my concern lies just as much with works of fiction
and poetry as with works of criticism and aesthetic theory. Indeed, in every case, the turn
to fiction or poetry illuminates something previously obscure in the aesthetic writing. In
considering multiple genres together, moreover, I am not concerned with the traditional
question of whether a literary work succeeds or fails at meeting the criteria of a supposedly programmatic essay that preceded it. Of every text I ask the same questions: How
93
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does it conceive historical relation? and What does this mean for subjectivity? This
brings me to the second difference. While, as already noted, studies both old and new of
Victorian aesthetics have emphasized the role of historical knowledge in selfunderstanding at both the individual and the collective levels, less attention has been paid
to the role of history in self-formation. The dissimilar examples, already discussed, of
Hegel and Nietzsche show, however, that subjectivity was being thought in the nineteenth
century in historical terms. Through figures such as memory, dreaming, revival, revolution, and collection, the texts considered here produce not only an image of the past but
also an image of the self.
In Homo aestheticus, Luc Ferry argues that modern subjectivity is aesthetic
subjectivity: to be modern is to exercise a judgment of taste in a world of sensible phenomena in which the human rather than the divine perspective arbitrates meaning.94 The
contemplation of a work of art becomes in modernity a moment of self-consciousness.
Aesthetics is thus the realization of the process of the subjectification of being, as diagnosed by Heidegger, that began with Descartes.95 The problem with this definition of
subjectivity, however, is that, according to a now familiar critique, the universal aesthetic
subject that it describes turns out to have a limited range of attributes—white, male,
middle-class, and so on. According to such critiques, not only is taste the means by which
individuals present themselves as belonging to a certain class, as Pierre Bourdieu has
shown—“Taste classifies, and it classifies the classifier”—but furthermore, as in Terry
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Eagleton’s analysis, aesthetics furnishes the ideology that grounds and reproduces
bourgeois hegemony.96 Furthermore, that the canonical values of aesthetics comprise a
patriarchal apparatus for the regulation of women’s bodies and lives is one of the foundational critiques of feminism, put forward, for example, by Mary Wollstonecraft and
Simone de Beauvoir.97 More recently, feminist critics such as Carolyn Korsmeyer, Rita
Felski, and Christine Battersby have shown how the male attribution of concepts such as
genius, taste, and disinterestedness has not only excluded women from the discourse of
aesthetics but also devalued women’s creativity.98 Finally, classic work by postcolonial
theorists, such as Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak, and Homi Bhabha, and by critical race
theorists, such as Cornell West, bell hooks, and Rey Chow, has demonstrated the white
supremacy inherent in classical aesthetics, not only in its consistent valorization of
whiteness and its often explicit racism, but also through its proximity to other forms of
knowledge such as natural science, ethnography, and orientalism.99 Such analyses present
aesthetics, at least in its classical form, as an oppressive mode of subjectivation, a form of
what Judith Butler would call “the regulation of identificatory practices,” that depends
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upon the abjection of the other in the name of a universal subject.100 However, Butler,
like Foucault, is also interested in alternative modes of subjectivation that disrupt the
interpellations of the modern state, and many of the same feminist, black, and postcolonial scholars cited above are committed to the development of an aesthetics that leaves
behind the problematic universalism of its canonical European forms, even as they affirm
the desirability of what they understand aesthetics to have promised.101 Responding to the
critique of Bourdieu, moreover, Jacques Rancière has contended that the political power
of the aesthetic lies in its ability to determine who and what can be perceived, and that in
the nineteenth century this entailed a radical democratization which, though only partially
realized in bourgeois political systems, completely transformed the way the world was
perceived.102 Whether or not we accept that aesthetics can be disentangled from its
historical origins in a universalization of a narrowly defined subject position, it remains
the case that, for both the theorists just cited and the Victorian authors discussed in the
following chapters, aesthetics is first and foremost about forming and understanding the
self rather than representing and understanding the other.

4.
Each of the following four chapters takes a different context in Victorian culture and
explores one of its characteristic modes of relating to the past as a mode of selfformation: memory as both a help and challenge to natural-historical forms of representation in Ruskin and Eliot; the revival of antiquity as the origin of the modern individual in
100

Butler, Bodies that Matter, 3.
I borrow this formulation from Roelofs, The Cultural Promise of the Aesthetic.
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reflections on the meaning of the Renaissance by Pater and Symonds; haunting as a way
of connecting with the past and future in the context of the Gothic Revival and in the
work of Ruskin (again) and Morris, in particular; and, finally, Decadent forms of the
collection and display of antiquities as liberation from hegemonic historicisms in Wilde
and Beardsley. Each chapter accordingly addresses a major area of Victorian aesthetics—
realism, renaissance, medievalism, and decadence—from the perspective of a particular
moment in its theorization in relation to history. While this dissertation does not provide
an exhaustive survey of Victorian aesthetics, either at the level of the chapter or of the
whole, this set of interrelated discursive currents allows me to address modes of historical
relation—memory, revival, haunting, collection—that are among the most important for
literature and art in the period. While the chapters are roughly chronological in order
(Ruskin and Eliot, Morris and Pater, and Wilde represent three successive generations), it
is not my intention to tell a historical narrative about Victorian aesthetics, as each of these
cultural moments has a longer pre- and post-history that are not fully treated here. The
chapters should rather be approached as different aspects of a single, though by no means
unanimous or unchanging, discourse in Victorian culture, combining main currents,
countercurrents and undercurrents, eddies and backwaters, whose internal relationships
and ongoing transformations can only be glimpsed among this set of close readings of a
small number of texts.
In Chapter One, I consider the uses of memory by John Ruskin and George Eliot
in the context of aesthetic engagements with natural-historical forms of knowledge. Over
the course of the five volumes of Modern Painters (1843–1860), Ruskin attempts to bring
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a Romantic aesthetics of nature and a Linnaean natural history into alignment with the
historicist episteme of his time. His aesthetics are thus to be understood as an alternative
to the new natural sciences represented by Charles Lyell and Charles Darwin. Ruskin’s
antagonism to such science comes down to its erasure of the human individual and so he
aims for a temporalized natural history that preserves the position of the human as the
subject of meaning. Memory provides Ruskin with the solution to this problem because
nostalgia is the characteristic disposition of modern subjectivity. Accordingly, knowledge
of nature will always be mediated by memory, which can be articulated in both individual
and collective terms. Ruskin thereby questions the assumption of scientific historicism,
common to both historiography and natural science, that historical and natural truth lie
outside the subject. The analysis of personal memory connects the individual subject to a
larger transtemporal collective through nature. His contemporary George Eliot was also
concerned with the relationship between knowledge and memory in art, specifically in its
capacity to underpin readerly sympathy in novelistic realism. In her celebrated review of
the German sociologist W. H. Riehl, “The Natural History of German Life” (1856), Eliot
endorses the project of a “natural history of the people” and suggests the realist novel as a
suitable means of achieving it. Eliot’s rhetorical use of memory in the review establishes
a personal relationship to a speculative collective experience. In her novel The Mill on the
Floss (1860), however, memory appears in the form of two different affective orientations to the past: one aesthetic (that of the narrator), which persistently ironizes the
attempt at apprehending a community as, in Riehl’s phrase, “incarnate history,” and one
ascetic (that of the principal character, Maggie Tulliver), which continually fails in its
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attempts to withdraw from life in the present. Neither satisfies the desideratum of a
natural history of the people. Eliot’s novel demonstrates the incompatibility of historical
representation and personal memory—not, however, in the name of a scientific or philosophical historicism, but rather in a way that returns human experience to a natural world
of arbitrary disaster and a metaphysics of becoming. Despite the very different places in
which they end up, both Ruskin and Eliot are concerned with the various ways in which
memory attempts to compensate for the loss of Providence from the natural world and
thereby provide the ground on which a modern subject may form itself as an ethical
being.
In Chapter Two, I turn to the complex temporality of aesthetic revival in the
context of Victorian engagements with the art of the Renaissance. The historiographical
concept of the Renaissance took shape in the work of two major nineteenth-century
historians—Jules Michelet and Jacob Burckhardt—both of whom employed the methods
of scientific historicism. Their work cemented the idea of the Renaissance as the time in
which Europe emerged from the darkness of the Middle Ages and became modern.
Particularly important here is Burckhardt’s claim that the Renaissance saw the birth of
the modern individual as such. This emphasis on individuality proved hugely influential
for the Renaissance revival that occurred across Europe in the late nineteenth century. In
John Addington Symonds’s Renaissance in Italy (1875–1886), the most comprehensive
study of the period in English, Renaissance individualism is in tension with the scientific
historicism and philosophy of history that he espouses. Despite his personal investments
in the Renaissance, finding there an affirmation of same-sex love that will help him
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understand his own sexuality, Symonds scorns the idea of revival, disavowing the possibility that a reconsideration of the past could have any significant effect on the present
given changed historical conditions. The irony of Symonds’s position arises from the
challenge that the historiographical concept of “Renaissance” presents to his historicism:
it defines an early-modern Italian golden age as a moment of cultural rebirth and revival,
that is, in relation to an earlier historical moment. To think history with a concept like
Renaissance means to think the affinity of disparate moments in time outside of linear
narratives—a model of temporality fundamentally at odds with scientific historicism. In
contrast to the work of Symonds, the essays in Walter Pater’s The Renaissance (1873)
take the concept of renaissance seriously, exploring the idea of life in the present in
connection with that of the past. At its limit, the Renaissance becomes in Pater’s text any
moment in history in which the cultivation of aesthetic experience is taken to be the
highest good. Writing about Renaissance culture becomes a way for the male aesthete to
understand himself as historical, through his affinity with a history that cannot be narrated chronologically but which appears in moments of experience. For Pater, whose book
was criticized for its hedonistic aestheticism, the present is saturated with the past and the
best way to deal with this fact is to find that part of it which gives us the most pleasure
and then to give all of our attention to it: the engagement with the past is essentially
aesthetic. Yet the overwhelming life of the present stands in contrast to the mortification
of history that Pater consistently registers in his considerations of Renaissance art. The
tension between a vibrant and an undead past, between a past that comes offering pleasure and one that turns its back and slips away, captures an ambivalence in historical
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consciousness that challenges not only the intellectual foundations of scientific and
philosophical historicisms but also its affective dispensation.
Chapter Three considers another (sometimes opposed) aesthetic revival of the
Victorian period, the Gothic Revival. Victorian medievalism, as we find it in Augustus
Welby Pugin, Thomas Carlyle, John Ruskin, and William Morris, is generally understood
as a reactionary and nostalgic idealization of medieval society that draws its political
power from the rhetorical strategy of contrast with the present. As such, medievalism’s
view onto the past appears to be essentially retrograde. Yet for Ruskin and Morris, Gothic
architecture provides the occasion for a critique of the present attuned to the ways in
which the past informs aesthetic experience and artistic creation. While Ruskin was
critical of the sensationalized modes of encountering Gothic popularized by Romantic art
and literature, he nevertheless begrudges some value to sentimental forms of admiration
because they enable a collective experience of historicity that is both aesthetic and
affective. Ruskin’s theorization of Gothic architecture in The Stones of Venice (1851–
1853), moreover, provides a theoretical basis for this observation in its identification of
the experience of the grotesque as the key attribute of Gothic subjectivity. Ruskin’s
association of the Gothic subject with obscurity, uncertainty, and partiality can be felt in
Morris’s wistful and temporally complex portrayals of Gothic across his diverse work,
both before and after his reading of Marx and conversion to revolutionary socialism. In
the early short story “The Story of the Unknown Church” (1856) and in the utopian novel
News from Nowhere (1890), history moves from memory to vision and the Gothic subject
becomes a ghost among ghosts. While Morris theorizes Gothic architecture as the most
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historical of styles, his representation of it in both fiction and non-fiction focuses on its
transtemporal reach and suggests it may be the only cultural form capable of surviving
the great change attendant upon political revolution. Gothic thus becomes a site of
transtemporal haunting, involving not only the past and the present but also the future.
In Chapter Four, I consider the work of two major figures of British Decadence,
Oscar Wilde and Aubrey Beardsley, who repurpose the forms of collecting and display
associated with antiquities museums. While the dialogues in Wilde’s Intentions (1891)
provide canonical statements of Decadent aesthetics that reject the tenets of scientific
historicism and the norms of realist aesthetics, I focus here on his museum ode cum love
elegy The Sphinx (1894), which was first published in an edition de luxe designed by
Charles Ricketts. The speaker of this dramatic monologue imaginatively accumulates
fragments of ancient history and mythology and arranges them according to aesthetic and
erotic principles rather than those of a historicist museology. The result is historical
atmosphere rather than historical knowledge. As the objective form of the collector’s
desire, the collection that is The Sphinx generates not only an antiquity but also a lyric
subject whose desires drive the text’s formal poetic structure (a revised version of Tennyson’s In Memoriam stanza) in addition to its narrative of erotic excitement, exhaustion,
and disgust. Beardsley, in his illustrations to Aristophanes’ Lysistrata, similarly juxtaposes eclectic cultural and historical elements in flagrant disregard to historicist conventions
of representation, and moreover overturns classicist ideals of a pristine and timeless
antiquity. A reader of Nietzsche, Beardsley’s unashamed presentation of sexual autonomy ridicules the Victorians’ idealized images of the past that serve only to endorse their
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own morality. Both Wilde and Beardsley practice history-in-jest, but at the same time
their outrageous reappropriations of the past have an important result: they liberate it
from the oppressive domain of tradition and thereby open the gates to forms of historical
self-understanding that make no apology to those historicisms invested in determining
truth outside the subject.
The principal texts read in the following chapters collectively present an image of
Victorian aesthetics that is, on the one hand, focused on and addressed to a British
context, and, on the other hand, consistently international in its intellectual and cultural
engagements. While their authors mostly occupy a highly canonical position in Victorian
studies, with their statements on aesthetics often taken to define the major currents and,
indeed, the parameters of the discourse in Victorian Britain,103 in common with much
recent work in the field, I understand my objects as products of transnational encounters
and forces.104 In the present project, this involves situating the discourse of Victorian
aesthetics in two broader contexts: that of European intellectual culture and that of the
British Empire. It is certainly true, and will become evident in the next chapter, that the
authors worked within or against a tradition of aesthetics and historiography particular to
Britain, one characterized by a valorization of rural life and an identification of Gothic
architecture and supposedly Anglo-Saxon institutions as emblems of national continuity.
Yet it will be equally evident that most of the authors were also cosmopolitan, with
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strong personal ties in Continental Europe, and avid readers of French and German
literature in particular. Given the nature of intellectual and cultural exchange in nineteenth-century Europe, this is no surprise. What it means is that the particularity of
British aesthetics sits at the confluence of both national and international discursive
currents. In contrast to the context of European intellectual culture, however, that of the
British Empire is deeply submerged in canonical Victorian aesthetic discourse, rarely
coming to the surface. We will nevertheless encounter its moments at various points in
the chapters and will see it most fully in the Coda, which moves to the still essentially
Victorian context of colonial Australia.
In the Coda, I consider the attempt by Marcus Clarke to theorize and produce an
Australian aesthetics in colonial Melbourne. This antipodean shift, as the Coda will make
clear, is not comparative but rather a movement internal to Victorian aesthetics. While
the texts considered in the chapters bear the traces of empire—whether in Ruskin’s
primeval American forest, Symonds’s racialization of Progress, Morris’s antiimperialism, or Wilde’s Egyptology—the addition of Clarke’s programmatic statement
on colonial literature to the canon of Victorian aesthetics is a reminder, and one that bears
repeating, of Victorian culture’s complicity, even in its more Europhilic, cosmopolitan
instances, in the project of the British Empire. If Victorian aesthetics is a discourse about
the formation of the self as historical, then it is more concerned with the fate of the
European as the subject of history than with that of the non-European other who remains
outside of it. Foucault’s curiosity in the ethics of ancient Greece and Rome was repelled
by the injustice of those societies, even as it found there the promise of something other
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than that which the present seemed to offer.105 So, the “other historicisms” of the Victorians, while they allow us to reimagine what counts as history and to reconceptualize
aesthetics as itself a field of historical knowledge, will be most effective now not as
models but as perspectives from which to think our own historicity and the sense in
which, if Beiser’s claim is true, “we are all historicists today.”
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Chapter One
The Aesthetic and the Ascetic: Natural History and Memory
in John Ruskin and George Eliot

1.
That the natural world was an obsession of the Victorians is readily apprehended from
both their art and their science.1 That history was “the common coin of the nineteenth
century” is even farther beyond doubt.2 In aesthetics, we have perhaps no better contemporary diagnosis of these cultural conditions than Oscar Wilde’s dialogue against the
representational norms of Victorian art, “The Decay of Lying” (1889). In the final
chapter of this dissertation, I will pursue the alternatives to these norms that Wilde and
others of the Decadent movement practiced. For the present, however, Wilde’s antinomian critique is useful for its delineation, however polemical, of the dominant aesthetic
framework against which he is writing and in whose development John Ruskin and
George Eliot—the authors whose work is most important to this chapter—decisively
participated. Vivian (the dialogue’s principal speaker) denounces the call to “return to

1

“The preoccupation of the Victorians with Romantic nature poetry and
contemporaneous versions of it, with nature as an ‘aesthetic norm,’ and with nature as a
perennial source of beauty and delight can hardly be overstated” (Merrill, Romance of
Victorian Natural History, 6).
2
Jann, The Art and Science of Victorian History, xi.
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Life and Nature,” dismisses realist novels as improbable and unreadable, argues that life
and nature imitate art, and insists that art reveals nothing of either the age in which it was
created or that in which it is set (W4:83, 80, 90, 96). While Vivian takes aim at his targets
seriatim, the overarching argument is that the combined aesthetic imperatives of historical accuracy, and adherence to nature and to social reality are the mantras of a single,
worn-out aesthetics that misguidedly aligns mimetic accuracy with truth and moral
goodness. Hence the occasion for and final revelation of Vivian’s diatribe: “Lying, the
telling of beautiful untrue things, is the proper aim of Art” (W4:103). Interestingly,
however, in positing this monolithic regime of truth, Vivian’s protest attributes to it a
universal mode of representation that establishes the aesthetic substitutability and therefore, ultimately, aesthetic identity of historical, natural, and social objects. To be sure,
Vivian’s own aesthetic of l’art pour l’art also affords such substitutability.3 His target,
therefore, is not so much the use of certain subject matter—landscape, everyday life of
the past or present—as a particular form of representation and interpretation, a way of
relating to truth that we are accustomed to call realism. What interests me about Wilde’s
characterization of Victorian mimetic criteria is its alignment of three truths: social truth,
historical truth, and natural truth. The implication is that these three truths can be realized
in the same object. Vivian denounces all such truth-telling. In this chapter, I am concerned with the theory and practice of just such representation, which I call, on the basis
of the two premises at the head of this paragraph, and following George Eliot’s famous
discussion of it, natural history.
3

In this respect, they are both representative of Jacques Rancière’s aesthetic regime of
the arts (Rancière, Politics of Aesthetics, 14).
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While “natural history” as a genre of texts describing worldly phenomena dates
back to antiquity, modern scholarship has come to associate the term predominantly with
European science of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a science that reached its
highpoint in the systematic taxonomy of Linnaeus, whose Systema Naturae was first
published in 1735.4 In Foucault’s well-known account in The Order of Things, natural
history names the form taken by knowledge of the phenomenal world before the epistemic break at the end of the eighteenth century that opened the way for the new sciences of
biology and geology. Natural history was the practice of recording visible phenomena
through precise description and, key for Foucault, naming: “Natural history,” writes
Foucault, “is nothing more than the nomination of the visible.”5 Rather than narrating a
series of events over time, classical natural history orders that which exists; its concerns
are synchronic rather than diachronic.6 The systematic nomenclature of Linnaeus is
Foucault’s prime example. It also provides Mary Louise Pratt with a starting point for the
analysis of what she calls European planetary consciousness.7 With his system, Linnaeus
created a framework for the classification of all species, known and unknown. Such a
universalizing natural history, Pratt shows, “extracted specimens not only from their
organic or ecological relations with each other, but also from their places in other peoples’ economies, histories, social and symbolic systems,” a development attributable to
4

The English term originates in the title of Pliny the Elder’s Naturalis Historia, an
encyclopedia written in the first century CE, which itself translates Aristotelian φυσικὴ
ἱστορία, “inquiry into nature.” In neither case does it denote historical study in the
modern sense of the word, that is, an account of events over time.
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Foucault, Order of Things, 144.
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the gap between words and things in the European episteme, whose opening Foucault
tracks in The Order of Things.8 That such an ahistorical natural history was largely
superseded by the new, truly historical sciences of the nineteenth century was already
recognized by Friedrich Engels in The Dialectic of Nature.9 More recently, Wolf Lepenies’s Das Ende der Naturgeschichte similarly asserts the absence of history from
earlier sciences of nature: “The notion of a history of nature is unthinkable for classical
natural history.”10 However, Lepenies also recognizes the persistence of natural-historical
forms of knowledge (especially in literature) and even posits moments of reactionary
“dehistoricization” (Enthistorisierung) in already “temporalized” (verzeitlichten) scientific disciplines.11 According to this argument, if natural history persists as a way of
organizing knowledge about the world in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, then it
does so alongside—sometimes oppositionally, sometimes collaboratively, but always in
epistemological tension with—sciences such as geology, evolutionary theory and developmental biology.
Persistent or not, such a natural history—or, according to a more tentative orthography, natural “history”—might seem to be antithetical to the present project. If my aim
is to examine ways of relating the present and the past to one another, then surely such
examination can only be undertaken upon forms of knowledge that make chronological
distinctions, that are, to use Lepenies’s terminology, temporalized. While, as the Intro8

Ibid., 31; Foucault, Order of Things, 141.
Engels writes of classical natural history: “All change, all development in nature was
denied” (Engels, Dialektik der Natur, 74; my translation). For Engels, the decisive
moment comes with Kant’s natural philosophy, in which the earth is first understood to
be dynamic rather than static (ibid., 75).
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Lepenies, Das Ende der Naturgeschichte, 30 (my translation).
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Ibid., 20.
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duction has already made clear, I accept the general claim that European sciences underwent a transformation in the decades around 1800 that can be characterized epistemologically as temporalization, in contrast to Lepenies and notwithstanding Pratt’s argument for
the universalizing role of natural history in European imperialism, I do not see the
survival or recurrence of natural history—the systematic description of phenomena—in
the Victorian period as necessarily the result of a dehistoricization of knowledge or of the
untimely persistence of an ahistorical science.12 While the nineteenth century witnessed
the acceleration of the division between the human and natural sciences, for many
Victorian writers, the maintenance of a connection between cultural and natural representations was of tremendous importance. Despite their differences, Ruskin and Eliot are two
such authors: they both understand human culture in relation to nature and nature in
relation to history; they both see aesthetic representation as a potentially truthful way of
representing knowledge about the human and nonhuman world; and they are both concerned to elucidate the historicity of experience through aesthetics. In the texts examined
12

In this chapter, I am concerned with natural history as a form of knowledge about the
phenomenal world rather than a set of practices centered on the collection of specimens
in the field. It should be noted, however, that the nineteenth century was a period in
which practical natural history achieved widespread popularity in Britain in conjunction
with other recreational forms of nation-building. In Sciences of Antiquity, for example,
Noah Heringman argues for an intimate relationship between antiquarianism and natural
history in the Romantic period, that they were both part of a “prehistoric turn” in the
sciences that supported the creation of new disciplines as well as cultural movements
such as neoclassicism, medievalism, and popular natural history (Heringman, Sciences of
Antiquity, 2–3). Furthermore, as Lynn Merrill has shown, Victorian natural history
provided a way in which nature remained accessible and popular as an object of study for
non-specialists, a study that, as Mary Ellen Bellanca adds, often involved the recording of
both temporal change and constancy (Merrill, Romance of Victorian Natural History, 12;
Bellanca, Daybooks of Discovery, 105). While Ruskin and Eliot also practiced this kind
of natural history, which is, of course, continuous with its scientific forms, the texts
which I discuss here are concerned instead with the possibility of a natural history
informed by cultural history, rather than the reverse.
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here—Ruskin’s The Seven Lamps of Architecture and Modern Painters, Eliot’s “The
Natural History of German Life” and The Mill on the Floss—they continually turn to the
question of memory—both the representation and analysis of individual memories and
the theorization of memory as a mental process that relates the present to the past—as the
conceptual site for developing a natural-historical aesthetics.
I have chosen these texts for two reasons: firstly, they are highly canonical midVictorian texts that theorize and exemplify a post-Romantic natural-historical aesthetic
combining realist techniques of representation, historicist conceptualizations of temporality, and an in interest in history and the natural world—the aesthetic nexus against which
Wilde is writing and which provides the background for the positions taken in the subsequent chapters of the dissertation; secondly, these texts personalize this aesthetic through
an exploration of the power of memory to mediate between individual and collective
subjectivity, thereby developing natural history as an aesthetic form of knowledge and
representation that is emphatically subjective. While memory and what I am calling here
a natural-historical aesthetic are both common elements in nineteenth-century British
literature, it is the conscious and sustained exploration of their relation in these texts that
makes them so apt for this chapter. What distinguishes these texts, moreover, from earlier
Romantic instances of this combination—Wordsworth is an unmistakable precedent—is
the more explicit, persistent, and expansive social-historical situation of aesthetic experience, which is never allowed to transcend its conditions.13 Given its particular focus, the
13

I have in mind here Jerome McGann’s influential but controversial account in The
Romantic Ideology, according to which early British Romanticism is marked by its belief
in the ability of poetry to transcend its worldly conditions, a belief that is the object of
steady disillusionment over the course of Romanticism’s development. Within such a
54

present chapter does not (indeed, cannot) engage the entire domain in which the literary
and the natural-historical intersect in Victorian culture, and so does not contribute to the
already extensive scholarship on the rhetoric of scientific writing, the influence of
contemporary science on the arts, the widespread practices of collection and identification, nor even scientific-materialist approaches to aesthetics.14 My goal is twofold and
quite specific: to establish the contours of mainstream Victorian aesthetics in its commitment to natural and historical truth, and, at the same time, to show how—through its
insistence on personal memory—this aesthetics already centers the subject of historical
knowledge as an aesthetic subject.
As should already be apparent, what I mean by “natural history” in this chapter
diverges somewhat from the usual sense historicized in the paragraphs above. This stems
from my desire, following the work of Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno, to think
natural history more literally and more dialectically, not simply as pre-scientific, ahistorical and imperialist knowledge of the world in the senses of Foucault, Pratt, and Lepenies,
but as a mode of representation that sees nature in history and history in nature. Benjamin’s and Adorno’s dialectical theories of natural history, though engaging different
schema, Ruskin and Eliot begin where the Romantics end off: one of their primary
concerns is accounting for the historical and cultural conditions of aesthetic experience.
14
These are all now well-trodden fields. Literary studies of scientific writing, which has
naturally focused on Darwin, include the influential work of Beer, Darwin’s Plots, and
Levine, Darwin the Writer. Studies of the influence of science on Victorian writers are
legion, and include Shuttleworth’s study of Eliot, George Eliot and Nineteenth Century
Science, Levine’s Darwin and the Novelists, and Dale’s In Pursuit of a Scientific Culture.
Likewise, the influence of literature on scientific writing is explored in Lansley, Darwin’s
Debt. The engagement of writers (including Eliot and Lewes) in popular natural history
has been studied by Merrill, Romance of Victorian Natural History, and Bellanca,
Daybooks of Discovery. Finally, Morgan’s Outward Mind provides a thorough study of
scientific aesthetics in Victorian Britain.
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cultural contexts—in Benjamin’s case, baroque drama, in Adorno’s, the critique of
phenomenology—articulate a relationship between nature and history that illuminates
nicely the concerns for which I argue among the Victorians discussed here. In Benjamin’s
The Origin of German Tragic Drama, natural history undergirds allegorical representation, which consists in the accumulation of fragments and ruins. Such ruins provide the
stage-sets for the German mourning plays under consideration in his book, and it is in the
analysis of the ruin—allegory’s correlative in the realm of things—that what Benjamin
means by natural history becomes clear: “In the ruin history has physically merged into
the setting.”15 Natural history accordingly describes a spatial representation of corrosive
and dispersive historical processes. In Adorno’s reading of Benjamin, at stake is the
dissolution of the concept of nature as “substance in history.”16 Adorno takes the concept
to its dialectical extreme: the historical, even at its most historical, must be seen as
natural, and the natural, even at its most natural, must be seen as historical.17 The goal is
to break down not only the concept of nature as totality but also that of history as continuity. The result: nature is transient and history is material; not only a critique of
Heideggerian phenomenology, then, but an image of revolutionary potential. Certainly,
just such a dialectical natural history will not be found in the Victorian writers discussed
here. However, it is precisely the epistemological problems of the relationship between
totality and continuity, spatialization and temporalization, synchrony and diachrony that
are being grappled with in their texts. Moreover, they approach these problems as problems of artistic representation. For all that the work of Ruskin and Eliot is informed by
15
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classical natural history, it also goes beyond it in ways that anticipate, even if only
faintly, the dialectical models of Benjamin and Adorno. They achieve this, as the ensuing
discussion will show, through their attempts to align an aesthetics of nature with a
historicist epistemology.

2.
As the most prominent aesthetician of Victorian Britain, an especially loud voice in the
chorus advocating the artistic return to nature, and the practitioner of a historicist criticism, Ruskin is no doubt among the unnamed targets of “The Decay of Lying.” Over the
course of the five volumes of Modern Painters (1843–1860), he provides not only a
defense of the landscape painter J. M. W. Turner (his stated aim) but moreover a systematic aesthetics of nature and a history of art that periodizes on the basis of broad social
characteristics interpreted from the work of individual artists. However, whether Modern
Painters can be rightly considered a unified work is a long-standing question in Ruskin’s
reception.18 Written over two decades that also saw the publication of The Seven Lamps
of Architecture (1849) and The Stones of Venice (1851–1853), as well as the author’s loss
of faith and the death of Turner, it is not surprising that the work should reflect changes
in Ruskin’s interests and thought. Even so, a common concern for the accurate perception
and representation of nature runs throughout the five sprawling volumes.19 That this
18

Of the more important studies, lumpers include Landow (The Aesthetic and Critical
Theories of John Ruskin), Sawyer (Ruskin’s Poetic Argument), and Hewison (The
Argument of the Eye); splitters include Helsinger (Ruskin and the Art of the Beholder),
Wihl (Ruskin and the Rhetoric of Infallibility), and Teukolsky (The Literate Eye).
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concern engages both aesthetic and scientific discourse is well established. Most scholarship on Ruskin’s relation to science has focused on his engagement with Darwin, beginning with Modern Painters V and culminating in the more explicitly anti-Darwinian
works of the 1870s: Love’s Meinie (1873–1881) on ornithology, Deucalion (1875–1883)
on geology, and Proserpina (1875–1886) on botany.20 In The Literate Eye, however,
Rachel Teukolsky reads the first two volumes of Modern Painters as works of natural
history informed by early-nineteenth-century natural theology and an empiricist epistemology taken over from Locke. Ruskin’s goal at this early stage of the project, she
argues, is “to categorize the features of landscape painting in the mode of a natural
history treatise.”21 The result is informed as much by an Enlightenment impulse towards
rational classification as by a Romantic sensibility of individual Bildung, as evidenced by
Ruskin’s frequent citation of personal memory.22 In the terms of this chapter, the tension
between classification and Bildung identified by Teukolsky is the tension named by
natural history. In this section, though I begin with an example from The Seven Lamps of
Architecture, I focus on Modern Painters III, the volume that most explicitly engages in a
theorization of modernity, since it brings the dialectical relationship between observation
Stones of Venice. Together, she argues, these books present the work of accurately
representing nature’s infinite variety as an ongoing struggle with important political
results: “realism, which demands our resolute attention to nature’s infinite variety, is a
revolutionary aesthetic” (Levine, “Visual Labor,” 81).
20
See, principally, Smith, Charles Darwin and Victorian Visual Culture; as well as Frost,
“Circles of Vitality”; Krieg, “Ruskin, Darwin, and Looking Beneath Surfaces”; Leng,
“Ruskin’s Rewriting of Darwin”; Levine, “Ruskin, Darwin, and the Matter of Matter”;
and Weltman, Performing the Victorian, ch. 2. Such scholarship is in general agreement
that Ruskin, who took an active interest in scientific developments, found Darwin’s
theories particularly offensive because of their naturalization of the aesthetic in purely
materialist terms and, more broadly, their decentering of the human.
21
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and memory into contact with collective history. I then turn to the botany of Modern
Painters V to consider Ruskin’s first published response to Darwin’s On the Origin of
Species. My point in doing so is to reconnect the earlier work on the conditions of the
perception and representation of nature in modernity with the later more reactionary
work, and thereby show how it extends the theorization of historical relation into taxonomy. Where, in Modern Painters III, the aesthetic project of refining perception becomes
a way of relating to the past, in Modern Painters V, the allegorization of the natural world
provides a theory of knowledge that collapses all historicization into memorialization.
Ruskin thus moves from the analysis of individual memories into a theorization of
remembrance.
Ruskin begins the sixth chapter of The Seven Lamps of Architecture, “The Lamp
of Memory,” with a recollection of a blooming spring meadow in the French Jura, set
amongst pine forests and perched on a ravine.23 With this scene, Ruskin recounts not just
any memory but a moment, in his words, “marked by more than ordinary fulness of joy
or clearness of teaching” (R8:221). The passage begins with the detailed and loving
description of the spot, naming ten different species of flower, and follows the author as
he moves through the forest and out onto the edge of the ravine, where he watches a
hawk flying past. “It would be difficult,” he writes, “to conceive a scene less dependent
upon any other interest than that of its own secluded and serious beauty” (R8:223).
However, he immediately recoils from this Kantian conclusion. He continues:
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The occasion, including the revelation about the role of history in the aesthetic
experience of nature, is recorded in Ruskin’s diary for 19 April 1846 (R8:221, fn. 1).
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[…] but the writer well remembers the sudden blankness and chill which
were cast upon it when he endeavoured, in order more strictly to arrive at
the sources of its impressiveness, to imagine it, for a moment, a scene in
some aboriginal forest of the New Continent. The flowers in an instant lost
their light, the river its music; the hills became oppressively desolate; a
heaviness in the boughs of the darkened forest showed how much of their
former power had been dependent upon a life which was not theirs, how
much of the glory of the imperishable, or continually renewed, creation is
reflected from things more precious in their memories than it, in its
renewing. Those ever springing flowers and ever flowing streams had
been dyed by the deep colours of human endurance, valour, and virtue;
and the crests of the sable hills that rose against the evening sky received a
deeper worship, because their far shadows fell eastward over the iron
walls of Joux, and the four-square keep of Granson. (R8:223–24)
This Wordsworthian anecdote serves to introduce the main argument of the chapter,
namely, that architecture should embody history and so serve as a collective reminder of
human (or rather, as the invocation of a history-less America implies, European)
achievement. More specifically, Ruskin argues for the capacity of human artifacts to
embody the entire history of the culture that created them, that is, the congealing of
history into substance, and accordingly positions history as essential to any concept of the
aesthetic. The remarkable implication of the anecdote’s placement in a book about
architecture, and in a chapter about architecture’s memorializing capacity, is that this
capacity is projected onto nature. The passage is often cited, however, as a key moment
in Ruskin’s changing relationship with associationist aesthetics.24 Natural beauty is here
24

Associationist aesthetics, which had been influentially espoused by Archibald Alison in
his Essays on the Nature and Principles of Taste (1790), holds that aesthetic pleasure and
displeasure are the results of mental associations; it was vigorously rejected by Ruskin in
Modern Painters II (R4:66). Landow claims that Ruskin had a change of heart with
respect to associationism sometime in between the publication of Modern Painters II in
1846 and The Seven Lamps of Architecture in 1849 (Landow, Aesthetic and Critical
Theories, 105–10). Teukolsky, however, argues that Ruskin’s relationship to
associationism was more complicated, with his early rejection in Modern Painters II
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presented as an effect of history rather than an inherent property. It follows that a world
outside of human history (here, disturbingly, but conventionally, located in the Americas)
would be experienced (at least by a European) as a less beautiful one. Such a conclusion
may seem surprising from the author who once wrote that “everything in nature is more
or less beautiful” (R3:111), the author who repeatedly insists on nature’s infinite variety
as the greatest source of aesthetic pleasure. It fits, however, with the historicist hermeneutics that Ruskin would paradigmatically practice in The Stones of Venice, the kind of
criticism that Wilde ridicules in “The Decay of Lying.” Here, crucially, it is not just art
that is interpreted as the expression of time and place, but even the experience and
memory of the “imperishable creation” that is nature.
Ruskin returns to the problem of natural beauty’s historical determination in
Modern Painters III, where it is repositioned as a defining aspect of aesthetic experience
in modernity, whose diagnosis, in broad outline, is as follows. Modernity, according to
Ruskin, is the outcome of an epochal loss of faith whose primary symptom is widespread
melancholia (R5:321). Combined with the disdain of human bodily beauty, this melancholy faithlessness turns perception outward onto two objects: nature and history
(R5:325–26). No longer able to find beauty in the human figure (as in Greco-Roman
antiquity) or in the contemplation of the divine (as in the European Middle Ages), the
members of a modern European society look instead to external nature, which they know
through science rather than lore, and the imagined past, which they know through history
rather than tradition. Much of Ruskin’s evidence is literary: it is “the love of natural
belying his dependence on associationist arguments from the start of his career
(Teukolsky, Literate Eye, 49–57).
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history” that distinguishes Scott’s poetry from that of Homer and Dante (R5:350). But it
also includes analysis of his own earliest memories, in which these two modern objects—
nature and history—are not only dominant but intertwined. His memories include glens,
hills, lakes, icy rocks, and mossy tree roots—all, from the beginning, infused with
history, whether from facts imparted by his parents or the novels of Scott (R5:365–67). In
these childhood encounters, natural objects become aesthetic objects through history:
“mountains, in particular, were always partly confused with those of my favourite book,
Scott’s Monastery” (R5:366). In other words, history mediates nature. Unlike the painful
revelation experienced in the Alpine meadow, however, these memories celebrate the
historicization of nature as the restoration, however partial and melancholic, of wonder to
a personal subject in a profane world. History provides nature with its auratic residue.
Ruskin is now comfortable with the earlier revelation that the experience of natural
beauty depends as much on association as on natural form itself.
Modern Painters shows, moreover, that not only the aesthetic object but also
aesthetic experience is natural-historical. The examples discussed so far are recollections
in which history determines the experience of the perceptual objects provided by nature;
in short, the emphasis has been on natural objects. An example of Ruskin’s literary
criticism from Modern Painters III will demonstrate one way in which the lessons about
history and nature gleaned from memory translate into the aesthetic experience of art
objects and to the register of perception in general. In his appraisal of Dante’s description
of the color of apple blossoms (“less than that of roses, but more than that of violets”),
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Ruskin presents four floral scenes—“principal among the gifts of the northern earth”—
with which this color is associated in his mind:
1st.
2nd.
3rd.
4th.

Bell gentians growing close together, mixed with lilies of the
valley, on the Jura pastures.
Alpine roses with dew upon them, under low rays of morning
sunshine, touching the tops of the flowers.
Bell heather in mass, in full light, at sunset.
White narcissus (red-centred) in mass, on the Vevay pastures, in
sunshine after rain. (R5:283–84)

The most obvious point about these four almost photographic images is that, as the
incredible specificity of circumstance and detail indicate, they are all memories (the first,
second, and fourth explicitly located in the Alps, the third probably in Britain). Ruskin’s
passionate campaign to improve perception is glimpsed here in this heuristic practice of
memory-layering, in which memory not only provides the materials for reflection but
informs aesthetic experience in the present. Here, Dante’s representation of apple blossoms is measured not for its accuracy (which Ruskin simply asserts) but for its ability to
contain associations that are both personal and cultural. Like Freud’s image of Rome with
all the buildings of its palimpsestic history simultaneously present to the eye, Ruskin’s
analysis of perception theorizes it as the synchronized actualization of discrete events
from the past. Although Freud admits his fantastical image of the Eternal City is an
imperfect metaphor for the psyche, it still goes some way in illustrating his claim that the
past is as a rule preserved in mental life.25 Ruskin’s associationist heuristic is no psychoanalysis avant la lettre, but it precedes Freud in attempting to represent the historical in
accumulative, spatial terms and in understanding experience as always overdetermined
25

Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, 17–19.
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by the past. Ruskin’s reflective aesthetics (what he calls theoria) lead not only to the
revelation of the historical as the condition of natural beauty—as in the examples of the
Alpine meadow and the childhood memories—but also to the discovery that perception
and reflection more generally are themselves so conditioned.
Ruskin’s historicization of perception is not limited to the sphere of aesthetic
representation but is also registered in natural science. My final example from Ruskin
comes from the sections on botany in Modern Painters V. In translating his naturalhistorical aesthetics into scientific knowledge, Ruskin makes the case for the unity of all
kinds of experience. The shared capacity of plants and buildings to point to history that
sets up the argument of “The Lamp of Memory” provides him with the foundations for an
alternative taxonomy. In Modern Painters V, Ruskin presents his own systematic classification of plants, in which there are two divisions: “tented plants,” also called “resting
plants,” which “live in encampments, on the ground, as lilies; or on surfaces of rock, or
stems of other plants, as lichens and mosses. They live—some for a year, some for many
years, some for myriads of years; but, perishing, they pass as the tented Arab passes; they
leave no memorials of themselves”; and “building plants,” which “will not live on the
ground, but eagerly raise edifices above it. Each works hard with solemn forethought all
its life. Perishing, it leaves its work in the form which will be most useful to its successors—its own monument, and their inheritance. These architectural edifices we call
‘Trees’” (R7:21; Ruskin’s emphasis). The difference is civilizational: Does a plant
memorialize itself architecturally or does it not? Ruskin’s natural history is not simply
“the nomination of the visible” but, rather, draws on an earlier form of knowledge—
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namely, allegoresis—through which he is able to analytically present the plant kingdom
as typologically parallel to aspects of human society.26 This practice is carried further in
the division of building plants into classes: “builders with the shield” (i.e., broadleaf
trees) and “builders with the sword” (i.e., coniferous trees). The point is, Ruskin’s
typological allegoresis does not abstract the natural world outside of history in the way
that, as Pratt argues, colonial natural history does. This does not mean that Ruskin’s
alternative is any less imperialistic, as its militarized and racialized terminology makes
clear. It does mean, however, that Ruskin’s science is a self-consciously culturally
situated one that goes beyond associationism—it is no longer a matter of personal experience—by conflating memory with history and nature with culture. Botany thus becomes
a theory of historical knowledge, a way of perceiving and explaining forms of transience
and persistence, a science of memory. Nature memorializes human history—no metaphor.
The opening anecdote of “The Lamp of Memory,” like the childhood memories of
Modern Painters III, contains two instances of temporal relation: the ideal present in
which the author writes (and in which the reader reads) is related through remembrance
to the particular moment of the spring day in the Alps (the memory), which is in turn
related through association to European history. These are different forms of relation: the
first is remembrance of a discrete event, the second, evocation of much larger and less
clearly defined (by no means universal or abstract) spatial and temporal spheres. Nature
26
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is the node where the two relations meet: it is the hinge that articulates individual
memory and that of the larger cultural collective (“Europe” as a racial-civilizational unity
of shared history). In the case of the taxonomy, however, the relation is different. Allegoresis establishes a relation of equivalence: now individual memorialization is equivalent
to historiography because nature is equivalent to culture. The self-formation of the
European individual—the plant that builds its own monument (let us not forget the
racialized division of the plant kingdom into historical and unhistorical classes)—is the
memorialization of culture at the level of the individual. Taxonomy thereby becomes yet
another attempt on Ruskin’s part to overcome the alienation of European modernity by
restoring a racialized subject to its ancestral culture.
In all the examples discussed in this section, the equivalence of memory and
history is a way of reconciling nature and culture within the framework of a general
theory of perception. One of the goals of Modern Painters was to refute the widely held
belief, influentially expressed by both Kant and Mill, that scientific knowledge and
aesthetic experience belong to separate spheres.27 Ironically, such a refutation is also
implicit in the work of Darwin, Ruskin’s greatest enemy. But where Darwin’s materialist
explanation of beauty as the result of natural selection constitutes, via a radically nonanthropocentric historicization, a total naturalization of aesthetics, Ruskin’s memorializing historicism, by insisting on an anthropocentric cosmology, effects a total aestheticization of nature. If Ruskin’s natural history reverts to its premodern forms, then it does so
not by detemporalizing its object, which it sees as historical through and through, but,
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rather, by returning to the culturally situated human individual the prerogative of determining meaning.

3.
George Eliot reviewed volumes three and (very briefly) four of Modern Painters shortly
after their publication in 1856. In her review of Modern Painters III, she makes the
following remark: “The truth of infinite value that he teaches is realism—the doctrine
that all truth and beauty are to be attained by a humble and faithful study of nature, and
not by substituting vague forms, bred by imagination on the mists of feeling, in place of
definite, substantial reality.”28 It is because of such remarks that Eliot’s critical work, and
especially that published in the Westminster Review in 1856, is taken as a patchwork
formulation of the artistic and intellectual principles that she would put into practice
when she turned to fiction.29 The long review essay “The Natural History of German
Life” has taken on particular importance in this critical narrative, in which it is often read
alongside Eliot’s first novel, Adam Bede (1859). Suzanne Graver summarizes the consensus well when she identifies the crux of the essay in its desire for “a renewal of community based on a more accurate and complex understanding of social life in both the past and
the present.”30 In one of the most influential and sustained paired readings of essay and
novel, Sally Shuttleworth not only notes their many similarities but also identifies the
28
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essay as a “programmatic statement for [Eliot’s] theory of fiction” and an engagement
with the issues of an organic model of society that provides the foundation for Adam
Bede.31 Caroline Levine goes so far as to identify Eliot’s and Ruskin’s combined publications of 1856 as a watershed in the formulation of a theory of realism in England.32
However, questioning this commonplace of Victorian studies, Fionnuala Dillane points to
the conventionality of Eliot’s comments on novelistic representation in the context of
progressive periodicals like the Westminster Review, in which the piece was published. In
Dillane’s reading, the review essay is too strongly determined by the conditions of its
appearance in such a publication to be convincingly read as a sincere declaration of
artistic principles. Analyzing both the context of the review and its rhetoric, she finds that
Eliot’s “position never emerges but her equivocations are obvious.”33 Yet even if the
question of the relationship between Eliot’s journalism and novels warrants greater
circumspection, as Dillane convincingly argues, it is still the case that, through both her
unsigned journalism and her fiction, Eliot participated in a mid-century European discourse about art, society, and modernity that was accorded great political importance by
those in her circle, as the work of Shuttleworth and others has shown. In Britain, the
influence of Ruskin in this discourse, as Levine argues, was immense: in Modern Painters and The Stones of Venice, he created the theoretical and political framework for a
mode of naturalistic representation and historical interpretation that would determine the
31
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dominant forms of aesthetic discourse in Britain for decades—as Wilde no doubt saw. In
the previous section, I examined one small aspect of this framework, in which the mutual
mediation of nature and culture becomes a way of articulating the various forms of
relation between cultural history and personal memory. Despite developing a form of
social criticism in The Stones of Venice, curiously, Ruskin never provides us with an
image of social collectivity: his buildings and meadows are usually empty of any other
human presence save himself or a lone imagined figure, such as his Gothic stonemason
(whom we will meet in Chapter Three). In this section, the natural-historical representation of the social will come into focus with the work of Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl, the
German ethnologist and novelist reviewed by Eliot in “The Natural History of German
Life.” While readings of this essay usually focus on its engagement in a theory of realism, I want to draw out its reliance on a rhetoric of memory, in order to lay the groundwork for the next section’s discussion of Eliot’s uses of memory as a way of relating to
the past in her second novel, The Mill on the Floss (1860). In doing so, I show the ways
in which memory works to naturalize history.
“The Natural History of German Life” is a long review of the first two volumes of
W. H. Riehl’s Die Naturgeschichte des Volkes als Grundlage einer deutschen Socialpolitik (The Natural History of the People as Foundation of a German Social Policy): Die
bürgerliche Gesellschaft (The Bourgeois Society, 1851), which theorizes historical
change in society as the result of the interplay of two forces—inertia (Beharren), associated with the peasantry and the aristocracy, and movement (Bewegung), associated with
the bourgeoisie and the proletariat; and Land und Leute (Land and People, 1854), which
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provides a cultural-geographical survey of the German states and expounds a theory of
culture as environmentally determined.34 Riehl, considered the founder of folklore
(Volkskunde) as an academic discipline, was a nationalist and a conservative who lamented the destruction of Germany’s diverse traditional cultures by the processes of modernization. An adviser to King Maximillian II of Bavaria, Riehl developed Volkskunde as a
historically grounded empirical alternative to both statistical methods of social analysis
and abstract theories of society.35 It was, in Stein’s words, “a conservative cultural
science in the service of the state,”36 and Die Naturgeschichte des Volkes is accordingly
addressed to social policy makers. Eliot appears unconvinced by Riehl’s political agenda,
which is either ignored or subjected to wry apophasis, and becomes apologetic to her
liberal readership when discussing his conservatism. Nonetheless, Riehl interests Eliot for
his scientific approach to the representation of social classes, his insistence on cultural
particularity rather than universality, and his conception of European society as, in Eliot’s
translation, “incarnate history” (leibhaftige Geschichte). Before considering “The Natural
History of German Life” any further, it is worth pausing a little with Riehl, since scholarship on Eliot almost never engages his work directly and, moreover, it provides for an
interesting comparison with Ruskin’s art-historical diagnosis of modernity in Modern
Painters.
34
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As it happens, Riehl’s Land und Leute begins with a discussion of art history and
a diagnosis of modernity. He looks back to the dawn of European modernity in the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries—“the great restructuring of society whose end is still not
come”—and notices the sudden appearance of the people (das Volk), “in its rudest
reality,” as an aesthetic object in art and literature.37 While it was forgotten again in the
following two centuries, the artistic interest in the people has returned with new urgency
in the nineteenth century:
In poetry and the fine arts, a remarkable push to extend the sphere of
representable subject matter is apparent. […] Where earlier the people as a
collective personality was at most just a vaguely hinted staffage, just a
decoration in the background, now, more and more, it is becoming an
independent character—indeed, a main character—who is placed with
broad individualization in the foreground of pictures and works of poetry.
In an entirely different way than any earlier period, the present is seeking
to grasp the people as an aesthetic object.38
Riehl registers this development both in popular literature—in village tales and urban
working-class literature—and in the desire of an effete bourgeoisie to overcome its
alienation from the “raw life of the people.” In either case, the development results from
the loss of a naive relation to social conditions, just as, Riehl writes, the poetic longing
for nature only arises once humanity has alienated itself from nature.39 Like Ruskin, then,
Riehl interprets modern landscape art as the symptom of alienation and its attendant
37
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melancholia, and combines this with a critique of modernity informed by a reactionary
nostalgia for certain aspects of feudal society. Also like Ruskin, he insists upon the
necessity of preserving a cultural relation to landscape as historicized and aestheticized
nature in the face of its increasing dehumanization by modern science.40 Finally, though
with entirely different motives, he reconnects this artistic interest and social critique with
knowledge, insisting that the natural-historical analysis of the life of the people (i.e.,
European ethnography) produces a representation like that of a harmonious work of art.41
It is true that Riehl’s natural history comes with a rationalization of art by the bureaucratic state that would horrify Ruskin: “What the poet intuits and depicts is what the social
policy maker should analyze and apply.”42 Despite this important difference, however,
there is a shared belief that natural-historical knowledge and artistic production are
compatible and moreover require each other for either to succeed.
For Eliot, however, it is the ability of the social to mediate history, rather than a
diagnosis of modernity, that is of greatest interest in Riehl’s work. That this mediation
has aesthetic importance is made clear by the fact that she begins her review with a
critique of contemporary British literature, in particular, of its representation of the
working classes. As Riehl points out, one form of modern alienation, additional to the
alienation from nature that is so important in Modern Painters III, is bourgeois estrangement from the life of the people. Eliot’s critique of literature identifies the results of this
estrangement in bourgeois writers’ general inability to sympathize with peasants and
40
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laborers and, therefore, to represent them truthfully, a state of affairs in which Dickens’s
“preternaturally virtuous poor children and artisans” are exemplary.43 Eliot’s introduction
of Riehl through the question of literary representation is no doubt the reason why the
review has been considered so important and why the “natural history” of the text’s title
is so often read as a figuration of realism, the term Eliot had recently used, as we saw
above, in her review of Modern Painters III. Certainly, Eliot invites such a reading with
the slippage between novelistic representation and ethnographic study that opens the
review of Riehl and which is revealed explicitly towards its end, when she writes that
Land und Leute “would be fascinating as literature if it were not important for its facts
and philosophy.”44 Given the prominent place accorded the review by scholars, the quick
transition from the opening discussion of the shortcomings of a contemporary literature
that fails to generate sympathy to the assertion of the desirability of a “natural history of
our social classes” remains curiously unexplained.
Eliot’s first gloss of what is meant in the review by natural history includes the
study of “the degree in which [the social classes] are influenced by local conditions” and
“the tendencies in their position towards disintegration or towards development.”45 Her
43
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second gloss positions natural history as the science of the particular (rather than general)
conditions of life, and it is here that she finds the value of Riehl’s books to non-German
readers.46 Though, at first glance, these two glosses may seem spatial and classificatory,
combined, they present history as the ecology of human societies. Graver identifies this
natural history as exemplary of a new philosophy of history, at stake in which was
“nothing less than a major redefinition of social values.”47 For Riehl, as Eliot well sees,
particularity—distinct from individuality—is the index of the historical. The principal
object of this deterministic, conservative natural history is the peasant as embodied
history—a collective, racialized subject whose specific characteristics are historically and
geographically determined; the individualization brought about in modern bourgeois
societies is, by contrast, the sign of historical transcendence, deracination.48 That such a
natural history can measure historical change is made clearest by Eliot’s need to explain
to her readers the difference between the contemporary condition of the peasantry in
Germany as compared to England, where “it is only in the most primitive districts, as in
Wales, for example, that farmers are included under the term.” In order that her readers
understand Riehl’s ethnography of rural Germany, Eliot invites them to undertake an act
of historical imagination:
[…] we must remember what the tenant-farmers and small proprietors
were in England half a century ago, when the master helped to milk his
46
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own cows, and the daughters got up at one o’clock in the morning to
brew,—when the family dined in the kitchen with the servants, and sat
with them round the kitchen fire in the evening. In those days, the quarried
parlour was innocent of a carpet, and its only specimens of art were a
framed sampler and the best tea-board; the daughters even of substantial
farmers had often no greater accomplishment in writing and spelling than
they could procure at a dame-school; and, instead of carrying on
sentimental correspondence, they were spinning their future table-linen,
and looking after every saving in butter and eggs that might enable them
to add to the little stock of plate and china which they were laying in
against their marriage.49
For most of Eliot’s readers, as well as herself (she was born in 1819), rural life in England at the turn of the century will not be the subject of personal memory. In this review,
she is already writing fiction. Yet her imaginary vista onto a lost way of life exemplifies,
in miniature, an image of the people that is both aesthetic and natural historical. Eliot
here presents a world through the arrangement of carefully selected, particular metonymic roles and practices determined by natural rhythms and organized by tradition. The
nostalgia informing this exhortation to remember country life from fifty years ago is
made clear by the ensuing cynical characterization of that life in the present: “we can
hardly enter the least imposing farm-house without finding a bad piano in the ‘drawingroom’, and some old annuals, disposed with a symmetrical imitation of negligence, on the
table.”50 The particular details of both scenes—contemporary and retrospective—belie
the fact that they are both generalizations. A natural history, in so far as it finds history
embodied in material practices, but one whose data are not gleaned from folkloric fieldwork but rather imaginatively reconstructed: now and then, England and Germany. On
the one hand, a life naively historical in its “laying in” of tradition; on the other, a life so
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sentimental and alienated that it measures itself by the disingenuous arrangement of old
annuals. Natural history—for Ruskin, Eliot, and Riehl—provides a way of overcoming
this lived disparity of historical time. But where Ruskin’s thought continually splinters
into ever more particular and personal associations, and where Riehl, in his quest for a
German polity, fixes on the body of the peasantry as the site of historical continuity, Eliot
here invokes a more literary form of shared memory that is dreamlike in its subjective
reconstruction of space as historical.
Discussions of “The Natural History of German Life” usually connect the review’s comments about literature and representation to the portrayal of country life in
England in Adam Bede, the novel often taken as Eliot’s answer to the desideratum of an
unidealized representation of the people. The connection stands to reason, as Adam Bede
portrays imperfect individuals with a seemingly organic relation to a small rural community of “half a century ago”; moreover, its celebrated seventeenth chapter elaborates
Eliot’s earlier ad-hoc theorizations of realism, which is now compared to Dutch genre
painting, with its “precious quality of truthfulness.”51 Shuttleworth, for example, in
considering “The Natural History of German Life” and Adam Bede together, identifies a
common natural-historical element in the texts’ classificatory impulse and so reads
Eliot’s early experiments with natural history as evidence of a relatively static worldview
that would be revised in her subsequent novels.52 To take a specific example, the racialized descriptions of the physical appearance of Adam Bede and his brother Seth in the
novel’s opening pages invite comparison with Eliot’s discussion of Riehl’s characteriza51
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tion of peasant physiognomy as conservative in Die bürgerliche Gesellschaft.53 The
suggestion of a natural history whose remit includes racial genealogy thus reimagines the
static science of classification as a form of historical knowledge—“incarnate history” in
its most literal sense. This is one way in which the review’s slippage between the scientific study of society and the writing of fiction plays out in Eliot’s early novels. What
interests me about “The Natural History of German Life,” however, is its dependence on
an imperative of recollection in order to situate the details of its subject matter and
thereby elicit readerly interest: “we must remember what the tenant-farmers and small
proprietors were in England half a century ago.” Here is an invitation to sympathy that is
simultaneously a reminder of everyone in England’s historical determination and alienation, couched in the terms of personal experience. Accordingly, and in keeping with the
emphasis in this chapter on memory, I want to look at the aestheticization of memory in
relation to Eliot’s understanding of natural history in her second novel, The Mill on the
Floss, which has been described as both “Wordsworthian” and “anthropological.”54 As
we shall see, the novel ironizes the imperative to remember that underpins the natural
history of the people, thereby canceling the identification of memory and natural history
implicit in Eliot’s review and undermining their marriage in Ruskin’s aesthetics.
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4.
Most readers of The Mill on the Floss would quickly recognize its two obsessions: water
and heredity. They sit at the center of its natural-historical novelistic world and underpin
its dreamlike representation of necessity. After all, heredity is a naturalization of history,
a more individualized and patriarchal instance of “incarnate history,” and water is a
natural metaphor for temporality as old as Heraclitus. These obsessions accordingly
figure two aspects of temporalized nature in its inescapable determinacy: the past in the
form of the material genealogy conditioning each individual, and the ungraspable present
as the temporal moment in which the possibility of action arises and recedes. These two
figures of necessity are often in contention with the attempts of the novel’s central
character, Maggie Tulliver, to assert her desires, in her repeated missteps in the eyes of
her family and the distress caused by the determinations of oppressive gender norms and
the social attribution of a wayward and willful character.55 Early in the novel, for example, Mr. Tulliver reflects on the “the crossing o’ breeds” and its results with respect to the
characters of his children, Maggie and Tom; he is answered by Mrs. Tulliver’s immediate
concern about her daughter: “I don’t know where she is now, an’ it’s pretty nigh tea-time.
Ah, I thought so—wanderin’ up and down the water, like a wild thing: she’ll tumble in
some day.”56 Thence, over the course of the novel, heredity becomes a metaphor for the
complicated temporality of social responsibility,57 and so provides a way of grounding
morality via a naturalization of history in the face of the relentless flux of existence. This
55

See Ahmed, “Willful Parts”; and Beer, George Eliot, ch. 4.
Eliot, Mill on the Floss, bk. I, ch. ii, p. 12. Further citations will be made
parenthetically with book, chapter, and page number.
57
Thale, Novels of George Eliot, 45.
78
56

flux is figured by the mighty River Floss, which provides the ancient town of St. Ogg’s
with both its mythology and its prosperity, but which also blindly sweeps Maggie away
from her family with Stephen Guest, away from the past, against her will, a tragedy that
is only exceeded when the same river drowns her and her brother at the book’s end. As
Emily Steinlight writes, “Nature and history are not either/or propositions” in this novel.58 If The Mill on the Floss is dominated by figures of natural-historical necessity, what
room is there for autonomous relationships with the past? In this section, I explore two
such relationships, that of Maggie Tulliver and that of the novel’s narrator.
In The Mill on the Floss, the dialectical relation between individual and collective
is consistently referred to the realms of memory and history. Hao Li has argued that, for
Eliot, personal memory is the internalization of collective memory, which thereby
becomes a source of the self.59 With respect to The Mill on the Floss, she writes, “almost
every major character is relentlessly pursued by memory,” to the extent that memory
drives the plot.60 Each character in the novel, however, models a different relationship to
the past, with Dorlcote Mill often standing as the lost object either to be recovered or
mourned. The two most prominent relationships—namely, those of Maggie and the
narrator—are also the two most unalike. One of the ironies of The Mill on the Floss is
that the narrator is the only person who is allowed to cultivate a pleasurable relationship
to the past. The Tullivers are tragically incapable of doing so. The Dodsons are much
more interested in the future (to their benefit). Philip Wakem’s nostalgia is only ever a
source of anguish. By contrast, the narrator’s relationship to the past is characterized
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either by a wistful nostalgia or an easy irony: wistful when invoking personal memory,
ironic when discussing collective history. In either case, the past is an indulgence with
little real bearing on the present because the narrator seems to be living in a private study
rather than society. For the adult Maggie, however, every engagement with the past raises
the question of how one is to act in the present. A closer examination of these two
relationships with the past will show the conflicting ways in which memory works in the
novel to naturalize history in the present.
The Mill on the Floss begins with a dream that establishes both setting and
atmosphere:
A wide plain, where the broadening Floss hurries on between its green
banks to the sea, and the loving tide, rushing to meet it, checks its passage
with an impetuous embrace. On this mighty tide the black ships—laden
with the fresh-scented fir-planks, with rounded sacks of oil-bearing seed,
or with the dark glitter of coal—are borne along to the town of St. Ogg’s,
which shows its aged, fluted red roofs and the broad gables of its wharves
between the low wooded hill and the river-brink, tinging the water with a
soft purple hue under the transient glance of this February sun. Far away
on each hand stretch the rich pastures, and the patches of dark earth made
ready for the seed of broad-leaved green crops, or touched already with
the tint of the tender-bladed autumn-sown corn. There is a remnant still of
the last year’s golden clusters of beehive-ricks rising at intervals beyond
the hedgerows; and everywhere the hedgerows are studded with trees: the
distant ships seem to be lifting their masts and stretching their red-brown
sails close among the branches of the spreading ash. Just by the red-roofed
town the tributary Ripple flows with a lively current into the Floss. How
lovely the little river is, with its dark, changing wavelets! It seems to me
like a living companion while I wander along the bank and listen to its low
placid voice, as to the voice of one who is deaf and loving. I remember
those large dipping willows. I remember the stone bridge. (I, i, 7)
With its lucid, detailed description of appearances and its eschewal of narrative cause and
effect, this opening scene is less like a dream or a memory than an ecphrasis, at least until
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the intrusion of the narrator near the end of the paragraph. Eliot presents a seasonal
landscape drawn together by human activity—namely, trade and farming—and one in
which history only comes to view through everyday life and everyday life through nature:
the town whose roofs and wharves emerge from between the wooded hills, the ships’
sails spread among tree branches. That the image described is not a landscape by Pieter
Bruegel the Elder but rather the reconstruction of personal memory is revealed by the
sudden appearance of the narrator—“How lovely!”—“I remember…” It is someone’s
memory, though one manifestly shaped by the history of fine art. As the chapter goes on,
the narrator’s position and view condense and focus, and we are provided with a description of another painterly scene: of a mill, a wagon, a young girl and her dog. And now, it
turns out, this is all actually a dream, but one that is being described as it is taking place.
What we have, then, I think, is less a representation of dreaming, despite what Eliot has
the narrator write, than a reconstruction of a past experience and the pleasure taken in that
reconstruction. The Mill on the Floss thus opens by presenting remembrance as selfconsciously aesthetic work: the production of images. Where for Ruskin memories are
revealed to be aesthetic in analysis, Eliot here presents them as aesthetic in their production.
Such aestheticization continues in the narrator’s longer intrusions. Whether
dozing off again into personal reminiscence (a habit constrained to the first two books) (I,
v, 39–40; II, i, 142–43), discoursing on the history of St. Ogg’s (I, xii, 109–12), or
reflecting on the progress of the novel (IV, i, 251–53, containing the much-discussed
comparison of the Rhine and the Rhône), the narrator signals the importance of collective
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or imagined history to the imaginative representation of the past. As the story progresses,
these intrusions also reveal the difference between Maggie’s and the narrator’s ways of
relating to the past: “Life did change for Tom and Maggie; and yet they were not wrong
in believing that the thoughts and loves of these first years would always make part of
their lives. We could never have loved the earth so well if we had had no childhood in it”
(I, v, 39). Here the ominous suggestion of change segues into a celebration of childhood
memories by way of a cryptic allusion to a future made by the past. Eventually, Maggie
and Tom are shut out from taking pleasure in the past by their father’s bankruptcy: “They
had gone forth into their new life of sorrow, and they would never more see the sunshine
undimmed by remembered cares. They had entered the thorny wilderness, and the golden
gates of their childhood had for ever closed behind them” (II, vii, 180). But not so for the
narrator, or, it is assumed, the readership interpellated by those dreamy intrusions, a
readership ready to take intense pleasure in personal memory and moreover to connect it
with national history, both because of and despite the cosmopolitan alienation hinted at
by the narration. “These familiar flowers, these furrowed and grassy fields, each with a
sort of personality given to it by the capricious hedgerows—such things as these are the
mother tongue of our imagination, the language that is laden with all the subtle inextricable associations the fleeting hours of our childhood left behind them” (I, v, 39–40). Here
personal memory is radically collectivized and the experience of nature becomes one of
the foundations of an imagined community of readers, looking back nostalgically to an
earlier England, one on the cusp of industrialization and social and political reform.
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The collective act of memorialization is further nationalized in the account of St.
Ogg’s that begins the first book’s twelfth chapter and that serves to introduce the domestic scene of Mr. and Mrs. Glegg at home. Romans, Vikings, Anglo-Saxons and Normans,
Catholics and Protestants, Puritans and Loyalists—St. Ogg’s is a comprehensive English
synecdoche. Yet, through its ironic displacement of personal memory onto the material
fabric of the unremarkable town, this cute history undermines, albeit gently, the earnestness of the narrator’s invocation of a national childhood. Now the same red-fluted roofs
and black ships, so evocatively traced in the opening panorama, become hackneyed by
their association with “the well-crushed cheese and the soft fleeces, which my readers
have doubtless become acquainted with through the medium of the best classic pastorals”
(I, xii, 109). Rather than drawing readers in through the invocation of a shared formal
foundation for sympathy—“the mother-tongue of our imagination”—that universalizes
the intensely personal experience of childhood, the narrator forces a collective irony by
reducing experience to generic convention, deploying the codes of a common middleclass curriculum as the markers of historical transcendence: we, dear readers, are alienated together. As a result, the ghost-filled town becomes a pastiche:
It is one of those old, old towns which impress one as a continuation and
outgrowth of nature, as much as the nests of the bower-birds or the
winding galleries of the white ants: a town which carries the traces of its
long growth and history like a millennial tree, and has sprung up and
developed in the same spot between the river and the low hill from the
time when the Roman legions turned their backs on it from the camp on
the hill-side, and the long-haired sea-kings came up the river and looked
with fierce eager eyes at the fatness of the land. It is a town “familiar with
forgotten years.” (I, xii, 109)
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The citation of a commonplace from Wordsworth’s Excursion is the inscription that
completes the picture of the organic community in which the familiar and the forgotten
are, uncannily, equated. The result, as the narrator’s history will explain, is that town-life
goes on in ignorance of its history: “The mind of St. Ogg’s did not look extensively
before or after. It inherited a long past without thinking of it” (I, xii, 112).61 Collectively,
according to the narrator, the past is simply there, forgotten and familiar. It requires the
aesthetic work of narration or reading in order for that history to become manifest;
whether personal memory or national history, the results are similar, even when the
relationship with the past is ironized. When we look at the novel’s characters, however,
we get something entirely different. The past is neither a source of pleasure nor an
effective way for an individual to be reconciled with the social body. Despite her stated
position of duty to the past, this is least of all the case for Maggie.
While several critics have noted the formal similarity between Maggie’s habits of
absorption and the narrator’s indulgence in tangential reverie, which, especially as the
narration moves closer to Maggie’s perspective in book six, together model the experience of reading novels, much more striking to me is the disparity between their affective
relationships to the past.62 The narrator’s, which is all pleasure, whether serious or
playful, stands in stark contrast to Maggie’s earnest moralizations. Where, for the narrator, medieval Christianity is merely the object of antiquarianism, providing in “several
manuscript versions” the fairly stereotypical hagiography of St. Ogg, for Maggie, it
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provides ethical guidance in the form of Thomas à Kempis’s Imitation of Christ: on the
one hand, the positive pleasure of amusement and the ideologically productive work of
the imagined community; on the other, the social estrangement and libidinal mortification
of asceticism. In heeding medieval Christianity’s “voice from the past,” Maggie’s relation to history becomes sacramental and eschatological; her reading of the Bible and
devotional literature “filled her mind with a continual stream of rhythmic memories” (IV,
iii, 272). Not only does Maggie take up a form of medieval culture anathema to the
narrator’s aesthetic nationalism, she even refuses outright the pleasures of the latter,
turning down the Walter Scott that Philip offers to lend her, once read with such enjoyment, and which, as we have already seen, played such a central role in Ruskin’s historicization of his experience of nature.
“Do keep it, Maggie,” said Philip, entreatingly; “it will give you pleasure.”
“No, thank you,” said Maggie, putting it aside with her hand and
walking on. “It would make me in love with this world again, as I used to
be—it would make me long to see and know many things—it would make
me long for a full life.” (V, i, 284)
Here, pleasure taken in the imaginative representation of the past is explicitly connected
with earthly life. Maggie thus inadvertently affirms the truth of the narrator’s relationship
to the past, even as she renounces it. Later, when she is trying to escape elopement with
Stephen Guest, she gives her own position its clearest statement: “If the past is not to
bind us, where can duty lie?” (VI, xiv, 440). Unlike the narrator, who vacillates between
more or less serious forms of nostalgia, Maggie has internalized a theory of historical
determination as a moral principle. She has already told Philip, “I desire no future that
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will break the ties of the past” (VI, x, 411). While Maggie delivers this “with grave
sadness,” it contains a sentiment with which the narrator can heartily agree: it is an
essentially nostalgic orientation towards the future. Taken out of its context and held
under a different light—say, that of the narrator’s early, wistful intrusions—and with its
implicitly organic understanding of history and its kernel of hope (“That book will never
be closed”), it has much in common with contemporary historiography and could almost
be whiggish.63 Of course, things do not get better for Maggie Tulliver, and, ultimately,
the theory of history contained in the novel’s plot—in contrast to its narration—is not one
of progressive continuity but one of arbitrary disaster. The effect for the individual—and
especially for Maggie—is that the past is an ambivalent burden that repeatedly intrudes
on any pleasure: her duty to her family interrupting her love of Philip, her duty to Philip
in turn interrupting her fascination with Stephen.
“The happiest women, like the happiest nations, have no history” (VI, iii, 355).
Maggie’s story consistently undermines the narrator’s happy historiography. Even so, the
two have this much in common: they both desire a present oriented towards the past. For
the narrator, inhabiting their alienation, this provides for the collation of personal and
national history (though not their equation, as the ironic history of St. Ogg’s makes
clear). For Maggie, subject to patriarchy, life turns out to be much more complicated; her
rationally considered position of moral fidelity to the past proves too difficult to maintain.
The narrator’s hedonism and Maggie’s asceticism represent the two deficient aesthetic
attitudes to be overcome in the Ruskinian ideal of theoria—the fusion in aesthetics of
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sensuous representation and moral value. More pointedly, however, by questioning the
compatibility of personal memory and historical representation, they suggest an ambivalence at the heart of the aesthetic and social theory of both Ruskin and Eliot. The desire
for the past encoded in these memories, whether of Ruskin or Eliot or their readers, of
Maggie Tulliver or the narrator of The Mill on the Floss, cannot be the basis for a way of
life in a natural and historical world no longer governed by Providence.

5.
In this chapter, I have looked at two instances of aesthetic theory and practice from the
middle of the nineteenth century that consider the natural and the historical together. In
John Ruskin’s Modern Painters and George Eliot’s The Mill on the Floss, along with
Eliot’s engagement with W. H. Riehl’s Die Naturgeschichte des Volkes, we have seen
some of the various ways in which memory can be figured as a historicization of nature
and a naturalization of history. Despite their differences, Ruskin’s and Eliot’s use of
memory serve a similar function. In neither case is memory merely a personal relationship to one’s own lived past. Rather, both authors present memorialization as aesthetic
work that aims to connect individual consciousness to a larger human collective, namely,
with Ruskin, to European civilization, with Eliot, to the English nation. While the focus
has been British, the example of Riehl shows that this was a project with a wider European currency in the nineteenth century. With their discernible roots in the Romanticism of
Wordsworth and Scott, and their studious engagement, whether hostile or friendly, with
contemporary science, the “natural histories” of Ruskin and Eliot, though but two in87

stances from a large and diverse cultural field, demonstrate the importance given in midVictorian intellectual culture to the task of aligning an aesthetics of nature with the
dominant historicist episteme.
This importance can be registered in many aesthetic departments, beyond the art
theory, social criticism and fiction considered here. A couple of examples briefly considered will serve to illustrate its pervasiveness. In design, for example, Owen Jones’s
monumental Grammar of Ornament (1856) presents a historical survey of world culture,
from the “Ornament of Savage Tribes” to Italian neo-classicism. The book’s final chapter, moreover, presents Jones’s vision for the future of design: a return to nature that
remains faithful to the past. “I have endeavoured to show,” he writes, “that the future
progress of Ornamental Art may be best secured by engrafting on the experience of the
past the knowledge we may obtain by a return to Nature for fresh inspiration.”64 Note the
abstract nouns: progress, experience, past, knowledge, return, Nature, inspiration. Jones
collects in one sentence the key signifiers of an aesthetics that is simultaneously postRomantic (in the sense of having incorporated and normalized the tenets of Romanticism)
and mid-Victorian in its commitment to a historiography of progress and the epistemological alignment of knowledge with nature. The very next sentence reads: “To attempt to
build up theories of art, or to form a style, independently of the past would be an act of
supreme folly.”65 For Jones, ultimately, the “return to nature” is the surest way to remain
faithful to history. While Jones cannot contribute directly to the discussion of personal
memory that has occupied me here, he nevertheless provides an example of how the
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aesthetic problem of nature and history was thought about in the Victorian period, and
how this problem flowed out into everyday life: Jones’s designs were enormously popular among Victorian middle-class householders.66
Gerard Manley Hopkins, by contrast, provides an example from poetics that is
well outside the mainstream but which nevertheless speaks to the same aesthetic problem.
While still concerned with the question of how memory traces history in nature, Hopkins
in several respects represents a break from the Wordsworthian tradition of “the real
language of men” and “spots of time.” His theological-aesthetic concepts of inscape
(natural pattern) and instress (its effect on the imagination), which he began using in the
1860s, turn the lyric memory of nature into an eschatological meditation on God’s glory
and Jesus Christ’s salvation of a fallen humanity.67 Many of Hopkins’s most well-known
poems—“As kingfishers catch fire,” “The Windhover,” “Pied Beauty,” “That Nature is a
Heraclitean Fire and of the Comfort of the Resurrection”—move from a highly wrought
description of natural phenomena through lyrical self-doubt and onto an affirmation of
faith in the holy trinity. Moreover, his experiments with sprung rhythm, developed from
his studies of Anglo-Saxon and Welsh verse forms, connect modern English lyric to
ancient cultural forms at the level of metrical temporality. As Meredith Martin shows, the
implications for both language and historical knowledge are enormous: Hopkins’s
interest in Anglo-Saxon verse was an interest in the capacity of language to capture “the
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instress of an entire people.”68 Poetic form is thus historicized as a way of seeing and
internalizing natural form.
As tempting as it would be to undertake more sustained readings of Hopkins and
Jones or to explore further examples from Victorian culture of a natural-historical aesthetics (such as the novels of the Brontës, the various work of the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood, or the writings of Darwin himself), my goal has not been to provide with this
chapter a comprehensive survey of mainstream Victorian aesthetics; furthermore, in
introducing these two additional examples here, I hope only to indicate something of the
diversity and pervasiveness of the project to think nature and history together through
aesthetics. For this is the very same project that Vivian rails against in “The Decay of
Lying”: the return to nature and the commitment to historicism. By 1889, when Wilde
wrote the dialogue, both of these mid-century natural-historical tenets had come under
serious attack across the arts, from Walter Pater’s aesthetic criticism to James McNeill
Whistler’s impressionistic “nocturnes.” Even so, these attacks were controversial: as is
well known, Ruskin’s outraged response in Fors Clavigera to Whistler’s pictures—“two
hundred guineas for flinging a pot of paint in the public’s face” (R29:160)—was found
libelous in court in 1878; Eliot, meanwhile, deemed Pater’s Renaissance “poisonous.”69
Wilde’s diatribe, despite its hyperbole, has a clearly identifiable object in sight, one
which must have been recognizable to his readers in order for the text to have had its
intended effect. The other three chapters in this dissertation treat aesthetic approaches to
the problems of historical representation that are, to a greater or lesser extent, responses
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to the natural-historical consensus that prevailed mid-century. The authors treated there
are less concerned with truth to nature (no matter how historicized) than they are with the
truth in aesthetic experience per se; they are more interested in the power of the present to
determine the historical for itself and for the future than in the tendency of memory to
drag us back into a past in which history and nature only reflect one another.
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Chapter Two
Renaissance Now: Historical Experience and the Modern
Individual in John Addington Symonds and Walter Pater

1.
While, from antiquity down to the present, natural history has usually been understood as
a universalizing discourse, Ruskin and Eliot, as we have just seen, look to reposition it as
culturally situated and aesthetic. The implication is that the subjects of natural-historical
knowledge are just as diverse as its objects. Such a move matters for this dissertation
because it demonstrates some of the ways in which Victorian aesthetic discourse attempts
to restore historical knowledge to subjectivity. In the case of both authors, however,
social determinations remain strong, even, as in The Mill on the Floss, overwhelming.
Accordingly, despite their unwavering commitment to particularity, neither Ruskin nor
Eliot would endorse the more decisive turn towards personal experience signaled, in the
British context, by the publication of Walter Pater’s The Renaissance (1873). If Ruskin
and Eliot are concerned with how individual experience relates to a collective sense of
history, Pater’s aesthetics, especially as articulated in his book’s preface and conclusion,
focuses on the experience of an individual subject overdetermined by the historical yet
seemingly without social ties: “What is this song or picture, this engaging personality
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presented in life or in a book, to me?”1 Such an individualism is clearly opposed to the
conservative and organic models of society expounded by Ruskin and Eliot. While
Pater’s understanding of the relationship between individual and collective is more
complex than this brief citation suggests, its location in the preface to a book about the
Renaissance points us to one of the major claims of nineteenth-century historicism:
modern individuality—always coded as male and distinguished by its relative individualism, that is, by its relative freedom from community and society—originates in Renaissance Italy.
This chapter examines some of the contradictions about the relationship between
individual and collective in the nineteenth-century discourse of the Renaissance, moving
from the work of the period’s major European historians, Jacob Burckhardt and Jules
Michelet, onto that of two English critics, John Addington Symonds and Walter Pater.
Together, these four very different authors provide a genealogy of Renaissance historiography as the exploration of a desire for the past that is also a desire for a different way of
living in the present. I begin with Burckhardt and Michelet, who, despite their opposed
visions of history, establish the period-concept as the moment of Europe’s transition to
modernity and the birth of the modern individual. I then turn to Symonds, who combines
Burckhardt’s cosmopolitan individualism and Michelet’s optimistic nationalism with
Spencerian biologism to produce the Renaissance as the sign of European racial superiority. In contrast to these three historians, but in consonance with other writers of British
Aestheticism such as Oscar Wilde and Vernon Lee, Pater understands the Renaissance as
an ethical-aesthetic concept rather than a strictly historiographical one, a mode of histori1

Pater, Renaissance, xix (emphasis in original).
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cal relation that aims at pleasure and transformation. Pater’s writings on the Renaissance
are particularly worth introducing here because they explore the investments of individuality in historical consciousness rather than obscuring them, either through objectification, as in Burckhardt and Symonds, or mystification, as in Michelet. In this regard,
Pater’s Renaissance has more in common with Ruskin’s or Eliot’s natural history than
any of them would have cared to admit. Unlike Ruskin or Eliot, however, Pater valorizes
the pleasures of aesthetic experience without apprehension or qualification; moreover, his
attention to the grotesqueness of the figure of renaissance, its blurring of the boundaries
between life and death, not only explores the limits to historical consciousness as the
consciousness of what is living and dead in history, but also aestheticizes those limits as
attributes of the subject of Renaissance history. Before I get to these nineteenth-century
writers, however, I would like to introduce a twentieth-century example that illustrates
what has always been at stake, at least since Michelet and Burckhardt, in the image of the
Renaissance.
Edmund Husserl’s last great work, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1937), opens with a surprising (for the philosopher of the
phenomenological reduction) historicization. Husserl begins by diagnosing the crisis
named in his title as the alienation of all science—historiography as much as physics—
from human life, a crisis caused, and here we hear an echo of Nietzsche’s Untimely
Meditations, by its commitment to a positivism that refuses to grant ethical meaning to
knowledge. The mathematization of nature has caused us to forget the lifeworld which
precedes and determines it. But it was not always so:
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In the Renaissance, as is well known, European humanity brings about a
revolutionary change. It turns against its previous way of existing—the
medieval—and disowns it, seeking to shape itself anew in freedom. Its
admired model is ancient humanity. This mode of existence is what it
wishes to reproduce in itself.
What does it hold to be essential to ancient man? After some
hesitation, nothing less than the “philosophical” form of existence: freely
giving oneself, one’s whole life, its rule through pure reason or through
philosophy. […] According to the guiding ideal of the Renaissance,
ancient man forms himself with insight through free reason. For this
renewed “Platonism” this means not only that man should be changed
ethically [but that] the whole human surrounding world, the political and
social existence of mankind, must be fashioned anew through free reason,
through the insights of a universal philosophy.2
Husserl thus provides an image of the Renaissance as the birth of European modernity
that is simultaneously a radical break with the past and a return to and revival of antiquity, here reduced to Greek philosophy, in which is found the promise of a free and rational
life. This is not merely an opening vignette for Husserl, but an image to which he continually returns throughout the book. The Renaissance determines modernity as such, and
yet the promise that it finds in ancient culture is one that modernity has never been able
to realize itself. For Husserl, this is an ontological, rather than merely ethical or epistemological, problem:
Only then [i.e., if the promise of a philosophical life were fully realized]
could it be decided whether European humanity bears within itself an
absolute idea, rather than being merely an empirical anthropological type
like “China” or “India”; it could be decided whether the spectacle of the
Europeanization of all other civilizations bears witness to the rule of an
absolute meaning, one which is proper to the sense, rather than to a
historical non-sense, of the world.3
2
3

Husserl, Crisis of European Sciences, 8.
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The stakes could not be higher: Is European humanity universal or is it just another
culture? Of course, the specific conditions of the 1930s will always inform how we read
Husserl’s text. Accordingly, it would not be a stretch to explain the urgency of the crisis
he identifies with the fascism that two other German-Jewish philosophers writing only
slightly later, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, understand as an outcome of a notdissimilar, though much more pessimistically formulated, process of alienation they
famously call the dialectic of Enlightenment. For Husserl, then, the Renaissance itself
presents an image of a cosmopolitan Europe in place of one divided by nationalisms, but
a Europe, moreover, whose global hegemony is the path towards the realization of its
universality. Nothing like Husserl’s urgency will be found in the nineteenth-century
discourse of the Renaissance; the concerns will, nonetheless, be much the same, and the
questions of imperialism, European chauvinism, and Eurocentric historiography will
become, perhaps surprisingly, given the period’s historical basis in pre-Columbian Italy,
of central concern.
What then is the genealogy of this image of the Renaissance and of this mode of
historical consciousness that looks to a particular moment in the past in order to refound
European humanity in the present? While “the Renaissance” is a historiographical term
whose meaning we can now, to a certain extent, take for granted, for much of the nineteenth century, when it first gained currency as a proper noun with a definite article, its
concept was undergoing formation and was subject to contention. In most accounts of
Renaissance historiography, two works from the middle of the nineteenth century are
given particular importance: the seventh volume of Michelet’s Histoire de France (1855),
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which gives the name to the period of Europe’s transition to modernity; and Burckhardt’s
Die Cultur der Renaissance in Italien (1860), which consolidates many of the ideas
associated with the period, especially that of the birth of the modern individual. Despite
the undeniable importance of Michelet and Burckhardt in the genealogy of the period
concept, it nevertheless has a longer history. While in the 1950s Erwin Panofsky argued
for a strong awareness of cultural rebirth among fifteenth-century Italian scholars and
artists themselves,4 J. B. Bullen has more recently contended that, in order for the Renaissance to be established as a discrete period, there was needed not only historical distance
but a coherent concept of the medieval from which to differentiate it.5 Bullen attributes
the coinage to the late-eighteenth-century French art historian Jean Baptiste Seroux
d’Agincourt, who, influenced by the Enlightenment histories of Voltaire and Edward
Gibbon, and the art history of J. J. Winckelmann, first applied the name of Renaissance
to the period between the Middle Ages and modernity.6 However, “the Renaissance”
really gained traction, first in France and then in England, in the context of the Romantic
revival of Gothic architecture, wherein, for a writer such as Ruskin, it represented a
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Panofsky, Renaissance and Renascences in Western Art, 8–41. The case is also made by
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lamentable revival of paganism and a fall from grace.7 It was then through the work of
(among others) Michelet, Burckhardt, Nietzsche, and Pater that the Renaissance underwent a transvaluation, still characterized as a period of secularization but now valorized
as the moment of the individual’s freedom from medieval oppression. In Nietzsche’s
words, the Renaissance signaled the “unfettering of the individual.”8 Despite the concordance of their positive assessment, however, the details of the historical image presented by each of these authors differ substantially. It is only towards the end of the
nineteenth century, in the work of Symonds, that Bullen finds the Renaissance referring
to “an established historical fact that needs no defence.”9
While the Renaissance may no longer exert the same moral force it did for
Husserl, his image of it as a moment of intense classical revival is certainly one that
remains widely current. If this is so, however, it is the result of a transformation of the
period’s associations in the early twentieth century.10 As Bullen explains, the period no
longer has quite the same connotations of unconventional morality, for example, that it
did throughout the nineteenth century.11 A fuller image is provided by Yvonne Ivory,
who identifies five topoi that characterize most representations, fictional and non7

See especially The Stones of Venice, wherein the Renaissance is routinely denounced as
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fictional, of the Renaissance around the turn of the century: “The aestheticization of all
aspects of life; the celebration of the body; the tolerance of crime, especially in its
incarnations of vice and excess; the proliferation of illicit sexual practices; and the rise of
individualism and its attendant cults of personality.”12 Having identified these five topoi,
Ivory examines one of the most common uses, in the specific contexts of her study
(Britain and Germany in the period from 1850 to 1930), of the image of the Renaissance
that these topoi constitute: homosexual writers’ use of the Renaissance to legitimate their
desires, for themselves and for their societies, at a time when the concept of homosexuality as we know it was only just beginning to take shape.13 This usage, as Ivory makes
clear, is related to a broader movement of individualism and self-culture, that, in Renaissance historiography, is strongly associated with Burckhardt and has its most well-known
recent articulation in Stephen Greenblatt’s Renaissance Self-Fashioning. There is,
however, a second strand in Renaissance historiography, one that establishes the historical and geographical primacy of Europe. This strand runs from Michelet’s French nationalism and his triumphalist view of the Renaissance as the overcoming of medieval
darkness, through to idealizing rehabilitations of Renaissance humanism, such as Husserl’s and Panofsky’s, as the promise of European cosmopolitanism and philosophical
life.

12
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2.
Despite the cosmopolitan aspirations of much Renaissance historiography, we find in its
earliest popularizer a baldly nationalistic tenor. Most discussions of Michelet’s development of the Renaissance concept focus on volume seven (1855) of his Histoire de
France, which takes Renaissance as its title and contains Michelet’s most developed
characterization of the period. Here, the word denotes broadly Europe’s rediscovery of
antiquity and transition to modernity and more narrowly a specifically French engagement with the culture and society of fifteenth-century Italy. However, Michelet’s first
discussion of the Renaissance in the Histoire de France occurs in volume four (1840), in
the chapters on Louis of Orléans (1372–1407), who embodies “the amiable and brilliant
spirit, the light, hardly severe, but rather gracious and sweet, spirit of the Renaissance”
and in whose time France emerged from the Middle Ages and realized itself.14 In this
context, the Renaissance spirit becomes the spirit of France itself, transhistorical but
finding its expression at a specific historical moment. In its narrowest sense, in volume
four, Michelet’s Renaissance is the moment at which France assumes its rightful place as
the leading nation of Europe. At its broadest, in volume seven, it is a heroic all-Europe
effort, its greatest figures Columbus, Copernicus and Luther, and its two great achievements the discovery of the world and the discovery of man.15 While Michelet’s Histoire
de France is, in many respects, a history of great men, and moreover, as we shall see, his
understanding of history is intensely personal, his image of the Renaissance presents it as
the collective achievement of European modernity.
14
15
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In Die Cultur der Renaissance in Italien, Burckhardt translates Michelet’s summation of the period’s achievements and includes it as the title of the book’s fourth part,
“Die Entdeckung der Welt und des Menschen.” In the course of the book, however, what
emerges as the most historically significant aspect of the Renaissance is the creation of
the modern individual as such.16 In the volatile political conditions of the Italian states,
where each strove to further his or her own interests, the veil of “belief, childish prejudice
and delusion” was first lifted, and people started to see themselves as more than members
of a “race, people, party, corporation, family or some other form of the universal.” Now,
“man becomes a spiritual individual and recognizes himself as such.”17 These first
individuals worked towards the formation of their own personalities (Ausbildung der
Persönlichkeit) by expanding both their practical and emotional capabilities and recognizing the resources (both internal and external) available to them for the enjoyment of
life. Where for Michelet the mortification of the old medieval order frees the human spirit
to discover itself and the world (that is, to realize its potential), for Burckhardt, by
16

Unsurprisingly, academic historians no longer accept Burckhardt’s Renaissance as a
true representation of the period. For example, the editors of a book of scholarly essays
write in their introduction: “Jacob Burckhardt’s classic claim that the Renaissance
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contrast, it is the particular—politically volatile and undemocratic—social conditions of
fourteenth-century Italy that allow for the development of an individualistic way of life.
Where for Michelet the discovery of the human begins with Luther’s breaking the bonds
of dogmatism, for Burckhardt, the locus of this discovering is the accomplished, cosmopolitan courtier (cortigiano), who is identified as the ideal social individual (der gesellschaftliche Idealmensch).18 Moreover, where Michelet refers the discovery of the world
to the colonization of the Americas and the Copernican revolution, the chief form it takes
in Burckhardt is not colonial or scientific (though these are discussed) but aesthetic: it is
the discovery of beauty in the outward world and the development of the capacity for its
description and enjoyment.19
Ultimately, Renaissance individualism represents, for Burckhardt, an argument
against the cultural mediocrity that he associates, in common with many other bourgeois
intellectuals of the time, with democracy.20 According to Burckhardt’s historicist analysis
(he was a student of Ranke’s), despotism goes hand-in-hand with the cultural and social
achievements of the Renaissance—the revival of antiquity as much as the self-cultivation
of the cortigiano. Not only does the presence at court of scholars and artists legitimate the
despot’s regime, based as it is on an unlawful seizure of the state, but these “many-sided
men” also share a deeper affinity: despot and artist alike rely on their personality and
talent in order to maintain their precarious positions.21 Accordingly, Michelet and Burckhardt represent not only two different images of the Renaissance but also two different
18
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approaches to historiography: while Burckhardt’s study is synchronic and his vision of
history pessimistic, Michelet’s Histoire is both diachronic and optimistic.22 We have,
then, two seemingly incompatible strands of Renaissance historiography: on the one
hand, the triumphalism of Michelet and, on the other, the individualism of Burckhardt.
Might it be possible, however, to look past these differences to find a relationship between Burckhardt’s self-producing individual and Michelet’s supreme France? As it
happens, Michelet himself suggests so.
In the preface to the 1869 edition of the Histoire de France, Michelet provides
reflections upon his monumental project, thirty-six years after the publication of the first
volume. His comments on the object and subject of history are remarkably convergent.
Of France, Michelet writes: “It is the powerful labor of oneself on oneself, whereby
France, by her own progress, transforms all her raw elements. […] France itself has
formed France. […] France is the daughter of her freedom.”23 Michelet claims “to have
established France as a person,”24 who, like Burckhardt’s cortigiano, is realized in the
Renaissance as the result of self-creation. The process of history is mirrored in that of
historiography. On the next page, Michelet posits the identity of author and text, in the
very process of their production: “My life was in this book, it has been transformed into
it. […] It is a fact that history, in the progress of time, makes the historian much more
than it is made by him. My book has created me.” This mode of historical writing is made
possible by nothing other than the “modern personality” itself, “so powerful and en22
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larged.” Its affective form is a love that results in identification: “In penetrating an object
more and more deeply, we come to love it, and henceforth we examine it with growing
interest. The heart touched with emotion has second sight; it sees a multitude of things
invisible to those who are indifferent. History and the historian merge in this view.”25 As
above, so below. It is worth recalling that this untempered reverse constructivism is being
pushed by the self-proclaimed founder of the archival method, who desired above all to
purify history of its fictive element and accurately represent the life of the past.26 Even
so, Michelet provides us with an instance of one of the hallmarks of Renaissance historiography: the resurfacing of the past is personally transformative for the one who studies
it. Accordingly, Michelet’s excess serves to illustrate the kernel of historiographical
ascesis in the tradition of Renaissance thinking as the work of the self-producing subject,
whether that subject be a fifteenth-century cortigiano, a nineteenth-century historian, or
Europe itself. In Michelet, even more than in Burckhardt, the formation of the self and
the emergence of European modernity are understood in relation to one another, not
merely coeval or causal but basically the same. As we know, however, in contrast to the
nationalist Michelet, Renaissance historiography, from Burckhardt to Panofsky, has
generally presented its object as not just any but the supreme historical locus for European cosmopolitanism, often in explicit opposition to the nationalisms of recent centuries.
Reading Burckhardt and Michelet together, despite the great differences in their historio25
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graphical method, reveals that this cosmopolitanism is not really a universalism but a
particularity defined by European modernity as the capacity for individualization. Or,
perhaps more accurately, it is a universalism in the same (paradoxical) way that, as
Étienne Balibar has argued, racism and nationalism are universalisms, namely, because
they formulate an ideal humanity.27 This universalism, implicit in Burckhardt and Michelet, becomes much more obvious in the historical work of the British critic, poet, and
theorist of sexual inversion, John Addington Symonds.

3.
Symonds’s seven-volume Renaissance in Italy (1875–1886), which remains the most
comprehensive study of the period written in English, is explicitly indebted to the histories of Michelet and Burckhardt. Taken as foundational are “the discovery of the world
and the discovery of man”—the period’s “greatest achievements”—and the central role
of self-culture and personality for the emergence of modern subjectivity in the courtier
and the “many-sided genius.”28 Symonds likewise aligns these aspects of the Renaissance
with its status as the moment of Europe’s transition to modernity.29 With Symonds,
however, the move from the national context to a pan-European one is accompanied by
an explicitly racialized discourse of global progress that is lacking in Michelet and
Burckhardt. While the Eurocentrism of our French and Swiss historians cannot be
27
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decoupled from an implicit white supremacy, race as such is not a central concept in
either’s philosophy of history: Michelet locates the collective force of history in class
(“the people”) and Burckhardt in high culture. For Symonds, whose philosophy of history
incorporates the discourse of evolutionary science, race is the motor of history.30 True,
the majority of Renaissance in Italy is given to descriptions of social conditions and to
detailed, erudite criticism of art and literature.31 Yet these studies are framed by a theory
of history that frequently invokes the language of race, whether in explanations of
particular historical phenomena or in more general reflections on the nature of historical
progress. The Renaissance is thus described as the Italian rediscovery of an ancestral
Roman culture, as though by a kind of racial instinct.32 Or, as in the opening definition of
the period, as a moment in the onward progress of Europe:
By the term Renaissance, or new birth, is indicated a natural movement,
not to be explained by this or that characteristic, but to be accepted as an
effort of humanity for which at length the time had come, and in the
onward progress of which we still participate. The history of the
30
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Renaissance is not the history of arts, or of sciences, or of literature, or
even of nations. It is the history of the attainment of self-conscious
freedom by the human spirit manifested in the European races.33
For all his tribute to Burckhardt and Michelet, Symonds implicitly rejects their conceptualizations of the Renaissance as, respectively, a cultural or national achievement marking
the end of the Middle Ages. The distinctly Hegelian formulation—“the attainment of
self-conscious freedom by the human spirit”—turns the Renaissance into history itself, “a
natural movement […] in the onward progress of which we still participate.” Where
Burckhardt presents Renaissance individualism as the overcoming of race, Symonds
takes it as a sign of the racial superiority of Europeans, the most historical of races. The
modern subject’s freedom to produce himself is, then, the prerogative of his race as much
as it is the outcome of historical conditions.34
Symonds’s Hegelian Renaissance not only narrates what Europe has already
achieved in its self-realization—including “the appropriation by civilized humanity of all
corners of the habitable globe”35—but also anticipates the future. The second volume of
Renaissance in Italy, which was published in 1877, the year after Queen Victoria was
first styled Empress of India, concludes with the classic image of the torch-race of
nations: “Greece stretches forth her hand to Italy; Italy consigns the sacred fire to Northern Europe; the people of the North pass on the flame to America, to India, and the
33
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Australasian isles.”36 Fraser cites this passage as an indication of Symonds’s “liberal
humanist view of history,” but what is told here is not simply a history of culture in
Europe but a global one of invasion and colonization.37 To be sure, we are not surprised
to find a racialization of history and an apology for imperialism in nineteenth-century
history books. Symonds’s incorporation of an evolutionary concept of race as the collective subject of history is not remarkable in itself, even if it is a departure from the earlier
accounts of Michelet and Burckhardt. What I want to focus on here is, rather, the way in
which Symonds constitutes himself as a historical subject in the writing of his text. In
bringing together Burckhardt’s theory of the individual and synchronic, cultural-studies
methodology with Michelet’s chauvinism and strangely personalized historicism, and
then putting all this alongside late-nineteenth-century evolutionary theory and its anxieties about race, Symonds’s text becomes the site of an unresolvable conflict between a
scientific approach to history and the historian’s sublimated personal investments.
In Renaissance in Italy, Symonds’s self-positioning is legible in a number of
places, but I will start with his explicit comments on the work of the historian and the
critic. Symonds expounds a positivist theory of historical knowledge and a conservative
approach to art appreciation, repudiating the aestheticism that achieved notoriety with the
publication of Pater’s Renaissance in 1873. In a “Digression on Criticism” buried in a
chapter about Bolognese painting in Renaissance in Italy’s seventh volume, Symonds
asserts that the question of pleasure has no place in criticism, that the critic must be a
“healthy person who has made himself acquainted with the laws of evolution in art and in
36
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society,” and that aesthetic judgment is not a question of art’s effect on the individual but
the consensus of “enlightened intelligence.”38 He had already, in the conclusion to
volume five, derided the aesthetic cult of the Renaissance, which, at the time of publication (1881), could have been read as a coded attack on Pater. Ironically, despite the
importance of the humanist revival to his work, Symonds insists that the Renaissance
should not itself be imitated: “We cannot extract from the Renaissance a body of ethical
teaching, an ideal of conduct, or a discipline of manners, applicable to the altered conditions of the nineteenth century.” Such a warning would be “impertinent,” he writes,
“were we not from time to time admonished from the chair of criticism that a new
Gospel, founded on the principles of the Renaissance, has been or is being preached in
England.”39 Given his investments in Renaissance culture, both here and elsewhere,
including in his homoerotic poetry, Symonds’s disavowal of aestheticism’s appropriation
of the past is curious, even if his characterization of it is flimsy.40 It can be explained,
however, by the program of scientific historicism that informs and frames Renaissance in
Italy: the historian represents “the simple truth.”41
Historical truth, however, even as Symonds presents it, is never so simple. John
Hale argues that Renaissance in Italy is hamstrung by a contradiction in its philosophy of
history: on the one hand, Symonds presents a Hegelian theory of history as progress in
which individuals have little agency; on the other hand, he remains beholden, in spite of
38

Symonds, Renaissance in Italy, 7:230–31. In his review of the volume, Wilde
dismissed this chapter as “too polemical to be pleasant” (W6:107).
39
Symonds, Renaissance in Italy, 5:459.
40
For a reading of Symonds’s poetry informed by his studies of the Renaissance, see
Ballam, “Renaissance Erotic.”
41
Symonds, Renaissance in Italy, 5:459.
109

this, to a Carlylean vision of history as the domain of heroic men, whose lives are celebrated, at times eroticized, throughout the text.42 This conflict is evident in his methodological remarks, which use the language of biography as well as that of progressive
history and evolutionary theory, sometimes in the same sentence. In volume one, for
example, Symonds’s writes that “the true object of the historian is to set forth the life of a
commonwealth as a continuous whole, to draw the portrait of a state with due regard to
its especial physiognomy.”43 In the conclusion to the fifth volume (originally intended as
the last in the series), Symonds expounds his vision of progressive history as “the biography of man.” The historian-biographer “trace[s] the continuity of civilization,” a
continuity that was first intuited in the Renaissance but has now “assumed the dignity of
organized speculation in the German philosophies of history, and in the positive philosophy of Auguste Comte.” “It has,” moreover, “received its most powerful corroboration
from recent physical discoveries, and has acquired firmer consistency in the Darwinian
speculation.”44 To conceive history according to the human life-cycle was commonplace
in philosophy by Symonds’s time and can be found in both Hegel and Comte, though I
suspect not in Darwin. Whereas Michelet’s metaphorically personalized France provides
for the historian’s confessed identification with his subject matter, Symonds’s metonymy
makes history into a biologized person knowable to the scientific historian, even as he
insists upon a general temporal process (evolution or progress) in which Symonds
himself, by implication, participates. The historian Symonds accordingly writes the
biography of his own race.
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What is at stake for Symonds—personally—in this “biography”? Hale claims that
Symonds’s “interest in history was above all personal,” having already characterized this
interest as the symptom of closeted homosexuality.45 “Convinced that he was repulsive,”
writes Hale of the young Symonds, “he dreamed of the ideal beauty of Greek youth.”46
While Hale’s psychological reading of Symonds borders on homophobic, more recent
scholarship has also made a strong connection between Symonds’s studies of antiquity
and the Renaissance and his work on the history of sexual inversion.47 Yvonne Ivory,
Heike Bauer, and Will Fisher all understand Renaissance in Italy as, at least in part, a
way for Symonds to conceptualize and historicize same-sex desire. Accordingly, the
“objective persona” (as Roland Barthes would call it) of Symonds’s historical narration,
with its discourse of positivism and progress, belies a deep personal investment in his
materials.48 This investment can be detected in the recurrent enthusiasm for the bodies of
Italian men, of which the following is typical:
The Italians of the new age were a noble nation, gifted with physical,
emotional, and mental faculties in splendid harmony. In some districts,
notably in Florence, circumstance and climate had been singularly
favourable to the production of such glorious human beings as the world
has rarely seen. Beauty of person, strength of body, and civility of
manners were combined in the men of that favoured region with
intellectual endowments of the highest order.49
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It is also present in Symonds’s claim that the cortigiano represents the prototype of the
modern gentleman. Indeed, his qualities comprise a near perfect set of aristocratic values:
nobility, courage, manliness, modesty, grace, culture, scholarship, artistic skill.50 Even
though Symonds rejects the subjectivism of aesthetic criticism, the nature of his personal
investments in the Renaissance become evident upon closer inspection. The concern for
the future of the European races, the desire for virile masculinity, the contempt for
middle-class philistinism—these reveal that the historicist critic Symonds, no less than
the unnamed aesthetic critics that he repudiates or the wildly confessional Michelet that
he endorses, engages the Renaissance to produce himself as the subject of its history.
Where Symonds’s work follows Michelet’s in suggesting that there is something to
celebrate in the fact of this historical subjectivity, Walter Pater’s reflections are marked
by an ambivalence and a focus on present experience that put into doubt both progressive
history and the form of subjectivity that finds itself therein.

4.
In contrast to those nineteenth-century writers on the Renaissance whose work we have
just explored, Pater is less concerned with discovering the origin of modernity and its
institutions than he is with finding ways of living in it. While his work confirms the
centrality of early-modern Italy and is concerned with the individual in history, the
Renaissance, for Pater, is more epistemological and affective than historiographical,
becoming a mode of representing and relating to the past that is not necessarily limited to
50
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the Renaissance as usually understood. This reconceptualization takes place in Pater’s
collection of essays entitled The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry.51 When Pater
first presents his project in the preface to this book, what we find is an aesthetic hedonism. It is a hedonism because it takes pleasure as the highest good, and it is aesthetic
because this pleasure is attained from the perception and contemplation of beauty in art,
nature, and human life. This aesthetic hedonism concerns particular instances of beauty in
the personal experience of a cultivated individual, the “aesthetic critic.” Hence the proper
questions of criticism: “What is this song or picture, this engaging personality presented
in life or in a book, to me? What effect does it really produce on me? Does it give me
pleasure? and if so, what sort or degree of pleasure? How is my nature modified by its
presence, and under its influence?”52 This is precisely the aesthetic subjectivism to which
Symonds so strongly objected.
Pleasure—which for Pater is never mere voluptuousness—lies at the core of his
concept of the Renaissance. In contrast to the aesthetic hedonism of the preface, however,
when Pater presents his definition of the Renaissance in the first chapter (“Two Early
French Stories”), what we get is something less sensuous and more cerebral. “For us,” he
writes,
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the Renaissance is the name of a many-sided but yet united movement, in
which the love of the things of the intellect and the imagination for their
own sake, the desire for a more liberal and comely way of conceiving life,
make themselves felt, urging those who experience this desire to search
out first one and then another means of intellectual or imaginative
enjoyment, and directing them not only to the discovery of old and
forgotten sources of this enjoyment, but to the divination of fresh sources
thereof—new experiences, new subjects of poetry, new forms of art. (1–2)
We are, nevertheless, still talking about pleasure, even if its object has become immaterial. Key here is the fact that Pater’s Renaissance is thoroughly erotic, a movement propelled by love and desire. The object of these feelings is a way of life that appears here as
a spiritual hedonism. It is spiritual in a sense that Pater, as a student of German philosophy, would recognize: the pleasures sought are those of the intellect and imagination. But
elsewhere, throughout the book, Pater emphasizes the love of sensually apprehended
corporeal beauty rather than the desire for spiritual pleasure. For Pater, these two forms
of pleasure are two sides of the same coin, and so the various forms of beauty are not to
be separated into a Platonic hierarchy. In any case, pleasure is the overarching concept
that brings together the three related tendencies that Pater calls upon to characterize the
Renaissance throughout his book, namely: the liberation of the senses and the imagination, the worship of the body and the love of physical beauty, and the Renaissance as a
way of life embodied in both individual lives and works of art.53 These tendencies, which
are to be found already in Burckhardt, coalesce emphatically in the book’s infamous
conclusion, which, with its call for a life of aestheticism, dehistoricizes the Renaissance
and presents it as a practice of existence. Here, the Renaissance is celebrated not because
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it represents a change for the better in the course of history—the utopian element in
Michelet and Symonds—but because, as a transhistorical concept, it promises to make
one’s life more meaningful and pleasurable now.54
The conclusion, which Pater adapted from an unsigned review of William Morris’s The Earthly Paradise (1870), begins with a meditation on a fragment of Heraclitus,
πάντα χωρεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μένει (186), which Pater translates elsewhere as, “All things give
way: nothing remaineth.”55 In this famous aphorism lie the foundations for Pater’s
philosophy of history and aesthetic ethics. By Pater’s estimation, all historical thinking in
the European tradition, right up to Hegelian dialectics and Darwinian evolution, is a
variation on this Heraclitean insight.56 Such a reading rejects the progressive, teleological
modes of historical thinking prevalent in mid-Victorian Britain, and which, as we have
seen, underpin Symonds’s Hegelian–evolutionary vision of history. Pater presents instead
a philosophy of history that undoes the unity of the subject and its normative claim to
history: as a metaphysical principle, Heraclitean flux—“that continual vanishing away,
that strange, perpetual, weaving and unweaving of ourselves” (188)—describes equally
the world and the consciousness that experiences it. Carolyn Williams accordingly reads
the conclusion as primarily concerned with reconciling objective knowledge and subjective experience,57 a worry that animates much post-Kantian European philosophy, as
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noted above in the Introduction. Pater’s solution is a life of constant attentiveness to the
phenomena encountered in the world and the development of perceptual capacities. As
the text progresses, this grows into an ethical imperative:
Every moment some form grows perfect in hand or face; some tone on the
hills or the sea is choicer than the rest; some mood of passion or insight or
intellectual excitement is irresistibly real and attractive for us,—for that
moment only. Not the fruit of experience, but experience itself, is the end.
[…] To burn always with this hard, gem-like flame, to maintain this
ecstasy, is success in life. […] Not to discriminate every moment some
passionate attitude in those about us, and in the very brilliance of their
gifts some tragic dividing of forces on their ways, is, on this short day of
frost and sun, to sleep before evening. (188–89)
This passage reads like a Baudelairean insistence on attentiveness to the present moment
and, in this regard, belongs to the discourse of nineteenth-century aestheticism. Pater’s
combination of Stoic vigilance and Epicurean hedonism redirects the questions of aesthetic judgment onto life itself. However, when read in either of its published contexts—
as the conclusion to a book about the Renaissance or to a review of a contemporary poem
that tells of an encounter between a medieval and a classical culture—we are reminded
that this insistence upon present experience is coupled with a recognition that we are
ourselves historically determined—“clothed […] in a vesture of the past”—and born into
an already historical world.58 That the original location of this aesthetic imperative was
not in The Renaissance itself but in Pater’s engagement with the poetry of his contemporary Morris reveals the extent to which Pater’s understanding of the Renaissance depends
upon his aestheticism. Moreover, the rehash inscribes Pater’s review of Morris as the
hidden final chapter of the book, reinforcing Pater’s definition of the Renaissance as a
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form of life not limited to a particular time and affirming it as a crucial concept for his
aestheticism.
Pater’s review of Morris provides us with his strongest statements on the aesthetic
relation to history in the work of the aesthetic critic, who “vitalizes his subject by keeping
it always close to himself.”59 In a passage not carried over into the conclusion of The
Renaissance, Pater theorizes an embodied relation to history: “The composite experience
of all the ages is part of each one of us; to deduct from that experience, to obliterate any
part of it, to come face to face with the people of a past age, as if the Middle Age, the
Renaissance, the eighteenth century had not been, is as impossible as to become a little
child, or enter again into the womb and be born.”60 This means both that we cannot
escape history and that we cannot isolate a historical moment and know it as it really was.
Revival is not impossible because progress has alienated us from the past, as Symonds
argues, it is impossible because our implication in history is already so layered and
intimate that we cannot see around it. Historical representation is, then, necessarily
partial, on the side of both the object of representation, which can never appear complete,
and that of the subject, whose representation always reveals a partiality. And this partiality is affective, the location of aesthetic pleasure. Pater continues:
But though it is not possible to repress a single phase of that humanity,
which, because we live and move and have our being in the life of
humanity, makes us what we are; it is possible to isolate such a phase, to
throw it into relief, to be divided against ourselves in zeal for it, as we may
hark back to some choice space of our own individual life.61
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In contrast to the historians discussed above, Pater rejects as impossible direct access to
the past and its objective representation. Instead, Renaissance is something done in a
relation of intimacy with the past that recognizes its inaccessibility, while still holding
onto the desire for it. The result is not only aesthetic pleasure but the revelation of one’s
entanglement in history. Transposed into The Renaissance, the text draws out the ethical
implications of the readings of Renaissance figures that make up the book’s chapters. Yet
the urgent, if wistful, tone of its preface and conclusion belies The Renaissance’s prevailing melancholia and the morbid tenor of many of Pater’s readings. Two essays from the
book that have proved of particular interest to critics are those on Sandro Botticelli and
Leonardo da Vinci. Here Pater’s Renaissance becomes ambivalent. Botticelli’s shrinking
Madonnas, his sad Venus, and Leonardo’s vampiric Mona Lisa attest to the difficulty of
the historical relation as the recognition of history’s saturation and inaccessibility, despite
the aesthetic critic’s zeal.
Pater’s reading of Botticelli’s withdrawn figures focuses on two works: Madonna
of the Magnificat (c. 1481) and The Birth of Venus (c. 1486), both of which Pater would
have seen, along with other works by Botticelli, in the Uffizi when he visited Florence in
1865. In searching for what makes the work unique (the primary aim of criticism in
Pater’s opinion), he finds in Botticelli’s subjects a combination of “loveliness and energy” with a melancholy resulting from “the shadow upon them of the great things from
which they shrink” (43). In Pater’s reading, Botticelli’s Madonnas are cold, dejected and
listless, uncertain of what to do with the unasked-for child in their arms; but their detachment and shrinking is precisely the source of their charm. Botticelli’s Venus has the
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same “sentiment” as his Madonnas: sad, cold, withdrawn. She is beautiful—Pater insists
that the painting is pleasurable—but cadaverous. Unlike the Madonnas, however, this
painting is the site of a revelation: “in pictures like this of Botticelli’s you have a record
of the first impression made by [“the Hellenic spirit”] on minds turned back towards it, in
almost painful aspiration, from a world in which it has been ignored so long” (46). The
Birth of Venus accordingly represents a key moment in the history of the Renaissance,
which occurs under the auspices of love: antiquity in the form of love itself is the object
of desire. Yet as much as one might want to bring this love closer, it remains cold and
distant, shrinking away in sadness from the future. The encounter, then, takes the form of
a desire for a love that cannot be reciprocated but which nonetheless yields aesthetic
pleasure.62
Pater’s description of Leonardo da Vinci’s Mona Lisa, or La Gioconda (Pater’s
preferred name for the painting), is one of the most striking passages in art criticism:
All the thoughts and experience of the world have etched and moulded
there, in that which they have of power to refine and make expressive the
outward form, the animalism of Greece, the lust of Rome, the mysticism
of the middle age with its spiritual ambition and imaginative loves, the
return of the Pagan world, the sins of the Borgias. She is older than the
rocks among which she sits; like the vampire, she has been dead many
times, and learned the secrets of the grave; and has been a diver in deep
seas, and keeps their fallen day about her; and trafficked for strange webs
with Eastern merchants; and, as Leda, was the mother of Helen of Troy,
and, as Saint Anne, the mother of Mary; and all this has been to her but as
the sound of lyres and flutes, and lives only in the delicacy with which it
has moulded the changing lineaments, and tinged the eyelids and the
hands. (98–99)
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Unlike Botticelli’s subjects, Leonardo’s Lisa does not shrink from the weight of history
but seems to carry it easily: all of European history is readable in her face as “the sound
of lyres and flutes.” She nevertheless appears in the same cadaverous light as Venus.
Here, however, this light is not the correlative of Greek antiquity’s inaccessibility but of
Europe’s undeadness. Lisa is not the mere observer of European history but has lived and
died with it through the centuries and bears its marks on her body; she embodies the
partiality of historical experience. Pater is quick to draw out the implications for historical understanding:
The fancy of a perpetual life, sweeping together ten thousand experiences,
is an old one; and modern philosophy has conceived the idea of humanity
as wrought upon by, and summing up in itself, all modes of thought and
life. Certainly Lady Lisa might stand as the embodiment of the old fancy,
the symbol of the modern idea. (99)
Here, again, Pater reveals the importance of philosophies of history to the art criticism of
The Renaissance, presaging his assimilation, in the conclusion, of nineteenth-century
philosophy to Heraclitean metaphysics. Despite the ambiguity of the “old fancy” and the
“modern idea,” the context directs us to take them as floating signifiers for old and new
ideas about the possibility of temporal persistence, recurrence, and transformation:
transmigration, anamnesis, dialectics, evolution, and so on. The point of Pater’s comparison is that “the fancy of a perpetual life” (the desire for earthly immortality), like “the old
fancy” of reincarnation, has found in the nineteenth century metaphysical and scientific
expression, though each form of knowledge understands the meaning of such a life
differently. Unlike Symonds, then, Pater does not see the theories of Hegel, Comte, and
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Darwin as modern discoveries conditioned by the Renaissance’s emancipation of reason
and all pointing to an ultimate truth of history, but rather as rearticulations of the most
ancient intuitions and desires. This, Pater suggests, is what renaissance really means if it
is to name a theory of history.
The ambivalent figure of the smiling, undead Mona Lisa shows us the extent to
which we already participate in history. In the lives of individuals, Europe itself dies and
comes back to life again and again. When Michelet resurrects the dead and assimilates
himself to a personal France, there is no apparent ambivalence or uncanniness. By
contrast, Pater’s identification of Europe in the person of Lisa is more melancholic than
triumphant, and the desire catalyzed remains unfulfilled. While Symonds is more reticent
about his personal investments, his commitment to positivism and progress means that
Europe will always be figured as the torch-bearer of history. Rather than emerging once
and for all from medieval darkness into the light of modernity—as Symonds’s put it,
“The Renaissance was the liberation of the reason from a dungeon”63—Pater’s Europe is
bathed perpetually in the necrotic light of history. In The Renaissance, Pater theorizes a
personal relationship with history that is ambivalent in its combination of desire and
detachment, intimacy and estrangement, ineluctability and inaccessibility, proximity and
distance. Pater shows that no matter how close we get to the past, it remains at a remove;
no matter how saturated by it we feel, it is never fully present. At the same time, when we
desire the past, we desire something that is already with us, for better or worse. This
messy vision of history presents a strong challenge to the scientific historicism of Symonds, a challenge of which Pater seems to have been aware.
63
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The stakes of Pater’s intervention in Renaissance historiography are at their
clearest in his review of the first volume of Symonds’s Renaissance in Italy, The Age of
the Despots, which he wrote shortly after the book’s publication in 1875.64 While the
review is favorable, two moments of tension stand out. Firstly, Pater recognizes that
Symonds’s goal is historicist: “to set the art and literature of Italy on that background of
general social and historical conditions to which they belong, and apart from which they
cannot really be understood” (196). But he also suggests that the “spirit of the Renaissance proper” is not to be found in these “general social and historical conditions,” whose
history is characterized by political oppression and cruelty. As far as Pater sees it, this
poses a problem for scientific historicism:
That sense of the complex interdependence on each other of all historical
conditions is one of the guiding lights of the modern historical method,
and Mr. Symonds abundantly shows how thoroughly he has mastered this
idea. And yet on the same background, out of the same general conditions,
products emerge, the unlikeness of which is the chief thing to be noticed.
(198)
Perhaps Pater’s representation of historicism here is a little simplistic; even so, a major
historiographical difference is thus signaled. The argument is delicately put but the
implications are vast: the Renaissance is historical but its meaning exceeds what historicism can tell us about it; the historical therefore cannot be absolutely historicized. Burckhardt’s claim for an affinity between despotism and aestheticism thereby loses its
necessity, along with its explanatory power. The second moment of tension comes in the
form of a backhanded compliment: “The imagination in historical composition works
64
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most legitimately when it approaches dramatic effects. In this volume there is a high
degree of dramatic imagination; here all is objective, and the writer is hardly seen behind
his work” (201). But these sentences come immediately before Pater’s assessment of the
book’s only major shortcoming, its lack of “reserve” (201).65 Pater’s valorization of
reserve stands out because this quality is often understood as the key technique of his
own queerly self-effacing style.66 Where Pater’s reticence makes him, in Henry James’s
memorable phrase, “the mask without the face,”67 Symonds’s copiousness means that he
can hardly be seen.
Pater’s implicit correlations of epistemology and style—aestheticism and reserve,
on the one hand, historicism and excess, on the other—gets to the crux of the difference
between his and Symonds’s visions of the Renaissance. The conclusion to The Renaissance creates the impression of a world chaotically overflowing with stimuli, to which
the most viable response is not to attempt a record of everything but rather to concentrate
the attention upon the present moment in order to select and enjoy that which is most
pleasurable amidst the flux of becoming: “strange dyes, strange colours, and curious
odours, or work of the artist’s hand, or the face of one’s friend” (189). History is the light
in which these objects of experience appear—we cannot see them without it—rather than
65
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the granular conditions of their appearance. The Renaissance is accordingly of interest
not for its particular social conditions but for what it gives to life in the present: “the
picture, the landscape, the engaging personality in life or in a book, La Gioconda, the
hills of Carrara, Pico of Mirandola, are valuable for the virtues, as we say, in speaking of
a herb, a wine, a gem; for the property each has of affecting one with a special, a unique
impression of pleasure” (xx). The contrast with Eliot and Ruskin could not be stronger.
But it is also remarkable how far Pater is from other nineteenth-century critics and
historians of the Renaissance. In Pater, the past refuses resurrection and assimilation à la
Michelet, and a call like Symonds’s for the objective representation of the simple truth
makes no sense. Where Michelet’s work glorifies France and Burckhardt’s presents a
proto-fascist endorsement of despotism, where Symonds celebrates individuality as the
destiny of the European races, and Husserl attempts to rescue Europe through a logocentric universalization of the humanist rediscovery of antiquity, Pater sees the Renaissance
as a reminder of history’s inescapable cycle of life, death, and rebirth that flows through
and constitutes subjectivity, “that strange, perpetual, weaving and unweaving of ourselves” (188).
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Chapter Three
Blurred Contrast: Gothic Architecture and the Haunted
Future in John Ruskin and William Morris

1.
While the art and history of the Renaissance provide Pater with the material for exploring
the potential of aesthetics to bring two or more disparate moments in time together, the
nineteenth century’s other major aesthetic revival—the Gothic Revival—drew much of
its energy from demonstrating the enormous difference between the present and the past.
Its central concept, therefore, is not so much revival as contrast. To be sure, contrast is
one of the most powerful topoi of historical consciousness and so is commonly encountered in reflections on historicity. In 1831, Mill identified it as definitive of the spirit of
the age.1 Contrast underpins the periodization of history that characterizes philosophies
such as Hegel’s and Comte’s, and which also, as Ted Underwood has shown, determined
the institutionalization of literary studies.2 It is a characteristic gesture of the historical
novel, especially in the nineteenth century, where narratorial reflection on the differences
between past and present could almost be said to define the genre. In Chapter One, we
saw how George Eliot uses historical contrast to illustrate the difference between Germa1
2
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ny and England by exhorting her readers to “remember” rural life of fifty years ago,
despite the fact that few of them would have personally experienced such a life. While
contrast is of general importance for scientific and philosophical historicisms, which
invariably express skepticism towards the notion of revival, it plays an especially important role for those Romantic and Victorian writers who reacted against modernity and
turned with nostalgia towards the Middle Ages. One of the first sustained uses of the
rhetoric of contrast in this context occurs in Robert Southey’s Colloquies (1829), which,
in a scathing review, Macaulay dismissed for its reactionary historiography, in particular,
the suggestion that people were happier in the early sixteenth century than at any other
time in English history.3 The bluntest use of the trope is to be found in the plates of
Augustus Welby Pugin’s Contrasts (1836) (Figure 3.1), which juxtaposes images of
“Catholic excellence” with those of “modern degeneracy.”4 Perhaps its most influential
Victorian deployments, however, occur in Carlyle’s Past and Present (1843) and in the
second volume of Ruskin’s The Stones of Venice (1853). For all these authors, the
ugliness, meanness, and alienation of modern capitalist society contrasts with the beauty,
piety, and communal life of medieval feudal society. Inspired doubly by these classics of
Victorian medievalism and the equally contrastive, periodizing thinking of Karl Marx,
William Morris, in the second half of the century, adds a vision of a better future to those
of the past and present. Dependent as it is upon a strong sense of modern discontinuity
with the past, the Gothic Revival, no matter what its politics, would appear to be
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Figure 3.1.
Detail from “Contrasted Residences for the Poor”
Augustus Welby Pugin, Contrasts, 2nd edition, 1841
Kunstbibliothek, Berlin
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a prime example of aesthetics informed by the dominant modes of nineteenth-century
historicism.
A closer look, however, will reveal that the Gothic Revival, as a discourse of
revival, does more than just contrast. To begin with, it invents continuities even as it
attempts to revive extinct cultural forms, then gets snagged on its own ambivalence when
confronted with the reality of past injustices. When we consider the diverse manifestations of Gothic in the nineteenth-century—Walter Scott’s poetry, Charles Barry’s Palace
of Westminster, a Morris and Co. drawing-room, Edward Burne-Jones’s series paintings,
Richard Wagner’s operas, or the Transylvania of Bram Stoker’s Dracula—it becomes
obvious that, even where contrast is invoked, it is in tension with other forms of temporal
relation and is accompanied by a wider range of feelings than disgust with the present
and nostalgia for the past. In this chapter, I explore some of the ways in which literature
of the Gothic Revival breaks down the logic of contrast central to historical consciousness. I will begin with a brief history of the term “Gothic,” then move onto the work of
Ruskin, whose famous rhetoric of contrast in “The Nature of Gothic” is undermined by
his theory of Gothic experience as distorted. I then turn to Morris, whose essays, short
fiction and novels exemplify the ambivalence of Gothic by presenting it as a way in
which past and future simultaneously haunt the present.
In most modern European languages, “Gothic” and “medieval” are synonyms and
their coextension thus exemplifies a certain kind of historical-geographical thinking
characteristic of European modernity and which we have already encountered in the
Introduction through the philosophy of Hegel. While the sense of there having been a
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“middle age” originates in Renaissance humanism, the term “medieval” is a nineteenthcentury coinage; “Gothic,” however, has a longer history.5 The people known to the
Romans as the gothi originated in Scandinavia and invaded parts of the Roman Empire in
late antiquity; during the Middle Ages, the Latin adjective gothicus and its cognates in
the vernacular languages became generic terms for the Germanic or northern. In the
Italian Renaissance, the semantic field constituted by these terms acquired a negative
valence and gotico came to signify northern barbarity. In particular, the term became
useful to distinguish the art and architecture of the Middle Ages from that of classical
antiquity to the detriment of the former.6 Ultimately, however, in aesthetic discourse, it
was more useful for its descriptive rather than evaluative function, and, by the late
seventeenth century, the English word “gothic,” like its cognates throughout Europe, was
in use to describe medieval pointed architecture, specifically, or, more generally, the
culture of the Middle Ages. In England, where the Middle Ages were identified as a point
of cultural origin as early as the Elizabethan period,7 “Gothic” gained currency in the
context of eighteenth-century nationalism, in which modern political institutions were
traced back to (supposed) Gothic ones, and antiquarians developed the idea of a native
Gothic aesthetic in opposition to a classical Mediterranean one.8 This movement was so
5

On the relationship between the two terms, see Alexander, Medievalism, xxv–xxvi.
The first known association of the Goths with the architecture that came to be known as
Gothic occurs in Vasari’s Lives (1550), where it is used disparagingly (de Beer, “Gothic,”
147–48). In “The Myth of ‘the Myth of the Medieval’,” Anne-Marie Sankovitch,
however, questions whether Vasari was in fact writing about the pointed style. For an
overview of the ancient Goths, see Sowerby, “The Goths in History and Pre-Gothic
Gothic.”
7
Jones, “Medievalism in British Poetry,” 15; Clark, Gothic Revival, 28.
8
The locus classicus for the affirmative presentation of an anti-classical Gothic aesthetic
incorporating both literature and architecture is Richard Hurd’s Letters on Chivalry and
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successful that, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, it is possible to speak of
British culture generally as a “Gothic” culture, defined, among other things, by its
relation to the Middle Ages.9 It was in this political–aesthetic context that both the revival
of Gothic architecture took place and Gothic romances first appeared.10 This genealogy is
recapitulated in the Oxford English Dictionary, where we see, looking over the quotations
gathered there, that, historically, “Gothic” has been used in English in one of four main
ways: (1) in a geographical sense, describing the ancient Goths, or metonymically,
synonymous with Germanic or Teutonic; (2) in a pejorative sense, denoting the barbarous; (3) in a broad historical sense, synonymous with medieval; and (4) in a narrow
aesthetic sense, describing medieval design, especially in architecture and book production.11 It is only later that Gothic denotes “a genre of fiction characterized by suspenseful,
sensational plots involving supernatural or macabre elements,” a sense that emerged from
Romance (1762). See Townshend’s introduction to The Gothic World (xxix–xxxv) for an
overview of the British appropriation of Gothic identity in the eighteenth century. See
Miles, Gothic Writing (30–49) and “Eighteenth-century Gothic” (12–16), for the
eighteenth-century Gothic aesthetic that preceded the first Gothic romances, and Duggett,
Gothic Romanticism, for this aesthetic’s role in conditioning British Romanticism. Martin
Arnold provides an overview of the influence of Nordic antiquarianism on the first
Gothic novels in “On the Origins of the Gothic Novel.” A more detailed study of the
political context is provided by Samuel Kliger in The Goths in England and by Edward
Jacobs in Accidental Migrations.
9
Duggett, Gothic Romanticism, 8; Jones, “Medievalism in British Poetry,” 15.
10
The proliferation of Gothic romances at the end of the eighteenth century is, it should
be noted, overdetermined. For the origins of the genre, see especially Clery, “The
Genesis of ‘Gothic’ Fiction,” and The Rise of Supernatural Fiction; Gamer, Romanticism
and the Gothic; Miles, Gothic Writing, and “The 1790s”; and Watt, Contesting the
Gothic. As these scholars make clear, a genre concept with the name of Gothic took form
later than the first texts of this kind appeared, despite the word’s early occurrence in the
subtitle to the second edition of Horace Walpole’s The Castle of Otranto: A Gothic Story
(1765).
11
My division of the senses does not correspondent exactly with that of the OED. I have
combined related senses to arrive at the groupings outlined here.
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its established use as a synonym for the medieval.12 What we see is that, from its beginnings, in addition to being a term of historical and geographical knowledge, “Gothic” is
also one of moral and aesthetic judgment.
While the history of the word shows us how it came to refer to both a style of
architecture and a genre of fiction, the two artforms are generally considered separately.
Moreover, even within literary studies, a distinction is typically made between the Gothic
of Ann Radcliffe and Bram Stoker, and the medievalism of Walter Scott and Alfred
Tennyson. While there is certainly a high–low cultural distinction operating here,13 the
primary difference between Gothic Revival and Gothic fiction would appear to be
affective. Where the Gothic Revival nostalgically contrasts an idealized Middle Ages
with a degraded modern world, Gothic fiction presents a traumatic encounter of the past
by the present, whether in the psychoanalytic terms of the uncanny (the return of the
repressed) or as a confrontation between the forces of modernity and the relics of premodernity.14 There is a strong case, however, for considering this diverse collection of
literary and artistic genres, forms, and movements as moments in a larger medievalizing,
Gothic tendency within modern British culture that seeks to understand itself as deter12

“Gothic,” OED. “The Gothic novel” as we now know it (i.e., as a transhistorical rather
than specifically Romantic genre) emerged as a literary critical concept only in the
twentieth century.
13
See Gamer, Romanticism and the Gothic.
14
Most introductions to the genre will cite its preoccupation with history and present both
psychoanalytic and historicist accounts of this preoccupation. See, for example, the
editor’s introduction in Hogle, The Cambridge Companion to Gothic Fiction,
Townshend’s in The Gothic World, and Watt’s entry on “Gothic” for The Cambridge
Companion to English Literature, 1740–1830. More extended recent studies focusing on
history include Smith, Gothic Radicalism, and Wolfreys, Victorian Hauntings, which
take a psychoanalytic approach; and Dent, Sinister Histories, which takes a historicist
approach.
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mined in a variety of ways by its relation to premodernity and specifically the Middle
Ages.15 So defined, this field, though large, would probably exclude some texts that are
now considered classics of Gothic fiction; my main purpose, however, is not to offer a
general definition of Gothic as a transhistorical literary genre but rather to formulate a
perspective on Victorian culture as a Gothic culture. Nevertheless, while Ruskin and
Morris are generally taken as representatives of the Gothic Revival (i.e., medievalism)
rather than Gothic fiction, my discussion of them aims to show some of the ways in
which their work participated in the conventions of the popular literary genre, as it is
through such conventions—in particular, the use of the grotesque—that the rhetoric of
contrast is undermined.

2.
The chronotope of the Gothic ruin, whether it is in a landscape by Caspar David Friedrich, a romance by Scott, a short story by Morris, a novel by Stoker, or the countless
follies built throughout Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, exemplifies the
aesthetic and affective representation of the Gothic relation to the past as one characterized by loss, obscurity, and spectrality. While John Ruskin is recognized as the most
important Victorian theorist of Gothic architecture, his theory’s bearing on the experience
of its ruined form is less well appreciated. “The Nature of Gothic,” the central chapter of
the second volume of The Stones of Venice, is probably Ruskin’s most influential piece of
writing. As already noted, it comes in a line of nineteenth-century British texts that use an
15

Recent scholarship has begun to make this case; see, for example, Duggett, Gothic
Romanticism; Jacobs, Accidental Migrations; and the contributions in Byron and
Townshend, The Gothic World.
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image of the Middle Ages in order to critique the present. Ruskin contrasts the perfection
of modern design, which he sees as a sign of slavery, with the imperfection of medieval
craftsmanship, a sign of life and liberty. Unlike modern architecture, Gothic both affords
self-expression for the worker and accommodates imperfection. Ruskin’s historicist
understanding of culture means that he identifies architectural form as the index of social
structure: just as the modern worker is immiserated by industrial production, which
produces only ugliness, so the medieval one was made happy by the work of Gothic craft.
As the occasion for Ruskin’s first overt political intervention in middle-class culture, and
a trope to which he would consistently return over the course of his long writing career,
the contrast between the modern and medieval worker is the primary argument for which
The Stones of Venice, and perhaps even Ruskin himself, is remembered. However,
Ruskin’s theory of Gothic provides us with much more than just a contrast of past and
present: he also provides a theory of Gothic subjectivity that relates artistic production
and aesthetic experience through the category of the grotesque. As the location of an
encounter with the historical whose imperfect nature means that it can never transparently
mediate the past, Gothic also provides Ruskin with the vehicle for describing experience
that is obscure and ambivalent rather than self-evident and decisive.
Before taking a closer look at “The Nature of Gothic,” I want to go over some of
Ruskin’s other descriptions of Gothic architecture, since, through their engagement with
the work of Scott and Turner, they will indicate how his architectural theory relates to
artistic representation and aesthetic experience more broadly. In the preface to the second
edition of The Seven Lamps of Architecture, Ruskin provides an analysis of emotional
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responses to architecture, which come in four forms: (1) sentimental admiration, (2)
proud admiration, (3) workmanly admiration, (4) artistical and rational admiration. The
fourth response is celebrated as by far the best, and the second and third are dismissed as
uncritical and vain. Interestingly, the first response, sentimental admiration, though
insufficiently critical, is not entirely valueless, finding “its highest manifestation in the
great mind of Scott” (R8:8). Ruskin illustrates this response with a pastiche: “The kind of
feeling which most travellers experience on first entering a cathedral by torchlight, and
hearing a chant from concealed choristers; or in visiting a ruined abbey by moonlight, or
any building with which interesting associations are connected, at any time when they
can hardly see it” (R8:7–8). The ironic tone here is disparaging. To be sure, by 1855,
when the preface was written—fifty years after the publication of Scott’s wildly successful Lay of the Last Minstrel, to whose famous description of the ruins of Melrose Abbey
in the Scottish Borders Ruskin alludes—such forms of Gothic Romanticism had long felt
hackneyed. Indeed, Ruskin could be parodying the very text which he praises:
If thou would’st view fair Melrose aright,
Go visit it by the pale moonlight;
For the gay beams of lightsome day
Gild, but to flout, the ruins grey.
Where the broken arches are black in night,
And each shafted oriel glimmers white;
When the cold light’s uncertain shower
Streams on the ruin’d central tower;
When buttress and buttress, alternately,
Seem fram’d of ebon and ivory;
When silver edges the imagery,
And the scrolls that teach thee to live and die;
When distant Tweed is heard to rave
And the owlet to hoot o’er the dead man’s grave
Then go—but go alone the while—
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Then view St. David’s ruin’d pile;
And, home returning, soothly swear,
Was never scene so sad and fair!16
After Scott, what could be more Gothic than, in Ruskin’s words, “visiting a ruined abbey
by moonlight”?17 That Ruskin admired Scott’s poetry and novels is well known: in
Modern Painters III, he singles Scott out as the most representative artist of modernity
and his letters from Scotland, which he visited many times throughout his life, often refer
to Scott’s work. In his Edinburgh lecture on Turner, Ruskin praises Scott’s representations of Melrose Abbey as “exactly expressing that degree of feeling with which most
men in this century can sympathise” (R12:121). In a later lecture, he deems them “faultless and intensely perceptive,” not just in their capturing of the buildings’ characteristic
structural feature (“interweaving”) but also of their spiritual character and their sadness
(R19:261). Ruskin’s appraisal of Scott’s Melrose does nothing to disprove the diagnosis
of sentimental admiration.
The intertextuality of Ruskin’s and Scott’s texts lies not merely in the former’s
ironic pastiche; more to the point, Ruskin theorizes precisely the aesthetic atmosphere
conjured by Scott’s poem. In contrast to the three other forms of emotional response to
16

Scott, Poetical Works, 14.
Ruskin notes the popularity of the Melrose ruins for readers of Scott in one of his
Oxford Museum letters (R16:230). This popularity is generally regarded as a direct
outcome of the Lay’s success, as Ruskin also implies. Queen Victoria herself visited
Melrose along with several other locations associated with Scott in the summer of 1867.
A discussion of Scott’s influence on tourism is provided in Watson, “Holiday Excursions
to Scott Country”; and Durie, “Scotland is Scott-Land.” Broader discussion of the
development of Gothic tourism out of picturesque aesthetics is provided in Townshend,
“Ruins, Romance and the Rise of Gothic Tourism.” On Ruskin’s own ambivalent role in
the development of cultural tourism, see Hanley and Walton, Constructing Cultural
Tourism. Tourists’ enthusiasm for Gothic ruins remains strong: on twenty-first-century
Gothic tourism and its eighteenth-century origins, see McEvoy, Gothic Tourism.
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architecture, and especially to the artistic and rational admiration that Ruskin values most
highly, sentimental admiration comes close to universality. Being “excitable in nearly all
persons,” it is the sensus communis of a Gothic culture, intuitive and common to all
classes (R8:8). That the kind of feeling we are talking about here circulates socially rather
than being an individual psychological response is confirmed by Ruskin’s comments on
Scott’s ability to express a “feeling with which most men in this century can sympathise.”
The Lay of the Last Minstrel not only gives us instructions on the best time to visit Gothic
ruins, but it also tells us how to feel when we do so: “And, home returning, soothly
swear, | Was never scene so sad and fair!” Ruskin reproduces this when he writes that
Scott’s poem “will make memorable to you the sadness, the foreboding of death, and the
feverish and unconsoling superstition which haunted, as they vanished, the last of the
Gothic spires” (R19:261). This last reading of Scott gives us the most comprehensive
enumeration yet of the affective qualities that make up the experience here under consideration: sadness, foreboding, haunting. These name three different forms of temporal
relation—retrospection, prolepsis, vestigial persistence—to the same bad object, namely,
as both Ruskin and Scott imply, death—individual and collective—whose signs are read
not only in the decay of the abbey and its ancient tombs, but also in its surviving ornamentation: “the scrolls that teach thee to live and die.” Key to each of these affective
forms of temporal relation is an element of aesthetic obscurity. As Ruskin writes, if you
want to feel sentimental admiration, you should visit a building at a time when you “can
hardly see it,” or, in Scott’s verse, “Where the broken arches are black in night.” Daylight
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allows us to forget death, but it is through relation to death, as we shall see, that we begin
to feel Gothic.
First, however, I want to look at some further representations of Melrose Abbey
so that we are really sure of our aesthetic object. As it happens, this very passage from
The Lay of the Last Minstrel was illustrated by Turner in one of a series of watercolors
commissioned by Walter Fawkes in the early 1820s (Figure 3.2).18 I do not know if
Ruskin was familiar with this picture, but it nevertheless instantiates—almost too well—
the Gothic feeling that he writes about with respect to Scott. Turner reminds us that what
the moonlight reveals is just as important as what the night obscures. While the shadows
are deep, hiding parts of the structure, the scene is dramatically backlit, with the light
from the rising moon flooding through the enormous east window and outlining the wellpreserved details of its tracery. This is, of course, how Gothic window tracery—and,
indeed, all Gothic interiors—are meant to be experienced: illuminated from the outside. It
may very well be the case, then, that, in order for a ruin to be experienced as affectively
Gothic, opened up to the elements as it is, at least, that is to say, for it to excite Ruskin’s
sentimental admiration, it must be experienced by moonlight: “For the gay beams of
lightsome day | Gild, but to flout, the ruins grey.” By night, amidst the gloom of the
abbey, Turner’s moonlight illuminates two things in particular. The lone male figure
standing in the ruined choir, a typical instance of Romantic sublimity, represents the
reader who has followed Scott’s instructions to the letter and thus dramatizes the reading

18

Wilton, The Life and Work of J. M. W. Turner, 425 (no. 1056).
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Figure 3.2.
J. M. W. Turner, Melrose Abbey, c. 1822
Sterling and Francine Clark Art Institute, Williamstown, Massachusetts
138

experience itself: experienced alone but shared by thousands.19 Moreover, the inscription
of two lines from The Lay of the Last Minstrel in the foreground, though conventional in
an illustration such as this, incorporates Scott’s poem into the very rubble of the abbey. In
telling us how and when to experience Melrose, the Lay has made it what it is. And it can
do this, as Ruskin so astutely observes, through a common Gothic feeling.
While, as I have already noted, Ruskin seems to be denigrating, in his description
of sentimental admiration, exactly the kind of popular Romanticism that Scott and Turner
dish up in their portrayals of Melrose by moonlight, it is also the case that Ruskin was
himself a master of such representation. While he does not condescend to moonlight, his
architectural studies are usually partial and unfinished, and it is not uncommon that his
drawings of buildings stage a dramatic encounter that rests at least partly on the distortion
of perspective and the obscurity of details. Just so, for example, in his depiction of Mont
Saint Michel of 1848, in which the object of representation seems to be more a sublime
effect than any particulars.20 More germane to my discussion here is Ruskin’s own early
drawing of Melrose Abbey, undertaken on a family tour of Scotland in the summer of
1838 (Figure 3.3). Ruskin’s pencil study of the south transept’s exterior differs markedly
from Turner’s dramatic watercolor, and yet its apparent realism is deceptive. Ruskin
exaggerates the vertical dimension (the perspective on the belfry is particularly forced)
and renders ornament with considerably more emphasis, though not necessarily precision,

19

In his introduction to the 1830 edition of The Lay of the Last Minstrel, Scott claims that
the book sold upwards of thirty thousand copies (Scott, Poetical Works, 6). Such a figure
was unprecedented in Britain for poetry.
20
Hewison, Ruskin, Turner and the Pre-Raphaelites, 158 (no. 139).
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Figure 3.3.
John Ruskin, The South Transept, Melrose, 1838
Ruskin Library, Lancaster University
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than he does structural lines, which are without shadow; indeed, the ornamentation
appears more intricate in Ruskin’s drawing than it is in reality. Ruskin would later
express dissatisfaction with the slapdash approach of his early “Proutesque” drawings
and in a passage excised from Praeterita confesses to having drawn the outlines in situ
and squiggled the ornament in later (R35:622–23). In this case, moreover, he adds to the
foreground a gravestone with skull and crossbones and a large Romanesque tomb, neither
of which are identifiable in other drawings or photographs representing this view of the
abbey. The point is not to upbraid the nineteen-year-old Ruskin for the accuracy or
liberty of his draftsmanship but rather to draw attention to the techniques by which
Gothic feeling is heightened: here, in particular, the grotesque exaggeration of verticality
and ornamentation, and the addition of a memento mori that directs interpretation towards
mortality and historical loss.
Ruskin’s enlistment of sentimental admiration persists beyond his juvenilia. In
The Stones of Venice, for example, Ruskin narrates an architectural encounter much like
those he describes in the preface to The Seven Lamps. His wonderfully evocative description of entering St. Mark’s Basilica in Venice, though admittedly depicting a Byzantine
rather than Gothic building,21 is complete with flickering torchlight and shadowy recesses:
Through the heavy door […] let us enter the church itself. It is lost in still
deeper twilight, to which the eye must be accustomed for some moments
before the form of the building can be traced; and then there opens before
us a vast cave, hewn out into the form of a Cross, and divided into
shadowy aisles by many pillars. Round the domes of its roof the light
21

In my defense, I quote from The Seven Lamps of Architecture: “I use the word Gothic
in the most extended sense as broadly opposed to classical” (R8:229).
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enters only through narrow apertures like large stars; and here and there a
ray or two from some far-away casement wanders into the darkness, and
casts a narrow phosphoric stream upon the waves of marble that heave and
fall in a thousand colours along the floor. What else there is of light is
from torches, or silver lamps, burning ceaselessly in the recesses of the
chapels; the roof sheeted with gold, and the polished walls covered with
alabaster, give back at every curve and angle some feeble gleaming to the
flames; and the glories round the heads of the sculptured saints flash out
upon us as we pass them, and sink again into the gloom. (R10:88)
Revealing how easily the atmospheric apparatus can cross the boundary of temperance,
Ruskin also describes disapprovingly the more theatrical (i.e., Catholic) installations of
St. Mark’s, intended, as he suggests, to heighten the affective response of worshippers:
Darkness and mystery; confused recesses of building; artificial light
employed in small quantity, but maintained with a constancy which seems
to give it a kind of sacredness; preciousness of material easily
comprehended by the vulgar eye; close air loaded with a sweet and
peculiar odour associated only with religious services, solemn music, and
tangible idols or images having popular legends attached to them,—these,
the stage properties of superstition, which have been from the beginning of
the world, and must be to the end of it, employed by all nations, whether
openly savage or nominally civilized, to produce a false awe in minds
incapable of apprehending the true nature of the Deity, are assembled in
St. Mark’s to a degree, as far as I know, unexampled in any other
European church. (R10:90)
Faced with such self-ironizing passages, and in light of the proximity of Ruskin’s criticism to the Gothic work of two of his most favorite artists, we see the pervasiveness of
Ruskin’s ambivalence regarding affective responses to architecture. But in spite of this
ambivalence—despite his celebration of Scott and Turner, and his insistence on the
importance of feeling, despite his disparagement of a fitted-out St. Mark’s, and his
sneering characterization of sentimental admiration—Ruskin knows very well how
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ecclesiastical architecture, and, in particular, Gothic churches, whether intact or ruined, is
often experienced. Specifically, such experience is marked neither by an expansion nor a
refinement of perception, which we would associate with the sublime or the beautiful
respectively, but by its restriction and obfuscation. What is more, the atmosphere of such
buildings—consisting in obscurity, darkness and partiality, along with the affective
correlatives of sadness, haunting and foreboding—is not left aside in Ruskin’s sustained
theorization of Gothic in The Stones of Venice but indeed recurs there as one of its key
elements.

3.
Perhaps the most surprising thing about “The Nature of Gothic” is that its author gives
greater consideration to the creator of Gothic architecture than he does either to the
buildings themselves or to the experience of those who inhabit or use them. In contrast to
the sentimental admirer of tourist Gothic that we encountered in the previous section, the
feeling subject of the most famous chapter of The Stones of Venice is that of Gothic
poiesis rather than Gothic aisthesis. This section will accordingly focus on the experience
of the one who makes Gothic architecture rather than its beholder. In the analysis of this
figure, however, Ruskin also provides description of a kind of Gothic feeling that he can
fully endorse, leaving behind the ambivalence he felt for sentimental admiration. Moreover, as we shall see, this Gothic feeling turns out to be one that the viewer of Gothic has
the possibility of sharing through the aesthetic category of the grotesque. As Ruskin
openly admits, his object of analysis in “The Nature of Gothic” is not Gothic architecture
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per se, but rather the “grey, shadowy, many-pinnacled image of the Gothic spirit within
us” (R10:182).
Though Ruskin’s medieval stonemason is one of the most familiar elements of his
aesthetic theory, I invite my readers to reacquaint themselves with him here from the
perspective of Gothic feeling. Let us first quickly situate him in Ruskin’s analytic of the
Gothic. Recall that, in The Stones of Venice, Gothic architecture is defined twice: according to its aesthetic form (what Ruskin calls “external or material form”) and according to
its affective character (variously called “internal elements,” “mental power or expression,” “moral elements”) (R10:183). Ruskin treats the form succinctly, providing a gloss
towards the end of the chapter: “Foliated architecture, which uses the pointed arch for the
roof proper, and the gable for the roof-mask” (R10:260). Much more important is expression, for which Ruskin lists six elements, qualified as attributes of what I call here the
Gothic object (the building) or the Gothic subject (the builder) (R10:184; reproduced in
Table 3.1).22 Here Ruskin’s image of Gothic man (women are entirely absent from “The
Nature of Gothic”) emerges most clearly. A savage lover of variety and nature, with a

22

It should be noted that Ruskin’s account of Gothic architecture, while hugely
influential in Victorian Britain, remains just one among many theories of the style.
Twentieth-century European art historians, who share very few concerns with Ruskin,
have generally focused on other aspects in their attempts to understand the style. From a
formal perspective, Paul Frankl identifies the rib-vault ahead of the pointed arch as the
distinguishing element (Frankl, Gothic Architecture, 41), a suggestion that Ruskin
expressly rejects (R10:245). From a cultural perspective, Erwin Panofsky provides an
account that is antithetical to Ruskin’s in almost every way, exploring at length the
relationship between Gothic cathedrals and the contemporaneous philosophical
developments of scholasticism, in the process describing the Gothic’s insistence on
totality, uniformity, logic, order, and symmetry (Panofsky, Gothic Architecture and
Scholasticism, 44–52), and writing of its professionalized, worldly architect (ibid., 25).
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Table 3.1. The Internal Elements of Gothic Architecture
Order of importance

Of the building

Of the builder

1.

Savageness

Savageness or Rudeness

2.

Changefulness or Variety

Love of Change

3.

Naturalism

Love of Nature

4.

Grotesqueness

Disturbed Imagination

5.

Rigidity

Obstinacy

6.

Redundance

Generosity

wild imagination, independent and generous, one is tempted to read this portrait as yet
another instance of the public self-fashioning that culminated in Praeterita.23 In any case,
we are well aware that Ruskin’s medieval craftsman is an ahistorical fantasy based on
racialized environmental determinism.24 This becomes even clearer when we add to
Ruskin’s keywords one of the more evocative descriptions of Gothic man:
But not with less reverence let us stand by him, when, with rough strength
and hurried stroke, he smites an uncouth animation out of the rocks which
he has torn from among the moss of the moorland, and heaves into the
darkened air the pile of iron buttress and rugged wall, instinct with work
of an imagination as wild and wayward as the northern sea; creatures of

23

Francis O’Gorman explains Ruskin’s theory of the Gothic in relation to events in
Ruskin’s life in “Ruskin’s Aesthetic of Failure.” Analysis of the relationship of the six
internal elements of Gothic architecture in The Stones of Venice is provided in chapter
seven of Patrick Conner’s Savage Ruskin and more recently in Lars Spuybroek’s The
Sympathy of Things.
24
The classic study is Unrau, “Ruskin, the Workman and the Savageness of Gothic”; see
also Connelly, “John Ruskin and the Savage Gothic,” and Ogden, “The Architecture of
Empire.”
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ungainly shape and rigid limb, but full of wolfish life; fierce as the winds
that beat, and changeful as the clouds that shade them. (R10:187–88)
The person here imagined is so thoroughly conditioned by his environment as to be
almost indistinguishable from it. Indeed, Gothic hereby takes the rhetorical form of an
inverted pathetic fallacy. Human emotions are not projected onto nature but, rather, it is
through nature that human affect attains shape and expression: “fierce as the winds that
beat.” One supposes there was a piquancy for Ruskin’s middle-class readers in such a
hypermasculine, Germanic primitivism, a piquancy that we now, I would think, register
with distaste. Nevertheless, Ruskin reproduces here once again the perceptual obscurity—in this piece of impressionistic prose, the outlines are indistinct—and atmospheric
darkness that characterize his earlier descriptions of medieval architecture, only now they
are the qualities of an entire lifeworld and its enmeshed subject. Even so, we cannot yet
say what it feels like to occupy the subject position of the Gothic artist as envisioned by
Ruskin. Though, in one of his most anti-Arnoldian arguments, Ruskin emphasizes
savageness as the sign of the individuality, freedom, and imperfection of the Christian
soul, this pre-eminent characteristic of Gothic architecture provides the occasion for a
critique of industrial capitalism (the critique that was so important to Morris), and so
focuses on the material rather than affective or aesthetic conditions of artistic labor. The
most we can say at this point is that Gothic man is an empowered individual unharried by
modern concerns. It would be incorrect, however, to conclude that he is without cares.
We learn more about these cares, and therefore what Gothic subjectivity feels like, only
in the third volume of The Stones of Venice, in the often-overlooked discussion of the
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grotesque—the fourth internal element of Gothic—that Ruskin defers from “The Nature
of Gothic.”
In “Grotesque Renaissance,” Ruskin echoes earlier definitions of the grotesque in
seeing it as a kind of ridiculous or failed sublime.25 The grotesque combines the “ludicrous” with the “fearful” (R11:151).26 Much like Gothic, the grotesque can only take
imperfect form, perfection being a quality proper to the beautiful and the sublime, but not
to the grotesque. This is true not only for the work of art but also for the imagination as a
faculty of representation. When truth is represented clearly in the imagination, the
representation is sublime; but when it is distorted, it is grotesque (R11:181): “if the mind
be imperfect and ill trained”—as is the case with most of us—“the vision is seen as in a
broken mirror, with strange distortions and discrepancies, all the passions of the heart
breathing upon it in cross ripples, till hardly a trace of it remains unbroken” (R11:179).
So, while the images of dreams, superstition and myth are all categorically grotesque, it is
ultimately a question of how one sees the world rather than what one imagines. Ruskin is
quite explicit on this point: “It is not as the creating, but as the seeing man, that we are
here contemplating the master of the true grotesque” (R11:169; Ruskin’s emphasis). The
surprise here is that the grotesque is, despite all its distortions, a form of naturalistic
25
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representation true to experience, “a terribleness taken from the life; a spectre which the
workman indeed saw” (R11:169); however, an experience obscured by passion. Accordingly, the question of the legitimacy of the grotesque—whether it is “true” and “noble”
(i.e., Gothic) or “false” and “ignoble” (i.e., neoclassical)—comes down to feeling.27 The
creator of the true grotesque feels the terror of experience even while jesting with it: “the
dreadfulness of the universe around him weighs upon his heart” (R11:169). The mind
“plays with terror” (R11:166; Ruskin’s emphasis). By contrast, the creator of the false
grotesque plays cynically, without reference to experience, obscured or otherwise, and
“feels and understands nothing” (R11:167). Taken from life, the true grotesque is the
imperfect representation of an experience that was itself obscure. Its pleasure arises from
the willful play of a disturbed imagination with this obscure, partial perception of something terrible, which will be, according to Ruskin, either death or sin. Neither a pure
positive pleasure nor the negative pleasure of relief (as Burke defines the beautiful and
the sublime, respectively), the grotesque is an essentially ambivalent aesthetic category—
but its ambivalence is one that Ruskin affirms.
In focusing on the lived experience of the worker, Ruskin conflates poiesis and
aisthesis; this conflation is important. Isobel Armstrong has noted the key position
occupied by the grotesque in Ruskin’s theory of the Gothic, as it moves his medieval
stonemason from the realm of fantasy into the nineteenth century. In Armstrong’s reading, the grotesque does nothing less than provide the conditions of possibility for a truly
democratic art; in other words, it makes working-class art possible by giving form to the
27
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experience of the oppressed.28 Lucy Hartley, by contrast, has shown how important the
aesthetic category of the grotesque is for Ruskin as a test of moral and critical judgment.29 One reason why the grotesque poses such a significant problem for Ruskin is
because it is an aesthetic category that crosses and obscures the boundary, so important to
nineteenth-century historicist aesthetics, and to medievalism in particular, between the
Gothic and the Classical. But the grotesque also provides the bridge between Gothic
poiesis and Gothic aisthesis, and this is where its importance for this chapter lies. With
the grotesque we discover that the Gothic subject is not just the one who makes Gothic
art but one who experiences the world as Gothic, one who has seen the specter of death
and played with fear. Ruskin’s class prejudice (and probably also his racism) prevents
him from prescribing savageness—the most important element of Gothic according to
The Stones of Venice II—as a necessary precondition for the appreciation of Gothic in
addition to its production; this moral element of Gothic remains on the side of poiesis. By
contrast, the grotesque provides the occasion for testing not only the feeling of the Gothic
craftsman but also that of the critic, or, as the case may be, the tourist.30 The universality
of the fear of death and the pleasure of play means that the grotesque, when carefully
managed, provides the place for affective identification with Gothic art. We may well
love nature and change, and enjoy seeing these expressed in Gothic, but it is only through
the grotesque that the other elements of Gothic are related to our emotional life. It allows
28

Armstrong, Victorian Poetry, 231–35.
Hartley, “Griffinism, Grace and All.”
30
It is true that some of the other internal elements, such as the love of nature, could also
fulfil this bridging role between artist and critic. However, I do not think that any of the
other concepts contain within them the same codification of a specifically Gothic feeling
that makes the grotesque so eminently suitable for such a role.
149
29

us to identify with our ugly feelings and perhaps even enjoy them. Thus, Ruskin’s theory
of Gothic architecture, with its emphasis on the experience of death and sin, comes very
close to being a theory of Gothic in general.

4.
Perhaps no-one took Ruskin’s theory of Gothic more seriously than William Morris, who
made no secret of his admiration for it. In his lectures and essays, his references to
Ruskin are always enthusiastic, unqualified, and often superlative: “ART IS MAN’S
EXPRESSION OF HIS JOY IN LABOUR. If those are not Professor Ruskin’s words,
they embody at least his teaching on the subject. Nor has any truth more important ever
been stated” (M23:173). For Morris, following Ruskin, capitalism produces not only
misery but ugliness. The hope of both writers is that the restoration of pleasure to work
will result in both happy workers and beautiful things. For the Ruskin of Unto This Last
(1860), the achievement of this aim involves the ruling classes paternalistically taking on
greater responsibility for the care of the working classes, including the setting of a livable
minimum wage and the provision by the state of universal free primary education, but
without extending any measure of political self-determination. While this would entail a
limited redistribution of wealth, Ruskin is nevertheless in favor of leaving the class
system essentially intact. Early in his career, Morris, by his own admission, despaired of
the possibility of real social change and had little idea as to the content of a positive
political program beyond the rebellious aestheticism of the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood,
with which he was closely associated in the 1850s. Following his political awakening in
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the late 1870s and subsequent shift towards socialism, which he publicly declared after
reading Marx’s Capital in 1883, Morris’s revolutionary politics positioned him far from
the reactionary conservatism of Carlyle and Ruskin, yet his enthusiasm for “The Nature
of Gothic” never waned.31
It is obvious that for Ruskin the most important thing about Gothic is neither its
structural and ornamental conventions nor even the kinds of aesthetic experiences that it
offers, though these are certainly important; rather, the value of Gothic as an aesthetic
form lies in its implicit critique of the present, and this is where Ruskin shares the contrastive rhetoric of Carlyle and Pugin. For Morris, however, this critique by itself is not
enough. Morris shares Ruskin’s sense of Gothic as both a narrowly defined historical
style (medieval pointed architecture) but also, and much more importantly, as a broadly
anti-classical feeling that finds expression in a range of artistic forms and styles characterized by their freedom from “academical pedantry.”32 In a lecture from 1884 on the
Gothic Revival, Morris defines the characteristics of historical Gothic art in social rather
than formal terms: “It was common to the whole people; it was free, progressive, hopeful,
full of human sentiment and humour.”33 Then, in the text “Gothic Architecture” (1889),
Gothic finds its simplest and most utopian formulation: organic art.34 While all art is
historically symptomatic in Morris’s materialist understanding of history, Gothic art is
31
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the only art capable of articulating an organic relationship between past, present and
future. After the revolution, which will inaugurate a change as great as that which destroyed feudalism, architecture will need to be “historic in the true sense,” meaning that it
will be both traditional and in “sympathy with the needs and aspirations of its own time,”
which will be radically different from those of any time previously; moreover, “it will
remember the history of the past, make history in the present, and teach history in the
future.”35 Gothic thus becomes a way of relating different historical moments. And it
finds in the past not an image of the future, but a promise of revolutionary change.
Looking over Morris’s creative work—from the Oxford Union murals painted
with members of the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood and the poems, such as “The Defence
of Guenevere,” for which he first achieved fame in the 1850s, through his extensive
research into medieval dyes, patterns and techniques in the 1870s, his historical romances
and translations of Icelandic epic, and, finally, to the Kelmscott Press edition of Chaucer
published a few months before his death in 1896—Morris’s Gothic bears all the hallmarks of aesthetic medievalism.36 Yet Morris’s apprehension of the Middle Ages is far
from the rosy spectacle presented by the Catholic-convert Pugin. In many lectures and
essays from the 1880s, he reflects on medieval society and its meaning for the nineteenth
century. Sometimes, in “Feudal England” (1887), for example, the Middle Ages are
characterized by a constant state of “open war,” the society, “an army fed by slaves.”
(M23:53–54). At other times, as in “Art and Industry in the Fourteenth Century” (1890),
the guilds and the free cities, before their corruption into organs of bourgeois power,
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provide positive examples of workers’ self-organization in the face of an oppressively
hierarchical society and the growing forces of commercialism and bureaucracy
(M22:382–85). Most often, Morris’s presentation of medieval society in his lectures and
essays reveals an uncomfortable ambivalence. In this regard, the ironically titled lecture
“The Hopes of Civilization” (1885) is a typical text. Here Morris relates the history of
modernity as the gradual development of the capitalist system out of medieval feudalism.37 He confesses to feeling “a strange emotion” when reflecting on the Middle Ages
and admits to taking pleasure, “not seldom,” in imagining the appearance of premodern
England, free of environmental degradation and dotted with beautiful buildings
(M23:61). This strange emotion takes a number of turns. To begin with, this England
would be unrecognizable to its nineteenth-century inhabitants, a source of both wonder
and estrangement. A closer look at the conditions of the “rigidly ordered caste society,”
however, would show them to be no more just than those of the nineteenth century, that
the struggle between classes was already underway (M23:62).
The imaginative reconstruction of the Middle Ages that precipitates this ambivalence is not, for Morris, the daydreaming of an armchair antiquary, such as the narrator of
The Mill on the Floss, but rather a result of living in a world in which the relics of that
past are still to be encountered. The essay “Art and Industry in the Fourteenth Century”
37
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begins with a long, second-person recollection of Peterborough in which the encounter
with the town’s medieval cathedral, “so beautiful and majestic in itself,” defamiliarizes
both past and present (M22:375). The political effect of this defamiliarized image of the
past—continuity and disjuncture, identity and difference—is the realization that things
can and must change again and that historical knowledge is accordingly ground for hope
rather than despair. The image of the past can help us both to understand our present
situation and to envision the future. Morris’s “strange emotion” is, then, a complicated
ambivalence, articulating past, present and future, through an imaginative experience in
which the alterity of the past appears as the conditions of possibility for the future.
It is clear that Morris’s political awakening and reading of Marx, while it gave
him hope for the future and hardened his sense of the injustice of modern society, also
forced him to revise the nostalgic medievalism of his youth. Yet, even in some of his
earliest work, we find a complicated temporality that prefigures the revolutionary thinking of his later work. “The Story of the Unknown Church” (1856) renders a peculiarly
Pre-Raphaelite image of commitment to historical transformation. “I was the mastermason of a church that was built more than six hundred years ago,” begins this short
story, the first-person narrative of Walter, a medieval stonemason, who tells his story
from beyond the grave (M1:149). Walter recalls the world in which he lived, centered on
the abbey church of the title, and its subsequent destruction. The text’s red thread is the
narrative of work, which Walter carries out with his sister, Margaret, who is also a
stonemason, and who is betrothed to Walter’s best friend, Amyot. Carving a relief over
the church’s western portal, Walter has a vision of the patriarch Abraham, which gives
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way to a prophetic dream about Amyot. He wakes from the dream to find that his friend
has returned from the Crusades, but within days the two lovers—Amyot and Margaret—
are dead. Walter becomes a monk and spends the rest of his life carving the lovers’ tomb
in the church, upon completion of which he dies.
The text is Gothic in several senses: the setting of a medieval abbey and the story
of a church’s construction makes it a classic example of Victorian medievalism; as a tale
of death and destruction told by a ghost, it is both macabre and supernatural enough to
qualify as Gothic fiction; finally, the grotesquerie of the narrator’s disturbed imagination,
in particular, his inscrutably allegorical dream-prophesies, along with the fact that he is a
stonemason, make the story Gothic in a Ruskinian sense. Dreams and visions are a
favorite narrative device of Morris’s, framing several of his early short stories and later
political novels. Especially in the later texts, dreams often provide the means of time
travel, either to the past (A Dream of John Ball) or to the future (News from Nowhere),
that enables a historical vision of social transformation.38 In earlier texts, however, they
often disrupt and confuse the passage of linear time.39 So, in “The Story of the Unknown
Church,” rather than framing the story, the narrator’s dream-vision comes in the middle,
and, rather than providing a clear picture of events, the images are obscure, disjointed and
left uninterpreted. In collapsing spatial and temporal perspective, it is as though Morris is
attempting to represent in prose the aesthetic conventions of a medieval tapestry. The
dream weaves together the present time of the narrative with its future and a mythic
(biblical) past. The vision of death—“a spectre which the workman indeed saw”—
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enables Walter to complete his work on the west portal. The most disarming specter
represented in the text, however, is the narrator himself, the ghost of organic art haunting
modernity.
Walter is a ghost, and ghosts often remember that which has been destroyed. The
destruction of the abbey takes place at the start of the text, just as the completion of the
tomb and the narrator’s death finish it:
I was the master-mason of a church that was built more than six hundred
years ago; it is now two hundred years since that church vanished from the
face of the earth; it was destroyed utterly,—no fragment of it was left; not
even the great pillars that bore up the tower at the cross, where the choir
used to join the nave. No one knows now even where it stood, only in this
very autumn-tide, if you knew the place, you would see the heaps made by
the earth-covered ruins heaving the yellow corn into glorious waves, so
that the place where my church used to be is as beautiful now as when it
stood in all its splendour. (M1:149)
Nothing is left of the church—not even its name—nothing but the testament of a ghost
and some barely perceptible traces on the landscape. The text opens by razing its central
object to the ground and insisting on its near total negation, just as the title already marks
it as unknown. And yet, the story, in spite of its nostalgia, is not an elegy for the destroyed church: there may be a prevailing atmosphere of tristesse here, but there is no
regret in the fact of the church’s destruction. Neither is there any sense of personal
discontent or unfinished business, as might be expected from a ghost. With its focus on
personal memory, its acknowledged partiality, rambling asides, and conversational
tone—including the frequent use of “so” and “now” as discourse markers and one case of
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self-correction40—the text reads like the transcript of an oral history. Even so, Walter’s
homely narration is at odds with the uncanniness of his position outside of life and
therefore history. The story of Walter’s life is one of historical affirmation—
remembering the past, envisioning the future and working in the present are the three
primary activities described—but his death and the destruction of the church negate
historical consciousness as contrast (you cannot compare something with nothing). In
some ways, Walter is a Pre-Raphaelite caricature, aestheticizing an imaginary memory of
an impossibly distant past. But, ultimately, all this past tells about the future is that it
must contain destruction. The present alone is the time of production. Even in his early,
more nostalgic, work, then, Morris represents the inevitability of death and destruction
even as he narrates the creation of a lifeworld through work.
To be sure, Morris shares the nineteenth-century European obsession with production that finds its most important theorist in Marx; as already noted, Morris’s citation
of Ruskin is generally limited to the latter’s theory of the necessity of creative work, a
philosophical anthropology of creative labor. Despite the emphasis on production and his
own staggering output, Morris’s Gothic is as destructive as it is creative. In “How I
Became a Socialist,” Morris writes, “Apart from the desire to produce beautiful things,
the leading passion of my life has been and is hatred of modern civilization […] hope of
its destruction” (M23:279). The dialectic of hope and despair is a driving force in Mor-
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ris’s work, as E. P. Thompson has noted.41 This dialectic is driven to its logical conclusion in “Dawn of a New Epoch” (1886), whose title takes on a chilling tone with the final
words of the lecture:
It may be hoped that we of this generation may be able to prove that [the
slavery of capitalism] is unnecessary; but it will, doubt it not, take many
generations yet to prove that it is necessary for such degradation to last as
long as humanity does; and when that is finally proved we shall at least
have one hope left—that humanity will not last long. (M23:140)
Arguably, nothing is more Gothic than the image of the destruction of civilization or the
extinction of the human species itself, whether by barbarian invasion, proletarian revolution, deadly pandemic, swarming zombies, or, as Morris suggests here and as global
climate change renders increasingly likely, the capitalist system itself. The wistful record
of the unknown church’s destruction and the unflinching expression of the hope of
extinction in the case of revolutionary failure add a decisive element to the theory of the
Gothic subject as outlined by Ruskin. The Gothic subject becomes a ghost, a subject
already partially destroyed and looking toward its full destruction, that unsettles by
recalling the destruction of the past and promising destruction in the future—the destruction of both itself and its world. But as Morris makes clear, some things need to be
destroyed.
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5.
Morris’s turn to socialism provided him with a figure that combines hope with destruction: revolution. As a reader of Marx and Engels, Morris understood revolution to be the
historically necessary and imminent event that would end capitalism and inaugurate
communism. While Marx was famously reticent about what a communist society might
actually look like, Morris had no such qualms, providing an image of a postrevolutionary society in his utopian novel News from Nowhere (1890), in which a nineteenth-century socialist going by the name of William Guest wakes up in twenty-firstcentury London. Morris had already shared something of this vision in lectures such as
“The Society of the Future” (1888), which presents the overcoming of capitalism as the
overcoming of civilization: not only will it be “a society which does not know the meaning of the words rich and poor, or the rights of property, or law or legality, or nationality,” but also one “conscious of a wish to keep life simple,” and one “founded on the free
exercise of the senses and passions of a healthy human animal.”42 Morris had also
reviewed the most popular utopian novel of the day, Edward Bellamy’s Looking Backward (1888), rejecting its technological state communism and criticizing its insufficiently
historical vision of the future as merely modern middle-class life purified of its injustices.43
Since Patrick Brantlinger’s influential reading of News from Nowhere as an “antinovel” that looks forward to a world in which art is no longer the expression of bourgeois
individualism but has rather become so universal as to inhere in communal life itself,
42
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much criticism of the text has addressed the surprisingly ambivalent status of art, and
especially the novel, in Morris’s communist society, along with its relationship to work
and pleasure.44 Less attention has been given to the equally ambivalent status in Morris’s
novel of historical consciousness. In some ways, Morris’s society of the future appears to
realize the end of history infamously predicted by the teleology of historical materialism.
As one of the characters remarks, “I have heard my great-grandfather say that it is mostly
in periods of turmoil and strife and confusion that people care much about history; and
you know […] we are not like that now” (M16:30). This has led some critics to conclude
that historical consciousness has become extinct in the society: “In this perfectly cultivated world, life itself becomes pure form, an eternal present with no need for history or
change.”45 Matthew Beaumont, however, makes a compelling case for the communist
society’s reduced historical sense being a key part of Morris’s critique of capitalism.
Connecting Morris’s work with a longer (subsequent) history of Marxist theory, Beaumont shows how reification makes the present in industrial capitalist societies both empty
and opaque, and that News from Nowhere’s vision of a communist society is one wherein
44
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“the present is finally present to itself,” and so one wherein “history is simply being.”46
Beaumont also points out the many moments of uncanniness, in tension with this world
of pure presence, brought about by Guest’s unexplained appearance in the future—that is,
as a ghost—which indicate “the impossibility of complete utopian plenitude.”47 However,
even if Morris’s society of the future is one of reduced historical consciousness—a
situation that suggests a correlation between capitalism and historicism that Morris never
unpacks—it nonetheless remains the case that this society has a complicated relationship
with the past, attested by Ellen’s grandfather’s discontent with the present and by the
repeated jokes about “reactionary novelists.” Moreover, despite the enormous transformations that led to it, the society is also, as we shall see, a society of active preservation.
It cannot therefore be characterized with precision as a world of pure presence that is
only undermined by Guest’s ghostly apparition from the past. In considering Morris’s
utopian novel, then, I would like to bring together some elements of Gothic discussed
earlier in this chapter and focus on the primary form by which the communist society of
News from Nowhere remains a historical society: buildings.
Guest’s first impressions of the society of the future are mainly impressions of its
architecture; the clue that finally pushes him into the realization that he is no longer in
nineteenth-century London is a bridge over the Thames: “I had perhaps dreamed of such
a bridge, but never seen such an one out of an illuminated manuscript; for not even the
Ponte Vecchio at Florence came anywhere near it. It was of stone arches, splendidly
46
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solid, and as graceful as they were strong” (M16:8). A few times, Guest fancies he is in
the fourteenth century, but he also notes the stylistic freedom that characterizes the
architecture:
Above this lower building rose the steep lead-covered roof and the
buttresses and higher part of the wall of a great hall, of a splendid and
exuberant style of architecture, of which one can say little more than that it
seemed to me to embrace the best qualities of the Gothic of northern
Europe with those of the Saracenic and Byzantine, though there was no
copying of any one of these styles. (M16:24)
What delights him, moreover, is the life that the buildings contain and express:
This whole mass of architecture which we had come upon so suddenly
from amidst the pleasant fields was not only exquisitely beautiful in itself,
but it bore upon it the expression of such generosity and abundance of life
that I was exhilarated to a pitch that I had never yet reached. I fairly
chuckled for pleasure. (M16:24)
Nothing in the future gives Guest greater pleasure than beholding these buildings. His joy
in the architecture of the future is a moment of delight in what Beaumont would call a
present that is fully present to itself.
However, the revelation of the present often involves contrast with the past,
drawing Guest back from full presence. Ernst Bloch disapproved of the luddite destructiveness of the revolution in News from Nowhere,48 yet the entire narrative is structured
around buildings preserved from prior ages. The novel consists of three parts: two
journeys to special old buildings, separated by the long history-lesson of the book’s
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Figure 3.4.
Frontispiece and first page
William Morris, News from Nowhere, Kelmscott edition, 1893
Kunstbibliothek, Berlin

didactic middle. The first journey is a wagon-ride through West London to the British
Museum (“an old friend”), where Guest learns the history of the society from Old Hammond, who, the book hints, may be Guest’s descendent. The second is a boat-trip up-river
to Kelmscott Manor, a sixteenth-century house in Oxfordshire that was Morris’s home
from 1871 until his death, and which provided the frontispiece for the Kelmscott Press
edition of the novel (Figure 3.4). These journeys afford Guest a vista onto the life of the
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society and the chance to get to know two of its members, Dick and Ellen. But they also
present Guest with some familiar London landmarks that survived the Great Change. The
first journey passes by Westminster Abbey, cleared of its “beastly monuments to fools
and knaves,” and the Houses of Parliament, preserved at the behest of a “queer antiquarian society” but now the Dung Market (M16:32). The second goes by way of Hampton
Court Palace, another “old friend,” which has retained its status as a popular leisure spot
(M16:146); Windsor Castle, now a communal dwelling and a “well-arranged store of
antiquities” (M16:161); and the former bastions of inherited privilege, Eton and Oxford,
which remain places of learning and knowledge but are now accessible to all (M16:160,
70, 185).49 Since there is no longer any education as such, let alone a class system, Eton
and Oxford operate under completely different conditions, yet their historical associations
are nevertheless preserved, as are those of the royal residences as leisure gardens and
cabinets of art and curiosities. Accordingly, the conversion of Parliament into a Dung
Market is not simply the sensible adaptive re-use that the people of the future, who have
neither state nor politics, understand it to be, but, rather, in the book’s funniest irony, the
best way for the buildings to preserve continuity of purpose and thereby illustrate the
truth of this purpose. In each case, the preservation of the buildings also preserves
historical function as though it were baked into the bricks.
One of the remarkable features of Morris’s Gothic utopia as Gothic is that it
contains no ruins, “no tumble-down picturesque” (M16:73). The Romantic Gothic of
Scott and Turner would appear to have no place in this society, nor the sentimental
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admiration described by Ruskin. Gothic is now a stonemason’s Gothic, as the example of
the “Obstinate Refusers” illustrates: this insatiable group of masons builds a whole house
out of ashlar so that they may carve its entire surface, skipping their lunch breaks and
refusing other work in their desire to continue carving (M16:172–76). Yet, even if all the
buildings are kept “trim and clean, and orderly and bright” (M16:73), there is an affective
response to architectural antiquity that goes beyond workmanly admiration. This is most
evident in the novel’s climax: the arrival of the characters at Kelmscott Manor, which,
Guest observes, the people intuitively venerate:
The extravagant love of ornament which I had noted in this people
elsewhere seemed here to have given place to the feeling that the house
itself and its associations was the ornament of the country life amidst
which it had been left stranded from old times, and that to re-ornament it
would but take away its use as a piece of natural beauty. (M16:202–03)
Standing before the house, Ellen exclaims:
“Yes, friend, this is what I came out for to see; this many gabled house
built by simple country-folk of the long-past times, regardless of all the
turmoil that was going on in cities and courts, is lovely still amidst all the
beauty which these latter days have created; and I do not wonder at our
friends tending it carefully and making much of it. It seems to me as if it
had waited for these happy days, and held in it the gathering crumbs of
happiness of the confused and turbulent past.” (M16:201)
For Ellen, the most disconcerting character in the novel, the Gothic remains historical in a
way that it should not be for someone living after the end of history, in a society of pure
presence, unalienated labor, and universal liberty. The old house may very well gather the
“crumbs of happiness,” but at the same time it points to the “turbulent past.” Ellen has
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already expressed her opinion that history should not be left to antiquaries like Old
Hammond and her understanding that time may yet change her world again for the worse
(M16:194). The Gothic of Kelmscott Manor, however well maintained, is, for both Ellen
and Guest alike, a bitter-sweet memento mori, like the ruined Melrose Abbey of Scott,
Turner, and Ruskin.
For Guest, the arrival at Kelmscott is the dreamiest part of his sojourn in the
future. And no wonder. The wagon-ride through London provides a concatenation of
impressions of a fully realized communist society, through which the past nonetheless
juts in the form of antique buildings, all of which will soon be explained by Old Hammond in the British Museum. By contrast, the journey up the Thames is a slow journey
home and so one back to the source of the self. Toiling against the flow of natural time,
William Guest achieves what Maggie Tulliver cannot. Where, in The Mill on the Floss,
Maggie is twice carried away by the river and repeatedly fails in her attempts to return to
an earlier moment, Guest succeeds in his passage upstream, his journey to the future
arriving in the past. But the place is eerily deserted:
We went in, and found no soul in any room as we wandered from room to
room,—from the rose-covered porch to the strange and quaint garrets
amongst the great timbers of the roof, where of old time the tillers and
herdsmen of the manor slept, but which a-nights seemed now, by the small
size of the beds, and the litter of useless and disregarded matters—bunches
of dying flowers, feathers of birds, shells of starling’s eggs, caddis worms
in mugs, and the like—seemed to be inhabited for the time by children.
(M16:202)
The warped scale effected by the small beds, the discarded “matters” of a nature morte,
and the vacation of the old house by the representatives of futurity combine with Morris’s
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strained syntax and awkward repetitions to increase the sense, slowly building on the
journey upstream, that spacetime is breaking apart. Ellen has already worked out that she
is speaking to a ghost who will soon disappear. On their way to Kelmscott’s repurposed
medieval church, where the harvest feast is taking place, Dick says to Guest (“the guest
of guests”), “Come along; they will be glad to see you” (M16:208). Ironically, these turn
out to be the last words we hear from the future. In the midst of the feast, Guest fades
from everyone’s view. When he runs outside, he encounters a worn-out figure dressed in
rags, the sure sign that he has returned to the nineteenth century.
Since Jacques Derrida’s Specters of Marx, we have been aware that communism
is only the most famous specter in the work of Marx and Engels; ideology, money, the
commodity, and capitalism also are spectral. In Derrida’s reading of Marx and Marxism,
the ghost is “the hidden figure of all figures.”50 Importantly, spectrality undoes not only
the opposition between presence and absence, as one might expect, but also that of past
and future: “one can never distinguish between the future to-come and the coming-back
of a specter.”51 If, as Derrida suggests, this makes Marxism a kind of protodeconstruction, then we should not be surprised to find Morris’s vision of a communist
society to be shot through with temporal inconsistencies. Any present is as much haunted
by its past as by its future. In News from Nowhere, a communist future, too, becomes “a
spectre which the workman indeed saw,” and no less ambivalently historical than the
present. Accordingly, Morris’s work fits with neither of the modes of recurrence conventionally associated with Gothic: the willed reanimation of the past by the Gothic Revival
50
51

Derrida, Specters of Marx, 150.
Ibid., 46.
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(which, as the example of the Dung Market shows, Morris was generally unimpressed
by) and the past’s unexpected, unwanted return in Gothic fiction.52 Following Ruskin,
Morris identifies haunting and foreboding as essential to the aesthetic experience of
Gothic, but moves beyond him by affectively transvaluing them, turning them into
feelings of hope.
The most radical moment in News from Nowhere occurs in its final sentence:
“Yes, surely!” exclaims Guest, “and if others can see it as I have seen it, then it may be
called a vision rather than a dream” (M16:211). Morris’s proselytization of perception—
“if others can see it as I have seen it”—looks forward to a collectivization of the narratorial function; he invites us all to proleptically haunt the future even as it haunts us: “Come
along; they will be glad to see you.” At the same time, the empty house with its transtemporal, ghostly lovers (Guest and Ellen), rather than provide the comfort of historical
continuity anticipated by the return to the source of the self, or a respite from historicism’s endless contrasting, pierces the bubble of the present and places prophetic vision
in the sensuous, though by no means self-transparent, rather than supersensuous world. It
is an actual house, as the frontispiece of the Kelmscott edition points out:
THIS IS THE PICTURE OF THE OLD
HOUSE BY THE THAMES TO WHICH
THE PEOPLE OF THIS STORY WENT
HEREAFTER FOLLOWS THE BOOK ITSELF WHICH IS CALLED NEWS FROM
52

Morris addresses the failure of the Gothic Revival at length in “The Revival of
Architecture” (M22:318–30). Even Ruskin came to have his doubts (R9:11–15). Kenneth
Clark, whose The Gothic Revival was first published in 1928, attests to the low regard in
which the Gothic Revival was held during the modernist period; he refers to the Houses
of Parliament as “a great necropolis of style” (Clark, Gothic Revival, 7, 119).
168

NOWHERE OR AN EPOCH OF REST &
IS WRITTEN BY WILLIAM MORRIS.53
In distinguishing the story from “the book itself,” Morris characteristically reminds us of
the materiality of his text. But he also implies that the story, like the house, exists outside
of the book. History, Morris suggests, is an actual empty old house, familiar but inhabited
by other people whom we may or may not be able to see, and who, like us, imagine
within its walls a happy life.

53

See Figure 3.4.
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Chapter Four
Decadent Antiquarianism: Lyric Collection and Anti-Classical
Display in Oscar Wilde and Aubrey Beardsley

1.
All of the four major terms explored in this dissertation—natural history, Renaissance,
Gothic, decadence—correlate historiographical and aesthetic knowledge, perhaps none
more so, however, than the last of these. As the name of a literary and artistic movement
whose characteristics are usually said to include artifice, erudition, sensuality, and
deviancy (all in excess), Decadence originates with a simple historicist diagnosis: decadent art in decadent times.1 As the editors of a volume of essays published at the millennium attest, it was only relatively recently that this pathologizing historicism, with its
image of the artist as an effete and impotent consumptive, was put into serious question.2

1

In this chapter, I distinguish the late-nineteenth-century literary and artistic movement
from general historiographical, moralistic, and stylistic uses of “decadence” by capitalizing the name of the former only.
2
Constable, Denisoff, and Potolsky, Perennial Decay, 2. They object, for instance, to
Regenia Gagnier’s essay “A Critique of Practical Aesthetics” for its presentation of
Decadence as a depoliticized form of Aestheticism (ibid., 9). Spivak makes a similar
argument against critical treatments of Decadence that, more or less subtly, reinscribe the
value judgments of the nineteenth century and historicize Decadence as “the abdication
of social commitment after 1848 and 1871” (Spivak, “Decadent Style,” 227). While she
does not cite any particular works, Swart’s The Sense of Decadence in NineteenthCentury France (1964) is representative of this kind of historicism.
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Recent scholarship has subsequently recuperated Decadence from its status as an aesthetic dead-end awaiting the rejuvenating force of Modernism and repositioned it as a literary
formation with political aims opposed to the prevailing social order and its moralizing
discourse of degeneration.3 A justified suspicion of grand narratives and biological
metaphors has led twenty-first-century historicist critics to reject the judgments of their
nineteenth-century predecessors in the case of Decadence.4 Today’s Decadence scholarship thus depends upon a careful and sustained distinction of aesthetic Decadence from
historiographical decadence. While such a distinction is welcome, it has not led to new
assessments of how Decadence itself understands and engages with history. And yet
Decadence, I argue, at least in the selection of English works considered here, constitutes
a radical intervention in nineteenth-century historical discourse. In contrast to the historiographical narrative of decadence and the medical diagnosis of degeneration—and,
moreover, unlike much work in Decadence studies, old and new—Decadence itself is
opposed to the dominant scientific and philosophical historicisms. This does not mean,
3

The work of David Weir has been especially important in rearticulating the relationship
between Romanticism, Decadence, and Modernism (see Weir, Decadence and the
Making of Modernism). Recent monographs that have taken a more political view of
Decadence include Kostas Boyiopoulos’s The Decadent Image, Alex Murray’s Landscapes of Decadence, and Matthew Potolsky’s The Decadent Republic of Letters. Kirsten
MacLeod’s Fictions of British Decadence is a self-avowed revisionist history that aims to
demythologize Decadence by placing it in a broader (and less sensationalized) literaryhistorical context.
4
Nevertheless, at the same time, both within and outside the academy, there has been a
resurgent discourse of decline that has not altogether eschewed the terminology of
decadence, even if it has left the medical language of the fin de siècle behind. This
discourse makes itself felt (albeit felt differently) in historiography across the political
spectrum, in for example Bernard Stiegler’s critique of consumer capitalism in The
Decadence of Industrial Democracies as much as in a conservative–humanistic history
like Jacques Barzun’s From Dawn to Decadence. Arthur Herman provides a useful,
though itself politically tendentious, overview in The Idea of Decline in Western History.
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however, that it has no interest in history. On the contrary, for all its concern with the life
of modernity, Decadence repeatedly, even obsessively, looks to the distant past—
typically, Egyptian, Greek, or Roman antiquity—for its artistic materials. In doing so,
however, it is concerned neither to produce a true image of that past “as it actually was”
nor to cultivate an idealized one serving claims of moral authority. Decadence shatters
the image of antiquity provided by a chaste archaeology and ridicules classicism’s core
concept of a universal gold standard transcending time. In the process, it establishes its
own mode of historical relation, that of an aesthetic subjectivity producing itself with the
material remains of the past free from the strictures of the more disciplinary forms of
historicism and classicism.
This chapter examines anti-classicist engagements with the cultures of antiquity in
the work of Oscar Wilde and Aubrey Beardsley. My discussion of Wilde returns to his
criticism in Intentions (1891)5 and then to his unusual poem The Sphinx (1894), which
figures the Decadent engagement with antiquity as a form of collection that produces
atmosphere rather than knowledge. As an objectification of desire, moreover, The Sphinx
exposes the libidinal economy of collecting. The collection has long been recognized as a
key topos of Decadent aesthetics, canonized in Joris-Karl Huysmans’s À rebours (1884)
and Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray (1890).6 Where the collections in these texts

5

See the opening paragraph of Chapter One above.
In addition to the gems of Des Esseintes’s infamous jeweled tortoise (Huysmans,
Against Nature, ch. 4), his collections include works of art (ch. 5), exotic plants (ch. 8),
perfumes (ch. 10), and books (ch. 12), including works of literary Decadence, both
ancient (ch. 3) and modern (ch. 14). Indeed, collecting provides the basic structure of the
book, with even the accounts of Des Esseintes’s past lovers (ch. 9) and his aborted trip to
London (ch. 11) determined by its logic. Dorian’s turn to collecting, in particular gems
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highlight the labor and pleasure of obscure systems of knowledge and the aesthetic
arrangement of exquisite particulars, my reading of The Sphinx treats a specifically
historical form of the Decadent collection, and so puts forward a theory of Decadent
antiquarianism as the thoroughly eroticized “taste for, or devotion to, antiquities”7 of a
fragmented lyric subjectivity. While Intentions and The Sphinx contest the truth-claims of
archaeological historicism, it is Beardsley’s illustrations for Aristophanes’ Lysistrata that
make a mockery of classicism’s claim to ownership of antiquity and its vision of classical
purity. Just as Wilde reveals the erotic underpinnings of archaeology, so Beardsley’s
anachronistic illustrations of Greek theater expose the truth of classicism. Both provide
alternative visions of antiquity that confront the dominant forms of its representation with
what they consciously exclude and unconsciously repress. This chapter thus argues for
the value of Wilde’s and Beardsley’s attempts to prize apart the proprietary relationship
between classicism and antiquity.
Where the collection occupies an untroubled position in the canon of Decadence,
however, the relationship between Decadence and classicism is rather more complicated.
This situation arises with the initial theorizations of literary Decadence by nineteenthcentury French critics and poets, who, as we shall see, define Decadence, at the most
basic level, as an aesthetic corollary of the historiographical narrative of decline and so
explicitly opposed to the classical. My goal in the remainder of this section is to trace the
contours of Decadence’s conceptual formation in the nineteenth century and then to
detemporalize the historical opposition of the classical and the Decadent—a move that is
and textiles, in chapter eleven of The Picture of Dorian Gray follows his reading of the
“poisonous book” assumed to be À rebours (W3:274, 282–86).
7
“Antiquarianism,” OED.
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implicit in Wilde’s Intentions. This is possible because classicism, like Decadence, is a
living aesthetic discourse in the nineteenth century, albeit one that by the 1890s had
sustained some heavy critique, and is, moreover, a way of engaging with antiquity whose
relationship with scientific historicism is itself problematic. Going back over this history
not only reveals what is at stake for the partisans on either side of the classicism–
Decadence divide, but also underscores the political nature of the Decadent intervention
in aesthetics that was also an intervention into the forms of relation to the imagined
distant past.
Just as the historical concept of decadence originates in the historiography of
antiquity, so the literary-critical concept of “decadence” first emerges within classicism.8
The long decline and fall of Rome provides the paradigm for modern understandings of
decadence, a paradigm established by Enlightenment histories such as Montesquieu’s
Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence (1734)
and Edward Gibbon’s History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776–
1789).9 Most histories of nineteenth-century Decadence, however, begin with the French
8

It is not my purpose to provide a comprehensive history of the concept of decadence in
nineteenth-century thought, of which there are already several, but rather to establish a
historical foundation for this chapter’s admittedly partial emphasis on Decadence as an
anti-classical engagement with antiquity. The best overview of the concept is, I think,
Freund’s La Décadence; others include Călinescu’s Five Faces of Modernity, Gilman’s
Decadence, Pierrot’s L’Imaginaire décadent, Swart’s The Sense of Decadence in Nineteenth-Century France, Thornton’s The Decadent Dilemma, and, most recently, Weir’s
Decadence.
9
Freund, Décadence, 105–19. As Thornton points out, the conceptualization of history as
a process of decline rather than progress predominates across European cultures and
epochs, making the nineteenth-century belief in progress exceptional. In Thornton’s
analysis, late-nineteenth-century Decadence is distinguished from other historiographies
of decline by its use of biological, and specifically evolutionary, terminology (Thornton,
Decadent Dilemma, 1–10; see also Swart, Sense of Decadence, ch. 1). For a broader
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classicist Désiré Nisard, whose study of first-century Roman poetry (chiefly Lucan),
Études de mœurs et de critique sur les poëtes latins de la décadence, was published in
1834. While, in the early nineteenth century, decadence was already in use to characterize
historical moments other than late antiquity (for example, in Carlyle’s French Revolution,
the ancien régime10), Nisard is typically identified as the first to make the historicizing
connection between imperial decline, societal decay, and aesthetic inferiority, and to
adduce this connection through the description of a decadent style as the necessary
corollary of decadent times.11 What is more, Nisard closes his study of Silver Age Latin
poetry with a conclusion that compares the Romanticism of his own time with the literary
Decadence of Imperial Rome and finds the latter’s principal stylistic attributes—
excessive erudition and descriptiveness—repeated in the former.12 Nisard’s critique
accordingly establishes three enduring aspects of aesthetic decadence: its historical
conditioning by a dissolute society, its stylistic tendency to focus on the part at the
expense of the whole, and its lamentable return in modernity as the symptom of another
epoch of decline.

analysis of decline, see Herman, The Idea of Decline in Western History. On the role of
Roman decadence specifically in nineteenth-century historiography, see Dowling,
“Roman Decadence and Victorian Historiography.” On the existence of the consciousness of not only historical but also aesthetic decadence in antiquity itself, see Fuhrer,
“Das Interesse am menschlichen Scheitern.”
10
Carlyle, French Revolution, 1:9–14; according to the OED, this is the first recorded
instance in English of the adjective “decadent.”
11
See, for example, Boyiopoulos, Decadent Image, 8; Constable, Denisoff, and Potolsky,
Perennial Decay, 8; Dowling, Language and Decadence, 151; Gagnier, Individualism,
176; Potolsky, Decadent Republic, 3. I owe the trinity of imperial decline, societal decay,
and aesthetic inferiority to David Weir, who identifies these as the three primary senses
of “decadence” (Weir, Decadence, 1).
12
Nisard, Études, 3:256–59.
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Nisard’s ideas recur throughout nineteenth-century treatments of Decadence,
whether encomium or polemic. Among the more canonical French discussions, Théophile
Gautier’s preface to the 1868 edition of Charles Baudelaire’s Les Fleurs du mal and Paul
Bourget’s 1881 essay on the same author both invoke the decadence of antiquity as the
aesthetic corollary of social decline, oppose it to classical form, and characterize it as
artificial and excessively preoccupied with particularity. Gautier:
In connection with [the decadent style of Baudelaire’s poetry], we may
recall the language, so corrupted and already marbled by the piquancies of
decomposition, of the late Roman Empire, and the complicated
refinements of the Byzantine school, the latest form of Greek art fallen
into decline. But such is the necessary and fatal idiom of peoples and
civilizations in which artificial life has replaced natural life and developed
in man unwonted needs. This style—moreover, despised by pedants—is
no easy thing, because it expresses new ideas with new forms and words
that we have never before heard. Unlike the classical style, it admits
shadow and in this shadow confusedly move the larvae of superstitions,
the haggard ghosts of insomnia, night terrors, the remorse that shudders
and turns at the slightest sound, the monstrous dreams that alone stop
impotence, the obscure fantasies that would astonish the day, and all that
the soul conceals, in the depths of its deepest and furthermost cave, that is
obscure, deformed, and vaguely horrible.13
In contrast to Gautier’s evocative characterization, Bourget’s psychological study makes
the decisive move of grounding the stylistic inferiority of decadence in a biologized
account of society: “A society may be likened to an organism. […] The individual is the
social cell.”14 But, once again, contemporary aesthetic decadence is explained through the
historicist analogy of the disintegrating society of the Roman Empire, albeit here analyzed in terms of population changes. Bourget’s biologism leads him to see decadence as
13
14

In Baudelaire, Œuvres complètes, 1:17 (my translation).
Bourget, Essais, 14 (my translation).
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a problem of individualism, understood as social degeneration.15 This individualism takes
aesthetic form in what has become one of the most frequently cited formulations of
Decadent style: “A decadent style is one in which the unity of the book disintegrates and
gives way to the independence of the page, in which the page disintegrates and gives way
to the independence of the sentence, and the sentence gives way to the independence of
the word.”16
While decadence was a familiar feature of British historiography and criticism,
occupying an important place in the work of Gibbon, Carlyle, and Ruskin,17 it was rather
the work of French authors such as Gautier, Baudelaire, Gustave Flaubert, and Huysmans
15

Bourget’s pathologization of Decadence anticipates one of the most notorious works of
cultural criticism of the fin de siècle, Max Nordau’s widely read polemic Entartung
(1892–1893; English translation: Degeneration, 1895). Drawing on the degeneration
theory of the psychologist Bénédict Morel and the criminologist Cesare Lombroso,
Nordau’s book lambasts almost every major European literary and artistic movement of
the century. In contrast to the critics who concern me here, he understands Decadence as
a specifically modern pathology and dismisses the analogy with antiquity as philologically ungrounded (Nordau, Entartung, 302). He does, however, understand Decadent style
as an excessive individualism or egomania (Ich-Sucht), that is, as a focus on the part
rather than the whole, and attests this with quotes from both Gautier and Bourget, as well
as discussion of Baudelaire, Huysmans, and Wilde (ibid., 298–322). On degeneration
theory and the pathologization of Decadence, see Greenslade, Degeneration, Culture and
the Novel; Hurley, The Gothic Body; Pick, Faces of Degeneration; and Spackman,
Decadent Genealogies, which reminds us that in many cases Decadent writers participated in their own pathologization.
16
Bourget, Essais, 14 (my translation). In Individualism, Decadence and Globalization,
Regenia Gagnier identifies the problem of the relationship of part to whole as one of the
most important in aesthetic, economic, and social theory during the period of the second
half of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, an importance supported
by its consistent citation by the critics I discuss here.
17
In addition to the works of Gibbon and Carlyle cited above, see the third volume of
Ruskin’s The Stones of Venice (1853), in which the aesthetic decline of Venice as a
center of Gothic architecture is correlated with its political decline as a sea-power, its
moral intemperance, and the broad historical transformation called the Renaissance,
which for Ruskin is the absolute antithesis of what it purports to be—not cultural rebirth
but cultural decadence: “the ruin which was begun by scholarship, was completed by
sensuality” (R11:131).
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that informed the reception and development of the new movement in Britain. The best
known of several essays of the late 1880s and early 1890s that sought to introduce French
Decadence to a British audience, Arthur Symons’s “The Decadent Movement in Literature” (1893) rehearses many of the characterizations of Decadence already canonized in
France.18 Once again, aesthetic decadence is hitched to historiography, opposed to
classicism, and pathologized:
The most representative literature of the day has all the qualities that mark
the end of great periods, the qualities that we find in the Greek, the Latin,
decadence: an intense self-consciousness, a restless curiosity in research,
an over subtilizing refinement upon refinement, a spiritual and moral
perversity. If what we call the classic is indeed the supreme art—those
qualities of perfect simplicity, perfect sanity, perfect proportion, the
supreme qualities—then this representative literature of to-day,
interesting, beautiful, novel as it is, is really a new and beautiful and
interesting disease.19
Likewise, in an essay on Bourget written for the Pioneer in 1889, Havelock Ellis, a friend
of Symons, draws a comparison between Latin literature in late antiquity and literature in
nineteenth-century France and England, and provides a precis of Bourget’s definition: “A
decadent style, in short, is an anarchistic style in which everything is sacrificed to the
development of the individual parts.”20 A decade later, however, with Decadence abandoned by many, including Symons, Ellis makes an important critical move in an essay on
Huysmans. While he repeats both the analogy between ancient and modern decadence
and the negative definition of decadent style as “only such in relation to a classic style,”
18

For a discussion of the British reception of French Decadence, see MacLeod, Fictions,
1–20. On Symons’s mercurial relationship with both the movement and the term, see
Bristow, “Sterile Ecstasies.”
19
Symons, “The Decadent Movement in Literature,” 858–59.
20
Ellis, Views, 1:52.
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he nonetheless refuses to pathologize decadence (an ambivalence in both Gautier and
Symons) and insists moreover on the autonomy of aesthetic judgment: “We have to
recognise that decadence is an aesthetic and not a moral judgment.”21 It is not that Ellis
removes Decadence from historical determination by a formalist reduction, as his insistence on an aesthetic of particularity might suggest. Indeed, he repeats the correlation of
social and aesthetic form: “an age of individualism is usually an age of artistic decadence.”22 Rather, Decadence is no longer the corollary of societal decline but simply one
end of an aesthetic continuum—the other being the classical—whose rhythms chart the
course of art history.23 But most importantly, and quite typically for this reader of Nietzsche, Ellis’s goal is transvaluation: Decadence no more stands for wickedness and
degeneration than the classic stands for goodness and health.24
While Ellis’s essay is an important early intervention in the critical reception of
Decadence, breaking the yoke of pessimistic historiography, a much stronger critique of
such thinking had already been made from within Decadence itself—in Wilde’s collection of essays and dialogues against realist aesthetics, Intentions (1891). In the first
chapter of the dissertation, I introduced one of this book’s texts, “The Decay of Lying”
(first published 1889), in order to characterize the dominant aesthetic discourse of
21

Ellis, Affirmations, 175, 186.
Ibid., 177.
23
Ibid., 175–76.
24
A similar argument is made by Robert Ross, Wilde’s closest friend and literary executor, in a lecture entitled “There Is No Decay,” delivered in 1908: “What is commonly
called decay is merely stylistic development […] we must remember that Decadence and
Decay have now different meanings, though originally they meant the same sort of thing”
(Ross, Masques, 284, 309). Hall and Murray discuss Ross’s and Ellis’s texts as articulating the Decadent remit of transvaluation and its critique of the moral concept of decadence (Hall and Murray, Decadent Poetics, 1–2).
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Victorian Britain. I want to revisit it now for its theory of history. The first point to make
is that the overall position of Intentions is not only anti-realist but also anti-historicist, or
at least, it is opposed to the scientific and philosophical forms of historicism which I
discussed in the Introduction.25 This position can be summarized in the four antinomian
doctrines that conclude “The Decay of Lying”: that “Art never expresses anything but
itself,” that “All bad art comes from returning to Life and Nature,” that “Life imitates Art
far more than Art imitates Life,” and that, finally, “Lying, the telling of beautiful untrue
things, is the proper aim of Art” (W4:102–03). Vivian’s doctrines are derived not only
from a sustained critique of realism (“a complete failure”), but also from an equally
important critique of a reductive historicism: “To pass from the art of a time to the time
itself is the great mistake that all historians make” (W4:102). Wilde’s most historical
example of such interpretation reveals the stakes of his argument for England’s nascent
Decadent movement:
The evil faces of the Roman emperors look out at us from the foul
porphyry and spotted jasper in which the realistic artists of the day
delighted to work, and we fancy that in those cruel lips and heavy sensual
jaws we can find the secret of the ruin of the Empire. But it was not so.
The vices of Tiberius could not destroy that supreme civilization, any
more than the virtues of the Antonines could save it” (W4:97).
25

It is true that in the volume’s final piece, “The Truth of Masks” (first published 1885),
Wilde derides anachronism and defends the use of archaeology for stage costumes (a
topical discussion in the 1880s), even as he values the poet John Keats’s antiquity over
the philologist Max Müller’s. However, it seems this essay was an ambivalent inclusion
in Intentions and the fact that it sits uneasily with the other pieces was evidently not lost
on Wilde, who, for the book version, added an abrupt and unconvincing conclusion
undermining most of the essay’s claims: “There is much with which I entirely disagree”
(W4:228; for the textual history of Intentions, see Josephine Guy’s critical introduction,
esp. W4:liv–lvii). In his early essay “Historical Criticism,” by contrast, Wilde’s theory of
historiography is conventional.
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Implicit here in Wilde’s rejection of the depth model of historical interpretation (both in
general and specifically in the case of decadence) is a rejection, moreover, of the moralization of history and, through the tacit repudiation of phrenology, its medicalization. The
hostility towards historicism reappears elsewhere in Intentions, for example, in Gilbert’s
glib dismissal of history as “always wearisome and usually inaccurate” in “The Critic as
Artist” (W4:144), as well as in the more sustained critique in “Pen, Pencil and Poison” of
the moralizing tendencies of complacent historians (W4:121). Importantly, however,
Wilde’s position does not amount to a rejection of the historical altogether but rather
makes an intervention in aesthetic theory regarding the nature and representational power
of historical consciousness. “To us, who live in the nineteenth century,” Vivian declares,
“any century is a suitable subject for art except our own” (W4:102). The point, then, is
not that artists and critics should forget about the past but rather that they should recognize the futility of any historiographical model that aims for either historical accuracy or
moral instruction. Wilde thus positions himself against the two dominant modes of
appropriating antiquity in the nineteenth century, epistemologically distinct but often
overlapping (as in Nisard): the humanistic, transhistoricizing discourse of classicism,
with its eternal verities and moral lessons, and the scientific historicism of the new
philology and archaeology, with its belief in objective reconstruction, whose famous
articulation by Ranke in the preface to his Geschichten der romanischen und germanischen Völker is directly opposed to didactic historiography.26 The point Wilde implicitly
makes is that the decadent is not opposed to the classical according to a historiography of
decline or a binary stylistics; rather, Decadence and classicism are different modes of
26

Ranke, Sämtliche Werke, 33:vii.
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engaging with and representing the past. It does not matter whether we live in decadent
times or not, we have, in any case, a choice as to how we make meaning from the past.
As one of the goals of this chapter is to distinguish classicism and antiquity, it will
be helpful here to give greater conceptual definition to these two terms and in particular
to the discourse of classicism—the discourse, as we have just seen, that first formulated
decadence in opposition to its own claims on ancient culture. As E. R. Curtius noted, the
word “classic” originates in antiquity as the name for the highest class of tax-payers in
the Roman Republic and was already being used figuratively to describe a superior
category of authors by Cicero.27 Yet Curtius’s full account of the concept’s role in
European canon-formation emphasizes both its retrospection and relativity: the classic
always belongs to the past and is defined with respect to the present. Even though “classicism”—the discourse of the classical—is an early nineteenth-century coinage which
took several decades to gain much currency,28 that “classic” brings together an evaluation
of the relationship between past and present with a figurative usage of “class” alerts us to
its long-held ideological content. James Porter unpacks this content in his essay “Feeling
Classical,” which conceives classicism as a structure of feeling in Raymond Williams’s
sense, and one that already existed in antiquity. Classicism, in Porter’s analysis, seeks to
instill “the feeling of proximity to and identity with what is classical,” that is, with “the
products of culture that are felt to be exemplary and of the first order.”29 Manifestly
ideological, classicism produces a certain kind of subject, one who feels classical and
who has a correspondingly classical habitus. It is fundamentally conservative and idealist,
27
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cultivating a continuity between past and present as a defense against the arbitrariness of
history. Classicism is, moreover, as Jonah Siegel points out, an “impossible project”
founded on the desire “to make the fragments of a lost antiquity cohere into a whole that
would reflect values acceptable to the day.”30 In this light, humanistic claims of Greek
universality and timelessness, such as Jacob Burckhardt’s assertion that we still see with
the eyes of the Greeks and speak with their words, appear at best self-delusional, at worst
a dogmatic limitation on the possibilities of experience.31
While such accounts of classicism and the classical emphasize its function as a
disciplinary apparatus, studies of classical reception in the nineteenth century have
demonstrated its broader range of political, affective, and aesthetic possibilities: the role
of classics was not limited to the education of future colonial administrators but also
provided the basis for the revolutionary politics of Romantic philhellenism and the lateVictorian formation of homosexual identity; moreover, its aesthetic traces are found in
popular as well as elite art.32 Even so, an important conceptual distinction needs to be
made between, on the one hand, “classicism” in the Winckelmannian–Arnoldian sense
analyzed by Porter and Siegel of “noble simplicity and calm grandeur”33 and “the best
which has been thought and said in the world,”34 and, on the other hand, “classics” in its
30
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broad sense as the culture of Greco-Roman antiquity. While Decadence’s definition by
Nisard and other French critics as the opposite of the classical is no doubt conditioned by
the particular importance of the latter concept to the history of modern French literature,
the consistent reference of these oppositional definitions to the internal development of
Greek and Roman literature indicates a conceptual distinction between the classical as an
evaluative category and antiquity as a historical period that is worth bringing to the fore.
According to nineteenth-century classicism, antiquity contains both the classical (Virgil)
and the decadent (Petronius). This aesthetic division of antiquity recurs in the French
discourse of decadence from Nisard to Des Esseintes, but for obvious reasons this schema
is no longer current in classical studies. My point here is not to recuperate the schema
but, rather, to show, consonant with Porter’s analysis, that its invention in the nineteenth
century constituted a way for classics to identify itself with what it judged best in both
antiquity and modernity, and against what it judged worst. Accordingly, in my discussion
of nineteenth-century Decadence, I insist upon the distinction between “antiquity” as a
ragbag term for the diverse cultures of the ancient Mediterranean and Near East, and
“classicism” as the name for the cultivation of certain cultural phenomena identified as
superior and originated in an earlier period (in most cases, pagan Greece and Rome).35 Of
preface to The Renaissance, Wilde’s misappropriation willfully misreads Arnold’s
intentions. See also Arnold’s characterization of Homer’s “general effect”—plain, direct,
and “eminently noble”—in On Translating Homer, which, with its call for translation
adequate to the original, attempts to make classicism into a scientific historicism (Arnold,
Complete Prose Works, 1:119).
35
Patrick Brantlinger has distinguished between a positive and a negative classicism, the
former taking a particular cultural moment in the past as a superior model for the present
to emulate, the latter interpreting the present as a disastrous repetition of some earlier
irredeemable age (Brantlinger, Bread and Circuses, 17). While this terminology captures
nicely the shared interest in the past, and specifically antiquity, of nineteenth-century
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course, as the argument of this dissertation makes clear, this does not mean that “antiquity” is something that can be known objectively, provided only the barnacles of classicism
are scraped away. Classicism constructs one image of antiquity; Decadence, another.

2.
As the editors of a recent volume entitled Oscar Wilde and Classical Antiquity note, the
fact that Wilde’s extensive knowledge of and lifelong interest in antiquity was fairly
typical for someone of his class and gender should not obscure what was atypical about
how he used this knowledge, not only in his art but also in his self-understanding and
public self-fashioning.36 It is not surprising, then, that the relationship between Hellenism
and homosexuality should dominate scholarship on Wilde’s engagement with antiquity,
although recent work has given greater attention to the role of the classics in his intellectual and artistic formation.37 The critique of Intentions represents another form of Wilde’s
engagement with the domain of classical historiography, of particular interest here for its
disassociation of historical and aesthetic decadence. As a result of the book’s largely
negative critique and its emphasis on critical rather than artistic principles, however,
Intentions does not provide an extended engagement with the materials of antiquity.
Accordingly, in this section, I turn to a particular anti-classicist use of antiquity in a
classicism and Decadence, it ends up reproducing the value judgment of the historiography of decline, even as it sets out to critique it.
36
Riley, Blanshard, and Manny, Oscar Wilde and Classical Antiquity, 9.
37
For the former, see Dowling, Hellenism and Homosexuality in Victorian Oxford;
Nisbet, Greek Epigram in Reception; Orrells, Classical Culture and Modern Masculinity.
For the latter, see, in addition to the contributions in Oscar Wilde and Classical Antiquity,
Evangelista, British Aestheticism and Ancient Greece (esp. ch. 4); and Ross, Oscar Wilde
and Ancient Greece.
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relatively understudied text by Wilde, his dramatic monologue The Sphinx, which he
started writing while a student at Oxford, but which was not completed until its publication in 1894 in a deluxe limited edition illustrated by Charles Ricketts that has been
called “the quintessentially decadent book of the nineties.”38 Through its aesthetic
arrangement of literary fragments from the ancient world within a narrative of frustrated
desire, The Sphinx exemplifies what I call Decadent antiquarianism.
Readers of The Sphinx consistently note its relentless allusiveness, its “jeweled”
style, and its turbulent eroticism—the erudition, descriptiveness, and perversity canonized by the classicist Nisard and later French writers as the hallmarks of literary decadence. Much scholarly energy has been spent on identifying the poem’s seemingly
endless intertexts, mostly in nineteenth-century French and English literature.39 A second
strand of criticism has focused on the poem’s erotic content, with critics finding a covert
exploration of queer desire coupled with a more explicit presentation of active female
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Kooistra, Artist as Critic, 94.
Murray identifies the primary intertexts in Tennyson’s In Memoriam (from which
Wilde takes the enclosed rhyme scheme), D. G. Rossetti’s “The Burden of Nineveh”
(another museum poem), Baudelaire’s cat poems in Les Fleurs du mal, Gautier’s novel
Mademoiselle de Maupin and his several poems and short stories featuring sphinxes, and
Flaubert’s La Tentation de saint Antoine, which also features a sphinx (Murray, “Some
Problems,” 75–78). Fehr provides a detailed and sensitive discussion of the poem’s
French influences, as well as Swinburne, and also notes some intertexts from Hellenistic
poetry (Fehr, Studien, 179–95). Ross reads the poem alongside Keats’s “Ode on a Grecian Urn” (Ross, Oscar Wilde and Ancient Greece, 76–80); Lennartz notes the similarities with Poe’s “The Raven” (Lennartz, “Oscar Wilde’s ‘The Sphinx,’” 416–17); Praz
and Kooistra read the Sphinx as a femme fatale in the lineage of Pater’s Mona Lisa (Praz,
Romantic Agony, 246–47; Kooistra, Artist as Critic, 106–07); Behrendt identifies a
reference to Luc Olivier Merson’s painting Rest on the Flight into Egypt (Behrendt,
Oscar Wilde, 60); and Boyiopoulos compares the poem with a hallucination of ancient
Egypt in De Quincey’s Confessions (Boyiopoulos, Decadent Image, 66).
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sexuality.40 More recently, however, Kostas Boyiopoulos has undertaken a sustained
reading of the poem that brings together the archaeological and the gemological with the
linguistic and the erotic: “Essentially the Sphinx copulates with the omnium-gatherum of
fragments, gemstones and names.”41 This reading not only locates the poem’s organizing
topos in the eroticization of the artifact but also demonstrates the Decadent insight that
every object of desire is also an objet d’art. Nicholas Frankel takes such an objectoriented reading even further, reading the poem itself as an archaeological relic of
“obdurate materiality.”42 My reading of The Sphinx differs from such arguments in two
ways. Firstly, I read the poem’s accumulation of fragments as an aesthetic technique
aimed at the production of history as atmosphere. Secondly, through a discussion of The
Sphinx’s poetic form in relation to the theme of archaeological collection, I shift the focus
from the poem’s objects onto its subject, whose fragmentation is determined by erotic
displacement. In both cases, I read the poem as a critique of archaeology’s claim to
historical truth and its valorization of objects and objectivity.
Wilde’s dramatic monologue begins in the college room of a student, the speaker
of the poem: “In a dim corner of my room for longer than my fancy thinks | A beautiful
and silent Sphinx has watched me through the shifting gloom” (ll. 1–2).43 He asks her to
tell what she has seen in her life of a thousand centuries: “Fawn at my feet fantastic
40
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Sphinx! and sing me all your memories!” (l. 30). But rather than wait for an answer from
his silent feline roommate, he launches into fantasy, imagining her memories as a jumbled cacophony of the historical and the mythological:
Sing to me of the Jewish maid who wandered with the Holy Child,
And how you led them through the wild, and how they slept beneath your shade.
Sing to me of that odorous green eve when couching by the marge
You heard from Adrian’s gilded barge the laughter of Antinous
And lapped the stream and fed your drouth and watched with hot and hungry stare
The ivory mouth of that rare young slave with his pomegranate mouth!
Sing to me of the labyrinth in which the twy-formed Bull was stalled!
Sing to me of the night you crawled across the Temple’s granite plinth
When through the purple corridors the screaming scarlet Ibis flew
In terror, and a horrid dew dripped from the moaning mandragores (ll. 31–40)
The speaker’s heightened arousal is marked by the shift in questioning that sees the
Sphinx move from voyeur to participant in the fantasized scenes of Egyptian antiquity; if
there was still any doubt, the erotic tenor of his archaeological zeal is made explicit:
“Who were your lovers? who were they who wrestled for you in the dust? | Which was
the vessel of your lust? what leman had you, every day?” (ll. 45–46). Again, the student
answers for the Sphinx, imagining her coupled with all manner of men and women, gods
and goddesses, animals real and fabulous, and even revived mummies, before concluding
that her lover must have been the great god Ammon. The lengthy description of this
divine lover—twenty lines of jeweled panegyrics—exhausts the speaker’s libidinal
energies and he turns against the figure whom he once found so fascinating, rounding off
the poem with a tirade of post-coital misogyny—“Get hence, you loathsome Mystery!
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Hideous animal, get hence! | You wake in me each bestial sense, you make me what I
would not be” (ll. 168–69)—and an ambivalent turn to Christ, who “weeps for every soul
in vain” (l. 174).44 While this narrative of frustrated desire provides the dramatic content,
its relationship to the poem’s engagement with antiquity and to its striking formal characteristics requires unpacking.
If The Sphinx is a collection of antiquities, it is unusual not only in its failure to
rationally organize them as in a museum but also in its making explicit collecting’s
libidinal economy. In Susan Stewart’s well-known theorization, the collection is a form
of the objectification of desire: it removes objects from their original contexts and
reorders them not simply to produce knowledge but also to assimilate them to the identity
of the individual or institutional collector.45 In its survey of the ruins of Egyptian civilization, The Sphinx exhibits a bewildering array of mythological and historical figures from
the ancient Mediterranean yet makes no attempt to order these fragments into a totalizing
historical narrative. Here is a part of the description of Ammon:
On pearl and porphyry pedestalled he was too bright to look upon:
For on his ivory breast there shone the wondrous ocean-emerald,
That mystic moonlit jewel which some diver of the Colchian caves
Had found beneath the blackening waves and carried to the Colchian witch.
44

San Juan is one of the few critics to have commented on the spitefulness of the sudden
turn against the Sphinx, identifying it as the expression of the self-loathing resulting from
the student’s only partially satisfied desires (San Juan, Art of Oscar Wilde, 32).
45
Stewart, On Longing, 151–65. The fact that, in The Picture of Dorian Gray, Dorian
takes up collecting in order to forget the “terrible portrait” hanging in a locked room of
his house (W3:286) underscores the fact that the collection (as Stewart theorizes it) can
only provide a partial image of its collector, and, moreover, illustrates the Wildean
insight about the truth of masks whose tensions are explored in the novel and elsewhere:
“Man is least himself when he talks in his own person. Give him a mask, and he will tell
you the truth” (W4:185).
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Before his gilded galiot ran naked vine-wreathed Corybants,
And lines of swaying elephants knelt down to draw his chariot. (ll. 95–102)
As Boyiopoulos observes, “Wilde unearths archaic and outdated words as if they were
historical ruins.”46 The effect of all this erudition is overwhelming and one can scarcely
read the poem without the explanatory notes of a modern critical edition.47 That such
explanations are, however, beside the point is made clear by the poem’s mythological
syncretism, its willful historical inaccuracy, and even the occasional nonsense: a galiot is
a small boat (the diminutive of “galley”) and so Wilde’s “naked vine-wreathed Corybants” presumably walk on water. The result is a history in which Marc Antony has the
same status as Adonis, Isis, a nereid, a hippopotamus, or hieroglyphs. Such is the flat
ontology of decadent antiquarianism, which collects and arranges objects for their
aesthetic effects rather than for their historical meaning. Accordingly, the curios of The
Sphinx are historical not because they metonymize a lifeworld that can be an object for
knowledge in spite of its pastness; rather, they are historical because they are utterly
bereft of that lifeworld, which no amount of scientific work can recreate. Even so, while
the enumeration of the Sphinx’s lovers is not quite a museum catalog in iambs, its
glittering surface generates an enchanting atmosphere of ancientness: Gagnier considers
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One early anonymous reviewer wrote, “How many of us, I wonder, know the nature of
‘rods of oreichalch’?—but the phrase serves none the less, but doubtless all the more, to
give that sense of mysterious luxury at which Mr. Wilde is aiming” (quoted in Beckson,
Oscar Wilde, 164).
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The Sphinx “the summa of Wilde’s art-as-seduction.”48 And, as Fehr perceptively points
out, while the erudition is ultimately a sham, its effects are calculated and powerful.49
The poem thus instantiates its own museology: the production of historical atmosphere
rather than historical knowledge.50
The Sphinx not only mocks the museum’s self-appointed task of producing
historical truth but exposes its conditions through the erotic figuration of the archaeological collection of antiquities. The description of the pedestalled Ammon reveals that he is
not himself a person but a statue (and so also, one now realizes, might be the Sphinx).
There is an inevitability, then, to the speaker’s retreat from the fantasized scenes of an
ahistorical ancient culture to the disiecta membra in which it is revealed to consist, the
return of fancy to the galleries of the museum and the real history of their installation.
Ten hundred shaven priests did bow to Ammon’s altar day and night,
Ten hundred lamps did wave their light through Ammon’s carven house—and
now
Foul snake and speckled adder with their young ones crawl from stone to stone
For ruined is the house and prone the great rose-marble monolith! (ll. 107–10)
The god is scattered here and there: deep hidden in the windy sand
I saw his giant granite hand still clenched in impotent despair (ll. 115–16).
“Go, seek his fragments,” the speaker urges the Sphinx: “Go, seek them where they lie
alone and from their broken pieces make | Thy bruisèd bedfellow! and wake mad passions in the senseless stone!” (ll. 121–24). Here, the combined allusion to Shelley’s
48
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“Ozymandias” and the myth of Osiris eroticizes archaeology as the impotent reassemblage of the lover’s lost body. For all its dramatization of the corrosive passage of time,
“Ozymandias” is a poem about the creation of historical knowledge out of Romantic
orientalism and archaeology: “I met a traveller from an antique land | Who said—‘Two
vast and trunkless legs of stone / Stand in the desert….’”51 The body of Osiris, recall, was
scattered throughout Egypt by Set then collected, with the exception of the genitals, and
reassembled by Isis. A revealing displacement has occurred: when the homosexual desire
for the godly/kingly body becomes too intense, it is transferred to the female Sphinx, who
also takes over the role of archaeological collector. Not just a displacement but also a
castration: Ammon’s “impotent despair,” Osiris’s unrecovered membrum virile, Ozymadias’s “trunkless legs”—the collected fragments lack the key organ of the phallocentric erotics on which the speaker’s fancy is carried away. The poem, though taking the
museum as the site for the articulation of male homosexual desire à la Winckelmann, also
centers the impotence of that desire in the fragment of “senseless stone.” If the collection
objectifies the collector’s desires, then, in the case of The Sphinx, the image it reflects is
one of frustration, no matter how scintillating the gems of its surface.
Stewart’s theory of the collection as the objectification of desire is intriguingly
consonant with her discussion of poetic form in Poetry and the Fate of the Senses.
Drawing on thinkers of both history and aesthetics, including Vico, Hegel, Marx, and
Nietzsche, Stewart identifies in lyric subjectivity the traces of the mutual conditioning of
poetic form and sensuous consciousness. “The self is objectified,” she writes, “but not
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completed, by the presentation of the form.”52 The desire for the pleasure of form is,
moreover, motivated by the pain of a lack.53 Poetic form, like the collection, objectifies
desire and in doing so produces an image of its maker (though, in either case, never a
complete one). Given that the formal elements of The Sphinx are among its most remarkable—in particular, its adaptation of the In Memoriam stanza and its outlandish rhymes—
it is worth considering how these relate to the Decadent antiquarianism and eroticism
already discussed.
When it was pointed out that The Sphinx takes its rhyme scheme from Tennyson’s
popular elegy, Wilde is supposed to have quipped, “No, it is printed quite differently.”54
Indeed, the transformation of Tennyson’s tetrameter quatrains into couplets of sixteensyllable lines, printed entirely in capitals with minimal punctuation, is not without poetic
effect. The abba rhyme scheme is typographically submerged rather than offset and the
text stretches across the page like a monumental inscription.55 In discussions of In
Memoriam, its form is often characterized as a series of self-enclosed, slow-moving
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fragments.56 The jeweled ornament of The Sphinx moves rapidly in spite of the cumbersome verse-length, but In Memoriam’s terse syntax and “lapidary”57 form is more geological than gemological, disclosing a theory of lyric time as the sedimentary record of
continuity and disruption.58 This difference between the poems is observable in both the
internal structure of the stanzas and their articulation within the whole.59 Where Tennyson almost never uses slant or polysyllabic rhymes, Wilde invents some of the most
outrageous in the language: “hieroglyphs” and “Hippogriffs” (ll. 19–20), “catafalque”
and “Amenalk” (ll. 25–26), “sarcophagus” and “Tragelaphos” (ll. 63–64), and the truly
Byronic “cubits’ span” and “Kurdistan” (ll. 89–90), among many others. These are
always, however, the a rhymes, the rhymes that enclose the stanza and delay onward
movement. In The Sphinx, these elaborate a rhymes throw the attention back into the
jumble of the previous line, making a mockery of Tennyson’s careful stanzaic organization. The rhymes themselves become the disiecta membra of ancient literature, awaiting
recovery and reassembly, displayed according to aesthetic rather than historical principles: hieroglyphs (Egyptian) and hippogriffs (Greek). Rhyme thus figures the sameness
in difference of the collection as the concrete image of self-identification. Or, to paraphrase Simon Jarvis, in the lyric collection that is The Sphinx, the subject hears itself
rhyme.60
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While much has been made of the erotics of In Memoriam, with Christopher Craft
labelling it a “desiring machine,”61 Denise Gigante’s study of the poem is the first to
analyze its eponymous stanza as the mediator between “the hermeneutics of form and the
hermeneutics of desire.”62 Gigante reconstructs the In Memoriam stanza’s invention in
the Renaissance by Ben Jonson as the dismemberment of the Petrarchan sonnet, which
silently repurposes an erotic genre as elegy and anonymizes homosocial desire by universalizing the individual voice in ballad tetrameter.63 In this long rhythmic history, we
might position The Sphinx as the second a rhyme of the In Memoriam stanza, recalling us
to the erotic and lyric origins of the form despite its proximity to the elegiac despair and
balladic impersonality of its canonical Jonsonian and Tennysonian forebears. If, as
Kooistra argues, “The Sphinx parodies In Memoriam’s desire for physical connection
over time and space with the unattainable love object,” then it does so in its very form.64
The excessively long lines that cannot hide the seams of their reconstruction, their
seemingly arbitrary scattering across “the lone and level sands” of the first edition’s
letterpress, the Alexandrianism of the rhymes, and the performed erudition of the allusions—the “desiring machine” that is The Sphinx orders its fragments so that it may
obscure its subject. So if, as Ross argues, The Sphinx is “a warning against allowing
archaeology onto the syllabus,”65 then it is such because it exposes the erotic tensions at
the heart of the discipline. The Sphinx, whose repeated apostrophization in the poem
61
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makes her the embodiment of this tension, becomes the floating signifier of antiquity, the
collector and the collection.

3.
The Sphinx was the second of Wilde’s two illustrated editions de luxe published in 1894;
preceding it by four months was Alfred Douglas’s English translation with illustrations
by Aubrey Beardsley of Wilde’s French play Salomé.66 While both texts are inspired by
French Decadence—Salome and sphinxes are among the movement’s most canonical
feminine figures—and, moreover, create a fantastically stylized image of antiquity,
formally, they are very different.67 Aside from the obvious generic differences between
the one-act Symbolist tragedy of Salomé and the eclectic dramatic monologue cum
museum ode cum love elegy that is The Sphinx, the texts exhibit a stark dissimilarity of
style. On the one hand, as we have seen, The Sphinx piles detail upon detail, creating its
alienating historical effect through an excess of accumulation and juxtaposition, the
symptom of erotic frustration, which threatens, in the more extreme rhymes discussed
above, to fragment and disperse not only its poetic form but language and the lyric
subject itself. On the other hand, Salome alienates through its repetitive, spare, biblical,
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The English Salome (without the acute accent) was published by Elkin Mathews and
John Lane in February 1894 (5:672), one year after their publication of the French
Salomé (W5:351); The Sphinx, by the same publishers in June 1894 (W1:307).
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Pierrot considers the figures of Salomé and the Sphinx to be the most important (along
with Orpheus and Narcissus) in Decadence’s appropriation of antiquity (Pierrot,
L’Imaginaire décadent, 245–50). Both feature memorably, for example, in À rebours,
where they are mediated by contemporary French Decadence: Salomé in the description
of Gustave Moreau’s paintings of 1876, Salomé dansant devant Hérode and L’Apparition
(Huysmans, Against Nature, 44–50), the Sphinx in the performance by Des Esseintes’s
ventriloquist lover of a passage from Flaubert’s La Tentation de saint Antoine (1874)
(ibid., 88–89).
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and ominous language, its syntactical tendency towards “infinite predication,”68 its
enactment of the incommunicability of desire, and its relegation of historical content to
accidentals. The characters’ recurrent, unheeded attempts at describing the moon in
symbolic terms is the leitmotif of this alienation:
HEROD
The moon has a strange look to-night. Has she not a strange look? She is
like a mad woman, a mad woman who is seeking everywhere for lovers.
She is naked too. She is quite naked. The clouds are seeking to clothe her
nakedness, but she will not let them. She shows herself naked in the sky.
She reels through the clouds like a drunken woman. . . . I am sure she is
looking for lovers. . . . Does she not reel like a drunken woman? She is
like a mad woman, is she not?
HERODIAS
No; the moon is like the moon, that is all. (W5:716)
Despite such stylistic and formal differences, however, the texts share not only a common
literary ground in French Decadence, but also a common theme in erotic desire. It is no
surprise, then, that intertextuality along with gender and sexuality comprise a major part
of scholarship on Salome, much as The Sphinx.69 The similarities and differences between
68

San Juan, Art of Oscar Wilde, 114.
Early critics noted the tragedy’s debt to nineteenth-century literature, especially to the
Belgian Symbolist playwright Maurice Maeterlinck, with Mario Praz reading Salome as a
parody of Decadence in its entirety (Praz, The Romantic Agony, 298). In more recent
decades, influential readings, such as those by Regenia Gagnier (Idylls of the Marketplace, 165–70), Elliot Gilbert (“Tumult of Images,” 148–53), Elaine Showalter (Sexual
Anarchy, 151–56) and Linda Zatlin (Aubrey Beardsley and Victorian Sexual Politics, 94–
95), despite their differences, have created a critical consensus in which Salome’s assertion of her sexual desire is understood as a challenge to patriarchal authority, a challenge
that is decisively punished. For a detailed overview of the play’s intertexts and the
scholarly attention given to them, see Joseph Donohue’s impressive editorial introduction
in volume five of the Complete Works (esp. W5:351–412). For a critical genealogy of the
figure of Salome in nineteenth-century literature, see Saladin, Fetishism and Fatal
Women. On Salome as parody, see Powell, Oscar Wilde and the Theatre of the 1890s, ch.
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Wilde’s two illustrated books of 1894 certainly invite comparative study: both represent a
more peripheral, less straightforwardly classical antiquity (Egypt, Judaea) along lines
established by French Decadence, yet in doing so they draw on different generic conventions and stylistic techniques, producing different aesthetic effects and different historical
atmospheres; both, moreover, use historical materials to explore the violence of patriarchy, though in different ways and from different perspectives; finally, as material texts,
they are pushed in different directions by the strikingly innovative designs of Beardsley
and Ricketts, which add their own creative interpretations of script and poem respectively.70 Rather than pursue such a comparative reading here, however, I would like to use
the remainder of this chapter to consider a different set of texts by Beardsley: his illustrations for a translation of Aristophanes’ comedy Lysistrata. The main reason for doing so
is that these works engage and subvert the mainstream of Victorian aesthetics, classicism
and historicism in a more engaged way than Salomé, which, even after its translation,
remains, I would suggest, a “French” text. As controversial as were both The Sphinx and
Salomé, not to mention The Picture of Dorian Gray, arguably none of Wilde’s work up to
his trial for gross indecency in 1895 challenges the standards of Victorian decency to
quite the same extent as Beardsley’s Lysistrata. This moral challenge, crucially, takes the
form of an equally explicit challenge to classicism as the proprietor of Greek antiquity.
Aristophanes’ play was first performed in Athens in 411 BCE but an unbowdlerized English version was not published until Leonard Smithers’s 1896 edition of one
3. Kooistra reads Beardsley’s illustrations as in turn a parody of Wilde’s text (Kooistra,
Artist as Critic, 134–46).
70
On Wilde’s books as material texts, see in particular Frankel, Oscar Wilde’s Decorated
Books.
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hundred copies, containing an unattributed prose translation by Samuel Smith and eight
illustrations by Beardsley.71 The anxieties of a Christian classicism repeatedly confronted
by ancient Greek culture’s seemingly unashamed representation of nudity and sex are
well known: the decorous fig leaves of the Vatican Museums, the untranslated passages
of the early Loeb editions.72 A comedy in which the women of Athens and Sparta conspire, under the leadership of Lysistrata, to forego sex in order to force their husbands to
end the war between the two cities, a plan that ultimately succeeds, was one such challenging text.73 But even if publishing an unexpurgated translation of Lysistrata was a
fraught undertaking in late-Victorian England, the inclusion of Beardsley’s illustrations,
with their giant phalluses and depictions of masturbation (female and male), made
impossible anything other than a very small edition for private circulation. Despite the
salacious content of Beardsley’s Lysistrata drawings, however, Linda Zatlin convincingly
argues against their classification as pornography.74 Unlike the work of contemporaries
such as Frederic Leighton or Félicien Rops (who provided a design for the title page of
the French Salomé), Beardsley not only ridicules masculinity but portrays women as
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Nelson, Publisher to the Decadents, 330. Smith was referred to Smithers by Ernest
Dowson, who declined the commission.
72
Meier-Graefe, moreover, attests to the British Museum keeping the more interesting
sides of its vases turned to the wall and even to the retouching out of “the most delicate
little things” by well-meaning “Kunstpastoren” (Meier-Graefe, Entwickelungsgeschichte,
2:612)
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See Walsh’s survey of Aristophanes’ nineteenth-century English translators in “The
Verbal and the Visual” (esp. 225–26).
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Zatlin, “Félicien Rops and Aubrey Beardsley,” 183–201; for a broader discussion, see
Zatlin, Beardsley, Japonisme, and the Perversion of the Victorian Ideal, 221–230.
Fletcher, by contrast, is unsure, though he also notes the sympathetic portrayal of women
in comparison with Rops (Fletcher, Aubrey Beardsley, 169–72).
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sexually independent and in a way that does not necessarily invite voyeuristic pleasure.75
This is, of course, in keeping with the content of Aristophanes’ play. The question of the
pictures’ pornographic nature has dominated the very limited critical discussion that they
have received, and only recently have they been treated in classical reception studies with
anything more than condescension.76
While the Lysistrata drawings’ challenge to Victorian decency is unrivalled, even
in Beardsley’s work, the focus on their explicit eroticism has obscured their relation to a
major cultural current of the time. The illustrations participate, I suggest, in the varied
reassessments of classical antiquity, in particular, ancient Greece, that took place in the
late nineteenth century. Nietzsche’s explosion of Winckelmannian Hellenism in The
Birth of Tragedy (1872) may be the most famous of these reassessments, but in England
the classical image of the Greeks was put under just as much pressure by Pater’s own
attempt to recover the Dionysian in Greek Studies (1895), Symonds’s work on the history
of same-sex desire in Studies of the Greek Poets (1873) and A Problem in Greek Ethics
(1883), and, of course, in Wilde’s appropriations of antiquity in Intentions, The Sphinx,
and Salomé, among other works, not to mention in his trials.77 For these authors, to
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“Unlike Rops, Beardsley chooses not to collude with the lewd purchaser” (Zatlin,
“Félicien Rops and Aubrey Beardsley,” 187).
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Walsh’s illuminating appraisal of the illustrations in the context of Aristophanes’
Victorian reception reveals much about the relationship between text and image (Walsh,
“The Verbal and the Visual,” 231–38).
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For discussion of Pater and Symonds in the context of a classicism largely determined
by Winckelmann and Arnold, see Evangelista, “Towards the Fin de Siècle.” Symonds’s A
Problem in Greek Ethics is reprinted in Brady, John Addington Symonds and Homosexuality, 39–121. For Wilde’s literary and extra-literary uses of Hellenism, including his
invocation of “Greek love” while on trial, see Evangelista, British Aestheticism and
Ancient Greece, ch. 4. For a more general discussion, see Dowling, Hellenism and
Homosexuality; and Eribon, Insult and the Making of the Gay Self (esp. part 2).
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reimagine antiquity as unclassical makes possible a radical break with a repressive
cultural tradition that nevertheless maintains a connection with history and, moreover,
promises not only sexual liberation but an entirely new form of life. As Zatlin has shown,
Beardsley shares several of these concerns; moreover, like Wilde (but unlike Nietzsche,
Pater, or Symonds), Beardsley’s attack on classicism is all the more devastating for its
lightheartedness. My goal in this section is to show the way in which Beardsley achieves
this through the Lysistrata pictures.
Among the eclectic influences upon Beardsley’s distinctive drawing style—most
obviously, Pre-Raphaelite design, Japanese woodblock prints, rococo fashion—two of his
earliest appraisers, Robert Ross and Julius Meier-Graefe, give particular importance to
the collection of Greek vases at the British Museum. Ross attributes the development of
Beardsley’s style between his first major commission—the designs, clearly influenced by
Burne-Jones and Morris, for J. M. Dent’s edition of Thomas Malory’s Le Morte Darthur
(1893–1894)—and his second—the famous drawings for Salome—to the careful study of
this collection, along with a visit to Whistler’s orientalist Peacock Room.78 Meier-Graefe
is even more emphatic, deeming Greece the most decisive influence on Beardsley’s style,
even if not the most obvious, and detecting in his presentation and arrangement of
figures—and, especially, his use of line—the influence of fifth-century-BCE Athenian
red-figure painters such as Brygos and Douris, whose work is included in the British
Museum; he particularly singles out Douris’ psykter depicting the revels of bearded
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Ross, Aubrey Beardsley, 45.
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satyrs, still housed there (Figure 4.1).79 In the Lysistrata drawings, for example, the
influence of Greek vase-painting can be seen in the consistent lack, relatively uncommon
in Beardsley’s work, of a background to the figures. More recent accounts of Beardsley’s
artistic formation have tended to stress the strong influence of Japanese art and its reception in fin-de-siècle orientalism, even when acknowledging the importance of antiquity.80
Yet even so, the image of Beardsley among the Grecian urns is indeed an intriguing one.
My interest, however, lies not in what Beardsley does with the techniques of classical art
gleaned in the British Museum but, rather, in what he does to the concept of the classical
that has its material basis in such collections. In more general terms, I am interested in
how the eclectic components of Beardsley’s art change each other when incorporated into
a work: Beardsley’s illustrations stage the encounter between his various influences. The
pastiche of red-figure pottery, Japanese prints, rococo fashion, and contemporary French
painting may look a lot like “the play of random stylistic allusion,”81 but I want to
suggest that, rather than being blank parody, Beardsley’s work has a strong critical
motivation.
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Meier-Graefe, Entwickelungsgeschichte der modernen Kunst, 2:611–13. Writing
slightly later, MacFall, though he does not discuss Lysistrata, dubs 1894 Beardsley’s
“Greek Vase Phase,” his account of which appears to be largely plagiarized from MeierGraefe (MacFall, Aubrey Beardsley, 114).
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See, for example, Fletcher, Aubrey Beardsley, 18; Warren, Art Nouveau and the
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Figure 4.1.
Douris, Red-figured psykter, ca. 500–470 BCE
British Museum, London
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The drawing from Lysistrata in which this eclectic encounter is most manifest is
Cinesias Entreating Myrrhina to Coition (Figure 4.2).82 The scene illustrated is from an
episode about two thirds of the way through the play in which Cinesias comes to the
Athenian Acropolis, which the women have seized, with a conspicuous erection (ἔστυκα,
l. 869)—as Lysistrata wryly observes, “writhing in Aphrodite’s love-grip [ὀργίοις]”
(l. 832)—and desperately begs his wife Myrrhina for sex.83 Lysistrata instructs Myrrhina
to tease Cinesias until he agrees to seek peace with Sparta; she does so then runs back
into the Acropolis, leaving him unsatisfied. Beardsley’s depiction of the moment at which
Myrrhina flees Cinesias departs from the text (his usual practice) in so far as there
Cinesias does not pursue his wife but is rather left waiting unwittingly as she sneaks back
into the fortress.84 While, unlike Myrrhina, Cinesias is ridiculous in the drawing, Beardsley’s narrative embellishment underscores the violence of the patriarchal institution of
conjugal right. Zatlin, however, in keeping with her general interpretation of Beardsley’s
work, emphasizes the picture’s portrayal of Myrrhina’s sexual independence: she notes
the allusion to Rops in Myrrhina’s thigh-high stocking, for example, but argues that
Myrrhina is unlike Rops’s Parisian sex-workers in being “neither seductive nor yielding.”
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Zatlin, Aubrey Beardsley, vol. 2, no. 1037. Further references to Beardsley’s drawings
will be made parenthetically in the text, citing the number as provided in Zatlin’s Aubrey
Beardsley: A Catologue Raisonné, which has superseded Reade’s Beardsley.
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Smith, Lysistrata, 41. In addition to the Smith translation illustrated by Beardsley, I
have consulted the Greek text edited by Henderson and Halliwell’s English verse translation, which is generally more accurate than Smith’s. Line numbers refer to the Greek text.
It should be noted that Victorian conventions for the transliteration of Greek differ from
those currently in use: in recent editions, the names of these two characters are usually
spelled “Kinesias” and “Myrrhine.” Here, I use the names as they appear in Smith’s
translation.
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Warren suggests Beardsley may have been influenced by the 1892 Lysistrata of the
French playwright Maurice Donnay, with whose work he was familiar (Warren, Art
Nouveau and the Classical Tradition, 134).
204

Importantly, for Zatlin, this attitude is also reflected outwards from the picture: “While
Aristophanes’ Myrrhina denies Cinesias sexual pleasure, Beardsley’s Myrrhina refuses to
give herself to the viewer. She expresses amusement, not invitation.”85 While I take
Zatlin’s point, I also think there is more to this picture. To begin with, there is not only
the sexual violence mentioned above but also its racialization. Though Cinesias’s oversized erect phallus may be influenced more by Japanese erotic prints than Greek vases,
his face is that of a satyr and his clothing a parody of dix-huitième fashion. Myrrhina, by
contrast, wears a Japanesque gown, which Snodgrass rightly identifies as the picture’s
visual focus,86 and a vaguely orientalist hairstyle. The picture thus invites an allegorical
reading cued by a Saidian theory of orientalism: the violent claim to ownership by a
masculinized West of a feminized East. Even so, while I would not want to gloss over the
sexual violence of the picture or to reduce Beardsley’s orientalism to a matter of form
and technique, I also believe that to end the analysis here would be to fail to account for
the picture’s irony and its relation both to the other drawings in the series and to Aristophanes’ text.
I want to think historically about this picture and to keep in mind that it is illustrating a text from classical Athens (remember, Cinesias and Myrrhina are Greeks!) that
nevertheless had in the nineteenth century a problematic position in the classical canon, a
position which Beardsley illustrates. Cinesias’s rococo outfit with its towering headdress
parodies a style that is already a self-parody, a style associated in the Victorian period
with the moral and aesthetic excesses of a less democratic era, and a style that imagined
85
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itself in continuity with classical antiquity (hence eighteenth-century French “classicism”
and English “neoclassicism”) until corrected by Winckelmann and Goethe. Cinesias,
whose name in Greek suggests both the sexual act and personal volatility, thus stands for
a ridiculous classicism that pursues its object with uncontrollable lust (Myrrhina’s name
means “myrtle,” a plant sacred to Aphrodite and a Greek euphemism for the female
genitals). Indeed, the illustration inverts some of the expected binaries: Myrrhina is
strong and rational, Cinesias weak and animal. If Cinesias’s rococofication brings the
bawdiness of the Greek vase closer to the Victorian period, then Myrrhina’s Ropsian
stocking makes it absolutely contemporary. But, at the same time, the central object of
the Japanesque gown constitutes an orientalization of the classical that makes a mockery
of classicism’s project of historical assimilation. What we have here is not quite the
historicism of Teufelsdröckh’s “Philosophy of Clothes” in Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus,
even less a Rezeptionsästhetik of accumulated interpretations. Yes, the meaning of
antiquity changes over time depending on how it is dressed, but, crucially, antiquity does
not dress itself. As a way of looking at the past, the eclectic and idiosyncratic dress of
Decadence brings difference into focus rather than smoothing it out.
Once attuned to it, we find the problematization of classicism to be a consistent
element in the Lysistrata illustrations. Cinesias Entreating Myrrhina to Coition is slightly
unusual in the set because of its conspicuous inclusion of an obviously orientalist object,
the gown, and because it is the closest Beardsley gets to portraying sexual intercourse.
This combination makes it one of the more challenging pictures to interpret. As Zatlin’s
work makes clear, the theme from the play that interests Beardsley the most is the sexual
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autonomy of the women, which is depicted in Lysistrata Shielding Her Coynte (no.
1032), The Toilet of Lampito (no. 1033), Lysistrata Haranguing the Athenian Women (no.
1034), and Two Athenian Women in Distress (no. 1036, Figure 4.3), all of which depict or
suggest masturbation. (The first two of these four also treat the play’s theme of the
relationship between erotic love and peace.) Here the positive representation of masturbation, which at the time was still widely regarded as immoral and unhealthy, not only
explicitly figures sexual autonomy in a direct confrontation to mainstream Victorian
morals and gender ideals, but also suggests that the serious study of the past (recall
Beardsley’s hours in the British Museum) can be a pleasure that one gives to oneself, free
from the apparatus of classicism. In Lysistrata Defending the Acropolis (no. 1035; Figure
4.4), then, antiquity is defended against a curmudgeonly classicism with the excrement of
the unruly female bodies that it refuses to countenance. The final two illustrations in the
set are also the only ones to focus on male figures. In The Examination of the Herald (no.
1038; Figure 4.5), a wizened, half-flaccid Athenian magistrate inspects the enormous
genitals of the Spartan herald, who appears indifferent to the magistrate’s curiosity.87
This could be a homophobic caricature of an impotent Hellenism unable to admit the
secret of its fascination with what it sees as a virile pagan antiquity unembarrassed by its
sexuality. But, if so, the three figures in The Lacedaemonian Ambassadors (no. 1039;
87

This scene directly follows that of Cinesias and Myrrhina; where Beardsley’s illustration follows Smith’s translation in representing the magistrate as an unnamed new
character—the “Committee-man”—scholars now take him to be Cinesias, still suffering,
like the Spartan herald, under the burden of a constant erection (Henderson, Lysistrata,
185). The play does suggest, however, that the Spartan’s burden is particularly conspicuous: Cinesias asks whether he is Conisalos (l. 982), “A Priapeian deity, with erect mentule” (Smith, Lysistrata, 48), and, if not, why he is carrying a large spear (δόρυ) (l. 985;
see also Henderson, Lysistrata, 186).
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Figure 4.6) present the ridiculousness of homosocial homophobia and its affective habitus
of frustration and awkwardness, and so reassert the vanity and discomfort of a straight
classicism unable to countenance ancient eroticism.
Beyond ridiculing classicism, what do Beardsley’s drawings do to our idea of the
Greeks? As an aesthetic mode and as a way of relating to the past, classicism simply
cannot represent Lysistrata’s theatrical sexuality. Beardsley’s illustrations, by contrast,
allow us to see the Greeks, certainly not as they saw themselves, but in a way that realizes something of the truth of Aristophanes’ bawdy comedy and that, more importantly for
my purposes, involves both alienation and identification. These Greeks are not Victorians—that much is obvious—they are too foreign, too untimely. Beardsley’s pastiche of
styles—his rococofication and orientalization of classical Athenian culture—is the source
of the illustrations’ continued effect, forcing us to see the gulf between us and the Greeks
that classicism cannot. In Said’s classic definition, orientalism is a form of knowledge/
power that produces the Orient as the conceptual other upon which the West depends for
its identity.88 While I do not mean to suggest that Beardsley transcends this discourse, his
deployment of an orientalist aesthetic upon the very culture that is supposed to have
founded and to continue to guarantee the terms of the West’s dominance over the East
constitutes a radical critique whose result is an alienation of the West from itself. The
rococo works similarly, though in this case the effect is more explicitly historical. It was
in the nineteenth century that fashion first gained its incredible power to mark its novelty
and thus its historicity through the citation of the old.89 As Walter Benjamin aphoristical88
89
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See Lehmann’s Tigersprung, in particular his reflections on mode and modernité.
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ly puts it, “Fashion is the eternal recurrence of the new.”90 Accordingly, it is only a linear
historiography that would see Beardsley’s rococo Greeks as a simple inversion of Marx’s
famous picture of the French Revolution draping itself in the clothes of Rome.91 For
Beardsley’s purposes, the rococo is “a past charged with the time of the now,” just as
Rome was for Robespierre,92 and so contains a revolutionary kernel. In alienating the
Greeks from Victorian classicism, Beardsley opens the way for new articulations of the
relationship between modernity and antiquity, which, as relational concepts, will themselves be changed in the process. Moreover, the estrangement of the West from itself
leads us to a question that has so far only been hinted at in this dissertation: If aesthetics
provides the means for reconceiving modes of historical relation as modes of subjectivation, what happens to the European subject when it is separated from what it understands
to be its history? For Beardsley, this would be an exciting opportunity to rewrite that
history. For those Victorians that left Europe for Britain’s colonies, however, it presented
an altogether different challenge, but one which aesthetics could nevertheless be called
upon to answer.
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Figure 4.2.
Aubrey Beardsley, Cinesias Entreating Myrrhina to Coition, 1896
Victoria and Albert Museum, London
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Figure 4.3.
Aubrey Beardsley, Two Athenian Women in Distress, 1896
Victoria and Albert Museum, London
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Figure 4.4.
Aubrey Beardsley, Lysistrata Defending the Acropolis, 1896
Victoria and Albert Museum, London
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Figure 4.5.
Aubrey Beardsley, The Examination of the Herald, 1896
Victoria and Albert Museum, London
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Figure 4.6.
Aubrey Beardsley, The Lacedaemonian Ambassadors, 1896
Victoria and Albert Museum, London
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Coda
Victorian Aesthetics in the Settler Colony:
Marcus Clarke’s Weird Melancholy

When Marcus Clarke arrived in the boom-town of Melbourne in 1863, having been
forced by family circumstances to emigrate at the age of seventeen, the city itself was less
than thirty years old. And yet, following the discovery of gold in the colony of Victoria in
1851, it had become the largest city in the Australian colonies and reputedly one of the
richest in the world; it already had a university, a museum, a public library, an imposing
parliament house, railways, telegraph lines, and its own Royal Society. After a failed
attempt at becoming a pastoralist, Clarke made a living writing for the stage and the
press, to which he contributed reviews, feuilletons, and the occasional poem. He became
known, however, for his panoramic descriptions of Melbourne life inspired by Charles
Dickens, Victor Hugo, and Honoré de Balzac that presented the colonial city, in phantasmagoric prose, as a metropolis equal to those of modern Europe.1 In 1870 he took
employment as a clerk at the Melbourne Public Library and began reading archival
material from the early days of British colonialism in Australia, particularly accounts of
the penal colonies in New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land (known as Tasmania

1

See McCann, Marcus Clarke’s Bohemia, ch. 1.
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from 1855). These researches resulted in short historical pieces, selections of which were
gathered in Old Stories from a Young Country (1871); a textbook for schools, History of
the Continent of Australia and the Island of Tasmania (1877); and, most importantly, his
historical novel of transportation and penal colonialism, His Natural Life (serialized
1870–1872; substantially revised 1874), whose events take place between 1827 and 1846.
When these historical writings, both fiction and non-fiction, are juxtaposed with Clarke’s
evocative descriptions of a metropolitan, colonial modernity seemingly without a past,
the former’s representation of a regime that was all but over, and which no doubt was
barely imaginable to those accustomed to shopping in Melbourne’s arcades or socializing
in its coffee palaces, marks a difference characteristic of the historical consciousness that
conditions historical fiction (’tis so many years since).2 Clarke concludes his account of
the arrival of the first convicts in 1788, for example, with a banal but thoroughly selfconscious reminder of the contrast between past and present: “Looking back—while a
boy yells latest Sydney telegrams under my window—from the new story of 1871 to this
old story of 1788, it seemed worth the retelling.”3 On the one hand, as Michael Wilding
notes, it is his exploration of this consciousness in its international context that makes
Clarke so important to Australian literary history, and which differentiates him from the
more nationalistic literature of the turn of the century with its insistent Australiana.4 Yet,
on the other hand, as Maya Boutaghou argues, His Natural Life is remarkable as a
2
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historical novel of the recent past because it explores what it is like to live in modernity
in the absence of history, or more precisely, to inhabit the space between the history of
form and the non-history of place, the antinomy that she sees as constitutive of settler
Australian identity.5 Historical consciousness, with all its emphasis on particularity and
subject-formation, is thus in tension with the aesthetic experience of an environment that
appears to a European subject to be stubbornly unhistorical and so resistant to the practices of identification that we have seen in the foregoing chapters. Much of Clarke’s work
attempts not only to represent this tension in lived experience but also to theorize it
aesthetically.
Nowhere is this theorization more apparent than in the preface Clarke wrote for
an 1876 memorial edition of his friend Adam Lindsay Gordon’s book of poems Sea
Spray and Smoke Drift.6 In contrast to Clarke, few now read Gordon; yet he was once
regarded as one of Australia’s preeminent poets, a fact attested to by the bust installed in
Westminster Abbey in 1934. Reviewing a collected edition of Gordon’s poems published
in London in 1888 (an edition that also includes Clarke’s preface), Oscar Wilde made
what would become a common criticism of Gordon’s work: “There is very little of
Australia in Gordon’s poetry. His heart and mind and fancy were always preoccupied
with memories and dreams of England and such culture as England gave him. He owed
nothing to the land of his adoption” (W7:187). Though generally unimpressed by Gordon
(“steeped in Swinburne, and bewildered with Browning” (W7:188)), Wilde deems
Clarke’s preface, from which he quotes liberally, “most curious and suggestive”: “Here,
5
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Boutaghou, Occidentalismes, 339.
Gordon emigrated to Australia in 1853 and committed suicide in Melbourne in 1870.
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certainly, is new material for the poet, here is a land that is waiting for its singer”
(W7:190, 191). As Wilde saw, the preface, which says little about Gordon’s medievalist
and equestrian verse, is remarkable for its exploration of the conditions of an Australian
literature to come. It begins by invoking an aesthetic historicism familiar to us from the
work of Ruskin and Eliot:
In historic Europe, where every rood of ground is hallowed in legend and
in song, the least imaginative can find food for sad and sweet reflection.
[…] Soothed, saddened, and cheered by turns, we partake the varied
moods which belong not so much to ourselves as to the dead men who in
old days sung, suffered, or conquered in the scenes which we survey. But
this our native or adopted land has no past, no story. No poet speaks to us.7
Unlike Ruskin, however, Clarke believes that it is possible to have a pleasurable aesthetic
experience in a landscape without historical and literary associations. “The dominant note
of Australian scenery,” Clarke famously writes, is “that which is the dominant note of
Edgar Allan Poe’s poetry—Weird Melancholy” (v). He continues: “The Australian
mountain forests are funereal, secret, stern. Their solitude is desolation. […] The very
animal life of these frowning hills is either grotesque or ghostly. […] All is fear inspiring
and gloomy” (v). What human presence there is falls into the same aesthetic categories:
“From a corner of the silent forest rises a dismal chant, and around a fire, dance natives
painted like skeletons” (v). Aboriginal society is thus invoked in order to deny it historicity and project it into the realm of nature. However, this realm, though it does not
appear historical to European historical consciousness, is not, for that consciousness,
absolutely timeless. Australian nature is terrifying because it is primordial:
7

Clarke, “Preface,” iv–v. Further citations will be made parenthetically.
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The lonely horseman riding between the moonlight and the day sees vast
shadows creeping across the shelterless and silent plains, hears strange
noises in the primeval forest where flourishes a vegetation long dead in
other lands, and feels, despite his fortune, that the trim utilitarian
civilisation which bred him shrinks into insignificance beside the
contemptuous grandeur of forest and ranges coeval with an age in which
European scientists have cradled his own race. (vi)
Even without cultural associations, then, Australian nature is able to produce for Clarke
the effect of historicity, but only out of its negation—the prehistoric—whose affectiveaesthetic corollary is “weird melancholy.” Herein lies the particularity of Australia for
European historical consciousness: “In Australia alone is to be found the Grotesque, the
Weird, the strange scribblings of Nature learning how to write” (vi). Clarke’s aesthetics
thus projects human history back into a natural, ahistorical domain where it is ironized
and rendered grotesque.
If there is a discrepancy between Clarke’s prose poem on the Poesque atmospherics of Australian nature and the poetry of Gordon, whose work is generally more sentimental than grotesque and, as Wilde noted, seems to bear few traces of the place in which
it was written, then this may be because a large part of the preface was rehashed from two
earlier pieces of writing.8 In 1875, Clarke edited Photographs of Pictures in the National
Gallery, Melbourne, a book to which he also contributed the text. About half the text of
the preface to Gordon originates in that accompanying two landscapes depicting locations
in the colony of Victoria: Nicholas Chevalier’s The Buffalo Ranges (1864; Figure 5.1)

8

Hergenhan, “Marcus Clarke and the Australian Landscape,” 32.
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Figure 5.1
Nicholas Chevalier, The Buffalo Ranges (1864)
National Gallery of Victoria, Melbourne

and Louis Buvelot’s Waterpool near Coleraine (1869; Figure 5.2).9 In many ways, both
works typify the combination of Romanticism and realism characteristic of much midnineteenth-century Western painting (the Düsseldorf School, the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood, the Hudson River School). But their similarities end there. Chevalier’s painting,
typically for him, juxtaposes sublime and picturesque elements (the snow-capped mount-

9

Chevalier was born in Russia and worked in Australia and New Zealand during the
1850s and 1860s. Buvelot, considered an important figure in the history of Australian art,
emigrated to Melbourne from Switzerland in 1865, where he worked until his death in
1888.
220

Figure 5.2
Louis Buvelot, Waterpool near Coleraine (1869)
National Gallery of Victoria, Melbourne

ains, the bullock dray, the mill) using a northern European palette, with only the stand of
eucalyptus trees of the painting’s middle ground confirming the Australian setting. But
the sublimity, as Clarke points out, belongs not to the hunched mountains but to the
vastness of the forest whose unfamiliar inhabitants, unlike the family of settlers, elude
representation. Buvelot’s painting, by contrast, is both more naturalistic and more pastoral. However, in eschewing the sublime and picturesque motifs of Chevalier, Buvelot
does not substitute the meticulous, almost scientific, naturalism of an Eugen von Guérard
(the most prominent landscape painter then working in Australia) but rather something
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akin to the grotesque atmosphere that Clarke attempts to capture in his ecphrasis,
achieved by a hypercolor chiaroscuro and the trees’ writhing branches. Buvelot’s pastoralized Australia is uncanny, its cattle and ducks overwhelmed by the dramatically back-lit
eucalyptus trees (probably river red gums). Human presence appears at first marked only
by an ax and mallet, apparently abandoned in the middle of chopping a log that lies open
and bloody like a slaughtered animal. But if we look across the pond and into the distance, there stands, in a field, a tiny, ghostly human figure, his back to the viewer, arms
crossed, watching the sunset. What both paintings finally point to—though Buvelot’s to a
greater extent, as a result of its eschewal, or, in the case of the human figure, minimization almost to the point of disappearance, of Romantic conventions—is the unsettled and
unsettling affect of settler colonialism in Australia.
Andrew McCann has provided a compelling reading of the “colonial uncanny” at
work in Clarke’s writing, in common with much nineteenth-century Australian literature
and, as we have just seen, painting, too. According to this reading, the Aboriginal presence is experienced by Europeans in Australia as uncanny because it represents an
atavistic return of the repressed—the “prehistoric.” This presence is not erased but rather
sublimated into the environment, creating an animistic image of the bush made available
to aesthetic experience as a threatening but pleasurable weird melancholy.10 Clarke’s
Australian aesthetic is thus conditioned by an encounter with a cultural other assumed, as
in the well-known analysis of Johannes Fabian, to belong to a prior moment in time,11 an
other who is then, as postcolonial scholars have long argued, violently appropriated into
10

McCann, Marcus Clarke’s Bohemia, 172–74.
This is the “denial of coevalness” that Fabian calls “allochronism” (Fabian, Time and
the Other, 32).
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the essentially Eurocentric realm of historiography.12 But Clarke’s empty bush and
dancing skeletons sublimate not just a presence but an absence, or at least a projected
one: “The presumed vanishing of Aboriginal peoples and cultures was, more often than
not, the precondition for the circulation of uncanny affect.”13 During the first few decades
of the colonization of Victoria, which one historian judges to have been “one of the
fastest land occupations in the history of empires,” thousands of Aborigines were killed
by disease or warfare, and by the time Clarke arrived in Melbourne, the colony’s Indigenous population was reduced by over eighty per cent.14 In the second half of the century,
the fact of genocide was habitually sublimated into poeticisms about a dying race and
quasi-Darwinian claims of evolutionary inevitability.15 In a passage from the text accompanying Buvelot’s painting and not carried over to the Gordon preface, Clarke reads the
two large eucalyptus trees as memorializing the country’s Aboriginal people:
The time-worn gums shadowing the melancholy water tinged with the
light of fast-dying day seem fit emblems of the departed grandeur of the
wilderness, and may appear to poetic fancy to uprear in the still evening a
monument of the glories of that barbaric empire upon whose ruins the
ever-restless European has founded his new kingdom. Glorified for a last
instant by the warm rays of the sinking sun, the lonely trees droop and
shiver as though in expectation of the chill night which will soon fall alike
12

For example, Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe; Trouillot, Silencing the Past;
Young, White Mythologies. Hayden White has made a similar point about history’s
constitutive distinction between the historical and the unhistorical in the human past
(White, The Content of the Form, 56).
13
McCann, Marcus Clarke’s Bohemia, 180.
14
Broome, Aboriginal Victorians, 54, 90–93. Recent accounts of the colonization of the
Port Phillip District (as the area around Melbourne was known) include Attwood’s
Possession and Boyce’s 1835.
15
As Patrick Brantlinger shows in Dark Vanishings, the trope of the dying race is characteristic of Anglophone settler colonies in the second half of the nineteenth century,
common to North America, the South Pacific, Australia, and South Africa.
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on the land they have surveyed so long and the memory of the savage
people who once possessed it.16
Here, nature becomes the observer, perhaps even the archive, of a history that Europeans
have been unable to fully enjoy and identify with due to their destructive role in it. Clarke
could not be more explicit: his aesthetic of weird melancholy inscribes history—
specifically, the history of European colonialism—into the Australian landscape, just as
Poe’s, its citational source, encodes the problems of antebellum U.S. imperialism.17
According to this reading, then, weird melancholy names an aesthetic of colonial genocide.
How does Clarke’s project relate to the aesthetic treatments of historical experience and subjectivity discussed in the chapters above? To begin with, the inclusion here
of Clarke and the two paintings he describes alerts us to an obvious point: as a canonical
formation, Victorian aesthetics appears to be overwhelmingly concerned with experiences in and of the imperial center. Clarke’s work, by contrast, explores the results of its
forcible, or, at best, reluctant (exile is a common theme in Clarke’s work), transportation
to an antipodean settler colony. The expansion of Victorian aesthetics into Australia
creates problems both for the representation of landscape, as we have seen, and, more
importantly, for the European subject that wishes to understand its historicity in relation
16

Quoted in Hergenhan, “Marcus Clarke and the Australian Landscape,” 40.
Kennedy, Strange Nation, 72. Since Toni Morrison’s Playing in the Dark (1992), Poe
has occupied an important place in the history of the discourse of race in the United
States (see in particular the volume edited by Kennedy and Weissberg, Romancing the
Shadow). Recent work that addresses the place of U.S. imperialism and Native Americans in Poe’s work includes Chacón, “Prosthetic Colonialism”; Karafilis, “American
Racial Dystopia”; and Rowe, “Edgar Allan Poe’s Imperial Fantasy and the American
Frontier.”
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to that landscape. In Clarke’s work, a lack of historical association in aesthetic experience
empties the subject of historical content and ironizes habitual forms of historicism, thus
challenging the very fundamentals of historical self-formation that aesthetics promises.
Clarke was an enthusiastic reader of Ruskin and Pater and we can detect in his work also
the attention to the sensuous richness and temporal complexity of experience in the
present18; but in attempting to make that experience into one of historical identification,
form and content are revealed as incommensurate. Where, for Morris, the future promises
a return, however uncanny, to the aesthetic forms of the past, for Clarke there will be no
return. And, finally, while Wilde and Beardsley’s orientalism is clearly a product of
European imperialism, forms of aesthetic appropriation like lyric collection struggle to
take hold of an object that is experienced as unhistorical. In contrast to the modes of
historical relation that we have encountered previously—such as contrast, continuity,
revival, recurrence, or juxtaposition—in the Victorian settler colonial context, the relationship to history is one of displacement. This in itself may seem fairly obvious. What is
interesting about Clarke, however, is his insistent attempts to transform this historical
displacement, along with the encounter of historical consciousness with that which is
determined in advance as ahistorical, into an aesthetics equally capable of producing a
historical subject.
Accordingly, it is this subjectivity, and not the characterization of landscape, that
is crucial. In Clarke’s work, the positive relation to a negated object (history/
18

Cyril Hopkins, the brother of Gerard Manley Hopkins, was a close, lifelong friend of
Clarke’s, and his only regular English correspondent after his emigration. Hopkins wrote
a biography of Clarke after his death and attests there to his wide reading, which ranged
from Dickens, E. T. A. Hoffmann, and George Augustus Sala to Kant, Ralph Waldo
Emerson, and Ernest Renan (Hopkins, Marcus Clarke, 29, 88, 138, 208).
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colonialism/genocide) produces a subject who bears the traces of that negation. In this
case, aesthetics is what makes colonial subjectivity representable and therefore available
as a site of identification. Accordingly, as with authors like Pater and Morris, Clarke’s
problem is ultimately an ethical and a political one about the relation of the self to a
historicized world: How is one to live in weird melancholy? This is what Clarke is really
asking, though his ambivalent text struggles for an answer. Even so, if the “one” in
question here is coterminous with Clarke’s subject position—and I think the logic of this
relation to history requires that the subject be the one who profits from the history of
colonial violence—then my reading of his text already suggests an answer: one can only
live in weird melancholy through the erasure and negation that condition it. Clarke’s
ambivalence stems from the fact that he cannot see beyond imperial ideology. From the
perspective of its critique, however, the aesthetic mode of historical relation and selfformation that produces weird melancholy cannot provide its own ethical solution
without perpetuating violence. Weird melancholy thereby becomes an aesthetic articulation of the feeling of being unable to be ethical, a salve for its own subject.
The significance of Clarke’s work and its context lies not simply in its incorporation of new territory or a new kind of subject into aesthetic discourse—its aesthetic
imperialism, as it were. More importantly, turning here to the settler colony changes the
way we see Victorian aesthetics: it appears no longer just as a discourse about Europe’s
relations to itself, but one also about its relations to others. That the formation of modern
European identities is constituted by exclusion, whether in aesthetics or historiography,
and moreover that these epistemic exclusions are the superstructural corollaries of real
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imperialist violence, is now a well-known critique. Yet it strikes me that we do not yet
know the full meaning of this critique for the discourse of Victorian aesthetics that is
typically located in places like London and Oxford. If Australia seems an unlikely
destination for a dissertation about Victorian aesthetics, then this is because the latter’s
Eurocentrism is so often reflected in our discussions of it. The ultimate context for
Victorian aesthetics, I contend, is the British Empire. While Australia cannot stand in for
the Empire as a whole, nor even, despite some important discursive continuities, for all of
Britain’s settler colonies (and, indeed, whether the Australian colonies themselves
collectively constitute a unified historical experience in the nineteenth century is itself not
assured), even so, these displaced but doubly Victorian texts prompt us to reconceptualize
Victorian aesthetics with a wider lens. They moreover reveal the stakes and conditions of
possibility for Victorian aesthetics that have thus far been less evident. Accordingly, we
are now in a position to ask questions that may not have occurred to us before: To what
extent was the Gothic Revival a reaction to colonial, rather than just industrial, modes of
production? In what ways do aesthetic practices of memory or of taking pleasure in the
experience of the historical present prepare the British subject for colonial contexts? How
do Decadent critiques of historicism change the relationship between the imperial center
and its periphery? While the answers to these questions will have to wait for another day,
I hope that in asking them the image we have of Victorian aesthetics and the ways in
which it produces historically conscious subjects will already start to change.
My readers will no doubt be able to see several reasons for why such a transformation might be important. The reason that matters most for present purposes, however,
227

lies at the heart of what this dissertation is about: it marks the beginning of a different
mode of relation between the past and the present. Victorian aesthetics, with its appreciation for non-linear temporalities, invites us to consider what our understanding of
Clarke’s work and its realignment of Victorian aesthetic discourse means for the present.
If aesthetics were simply a question of artistic representation, then it might suffice to read
Clarke’s weird melancholy as ecphrastic imperialism, the horrifying aestheticization of
genocide. That it is so bears repeating. But to finish there would be to leave weird melancholy to the Victorians, as though it were just another fixture in one of their overdecorated drawing rooms. We are concerned here not merely with the question of what
kind of currency an aesthetic of weird melancholy might still have for Australians (or, for
that matter, Americans), but, rather, with a reappraisal of the conditions of aesthetics and
the meaning of Victorian culture more generally. Western aesthetics has for a long time
sublimated or simply ignored its history. But I am convinced that the problems of Victorian aesthetics concern the twenty-first century as much as the nineteenth. And so, if
aesthetics is still essentially what it was for the Victorians whose work is discussed in this
dissertation, from Ruskin through to Wilde and Clarke—namely, a way of problematizing the historicity of subjectivity—then it also provides a way of thinking critically and
creatively about historical relation. It reminds us that history should never be easy, and
that the feelings of closeness and distance (along with their many affective complications) that we experience in our encounters with the past are not the effects of something
external to ourselves but rather the feeling of subjectivity itself.
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